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The ultimate objective of artificial intelligence is to develop intelligent agents that can think and
act rationally. In intelligent systems, agents rarely exist in isolation, but instead form part of a
larger group of agents all sharing the same (or similar) goals. As such, a population of agents
needs to be able to reach an agreement about the state of the world efficiently and accurately,
and in a distributed manner, so that they can then make collective decisions.
In this thesis we attempt to exploit vagueness in natural language so as to allow agents to be
more effective in forming consensus. In classical logic, a proposition can be either true or false,
which inevitably leads to situations in which agents that disagree about the truth of a proposition
cannot resolve their inconsistencies in an intuitive manner. By adopting an intermediate truth
state in cases where there is direct conflict between the beliefs of agents (i.e. where one believes
the proposition to be true, and the other believes it to be false), we can combine the beliefs of
agents in order to form consensus. We can then repeat this process across the population by
forming consensus between agents in an iterative manner, until the population converges to a
single, shared belief. This forms the basis of our initial model. We then extend this model of
consensus for vague beliefs to take account of epistemic uncertainty. After demonstrating strong
convergence properties of both models, we apply our work to a swarm of 400 Kilobot robots,
and study the resulting convergence in such a setting. Finally, we propose a model of consensus
in which agents attempt to reach an agreement about a set of compound sentences, rather than
just a set of propositional variables.
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“I think vagueness is very much more important in the theory of knowledge than you
would judge it to be from the writings of most people. Everything is vague to a degree
you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise, and everything precise is
so remote from everything that we normally think, that you cannot for a moment
suppose that is what we really mean when we say what we think.”
— Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918-19)
In the same lecture series from which the quote above is taken, Bertrand Russell states
that he wishes he would have been able to spend the time to learn more about the concept of
vagueness1. One of the oldest and most well-known studies of vagueness relates to the sôritês
paradox, and is attributed to the Greek philosopher Eubulides [77, pp. 11] in 4th century BCE.
The paradox is as follows: you are presented with what you would define to be a heap of sand,
and agree to the proposed assumption that the removal of a single grain of sand does not cause
the heap of sand to no longer be a heap. In other words, that the difference between a heap of
sand and a non-heap cannot be a single grain of sand. Then, by this admission, the repeated
process of removing sand from the heap, a single grain at a time, could never render the heap to
become a non-heap. Of course, it cannot be the case that a single grain of sand corresponds to
be a heap, nor can two grains of sand. Then, at what point would the removal of a grain of sand
change the heap to a non-heap? This fundamental question remains as relevant today as it was
over 2 000 years ago, as vagueness is inherent in natural language, and is prevalent in the way
in which we communicate with one another. Indeed, vagueness appears to be an inextricable
part of conversation, writing, and even science and mathematics. Vagueness is so pervasive in
language that ‘even when artificial languages such as Esperanto are created and taught, little is
done to clarify the meaning of vague expressions’ [77, pp. 9]. One question, therefore, is why?
Why is this seemingly suboptimal form of language so unavoidable when we communicate with
one another? Shouldn’t society have advanced so as to eliminate this apparent inefficiency? The
1Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Lecture 1: ‘Facts and Propositions’. The Monist,
495-509. Oct 1918. https://users.drew.edu/jlenz/br-logical-atomism1.html
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answer seems to be ‘perhaps not’, but the reasons for this are much more complex than might
first be expected. In fact, [53] proposes that vagueness is actually an unfortunate side-effect of
the empirical way in which we learn language. Specifically, O’Connor suggests that vagueness is
a side-effect of our ability to generalise learnt behaviour to similar situations. This is indirectly
supported by the unpublished work of Lipman [47] who argues that vagueness is sub-optimal if
considered in the context of signalling games [46].
The ubiquity of vagueness might suggest, however, that it is useful in some way, and that it
has a beneficial role to play in language. Indeed, there are several arguments to support this.
In contrast to Lipman’s claim that vagueness is sub-optimal for single-sender signalling games,
Lawry and James [43] show that vagueness is in fact advantageous when aggregating signals from
multiple senders in the same context. Similarly, van Deemter [76] supports the more general
argument that vagueness plays a positive role in a number of communication scenarios where
the meaning of an expression cannot be assumed to be agreed upon. That is to say, definitions
vary between individuals and so the use of a vague expression can enable others to understand
its meaning without a precise definition being agreed upon. Another possible use of vagueness in
language is in risk management. Lawry and Tang [44] suggest that the use of vague expressions
are particularly helpful in mitigating the risk of making a promise which cannot be kept or a
forecast which turns out to be wrong (e.g. in weather forecasts). More specifically, the authors
demonstrate how vagueness can be exploited to minimise risk and maximise gain in multi-agent
dialogues. The intuition is that the presence of borderline cases allows agents to make more
flexible assertions in the presence of uncertainty. This point is further supported in [76] where
it is argued that the risk of incurring costs (e.g. loss of trust in weather forecaster, programme,
broadcaster etc.) is significantly reduced by making a vague assertion over making a more precise
assertion, should such an assertion prove to be incorrect.
In this thesis, we argue that vagueness is useful in another way, by allowing agents to reach
consensus when they are in conflict with one another. When two agents attempt to reach
an agreement, they must find a way of resolving inconsistencies between their beliefs in order
to achieve consensus. Here we define consensus to mean an agreement between both agents
regarding a shared set of propositions, such that they both adopt the same resulting belief.
This belief is formed by merging the beliefs of both agents and resolving any inconsistencies by
adopting an intermediate truth state. In classical logic, where propositions are Boolean such
that they are either true or false, there is no obvious way to resolve conflict between two opposing
viewpoints. However, a feature of vague concepts is that they admit borderline cases, and so
we can utilise vagueness as a means of resolving conflicting beliefs by having the agents weaken
their beliefs by adopting a more vague interpretation of the underlying concept. Borderline
cases are neither true nor false, but explicitly borderline meaning that they do not fully satisfy a
proposition nor its negation. We use Kleene’s strong three-valued logic to model these borderline
cases, where the third truth value represents ‘borderline true/false’. While there are different
possible theories of vagueness, from supervaluationism [25, 68] to many-valued logics (including
fuzzy logic [82]), we adopt a three-valued approach to model explicitly borderline cases only,
and do not consider ‘higher-order’ vagueness or multiple truth values as in fuzzy logic. The
primary reason being that an intermediate truth value representing ‘borderline’ is intuitive from
2
a representational standpoint, and it provides a natural way in which conflicting agents can
‘meet-in-the-middle’. Further discussions on the practicality of valuations as a representation of
borderline cases, as well as arguments in opposition of representing higher-order statements as
part of the underlying language, can be found in [44].
Consensus formation is an important part of distributed decision-making and negotiation
scenarios. In human societies, for example, beliefs do not exist in isolation but inform and
influence our decisions and actions. In this context is is unreasonable for individuals to only
base their beliefs on first-hand experience. Instead, individuals rely on others to share and
disseminate their beliefs so that they can make the most informed decisions given limited time
and resources. This results in a dependent population, sharing beliefs between one another and,
in doing so, also requiring the ability to differentiate inaccurate or erroneous information from
trustworthy sources.
In artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, we encounter scenarios in which systems of agents,
or swarms of robots, need to make distributed decisions. In intelligent systems, individual agents
usually coexist as part of a larger group and exploit their ability to communicate with one
another in order to disseminate and aggregate knowledge from multiple sources. This is crucial
in any decision-making process. Examples include sensor networks [57] with applications in
environmental and industrial monitoring e.g. air pollution monitoring, earthquake detection,
nuclear detonation detection etc. Autonomous vehicles are another example where groups of
vehicles (agents) are able to communicate with one another in order to share information and to
update their beliefs about the world, such that they are best able to select the most efficient route
to their destination. The need to maintain accurate and up-to-date information is particularly
necessary in order to achieve desired behaviour, given that acting upon inaccurate information
(i.e. an inaccurate view of the current state of the world) may lead to undesired consequences
e.g. vehicles taking heavily congested routes. In robotics, a slightly different set of constraints
are placed on the individuals of the system. These could be a need to be fast and efficient
in time-critical applications, robust to the presence of noise or erroneous behaviour, and often
the process needs to be decentralised (i.e. distributed across the population, merging to form a
consensus across the swarm) due to communication often being restricted or unreliable resulting
from the limited hardware capabilities of robotic systems, or possibly environmental factors.
One such example is collective motion, or ‘flocking’, in which agents must continuously select
and distribute a shared direction of motion [30, 52, 71].
We intend to show that introducing a third truth value to consensus formation allows agents
to avoid Boolean inconsistencies when combining their beliefs. By having agents adopt an inter-
mediate truth value when there is a direct conflict of opinions regarding a proposition, they are
able to reach a compromise where there would otherwise be no obvious and intuitive method
of resolving a Boolean inconsistency without relying on the toss of a coin (a model we study in
comparison to our proposed three-valued approach). Then, by combining agents’ beliefs such
that all agents involved in the consensus formation process (typically pairs of agents) adopt the
same resulting belief, we can achieve population-wide consensus in a distributed manner where
all agents ultimately share the same opinion. We will also show that when we combine consensus
formation with evidential updating, agents are more effective at disseminating direct evidence
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compared with evidential updating alone, without any form of agent communication. Addition-
ally, we propose that adopting a third truth value for the consensus process is more robust than
its Boolean counter-part. In particular, we show that an intermediate truth state improves the
robustness of the distributed decision-making process to the presence of malfunctioning agents.
We go on to suggest that this approach may also be robust to other kinds of error, such as noisy
sensors or malicious interference.
1.2 Background
In this section, we introduce a number of key concepts relevant to the research described in
this thesis. In particular we discuss vagueness as it relates to our use of three-valued logic
and the explicit representation of borderline cases. Then, we discuss the concept of limiting





Figure 1.1: A depiction of truth-gaps allowing borderline cases in the definition of short.
Vagueness. A concept is said to be vague if it admits borderline cases i.e. where the
proposition is neither absolutely true nor absolutely false [37], and where explicitly borderline
cases are inherent to propositions involving vague concepts such as ‘tall’, ‘young’ and ‘red’.
This is depicted more clearly in Figure 1.1. Consider the following example: A search and
rescue operation is taking place in a region following an earthquake. For this operation, a
number of areas within the region have been identified as having been severely affected by the
earthquake, which now require operatives to enter these areas in order to attempt to extract
injured and trapped civilians. To do so, operatives must identify whether an area is considered
to be ‘accessible’ (referring to their ability to enter the affected area safely). It is possible that
a person, P1, believes that ‘the area is accessible’ (i.e. that the proposition ‘is accessible’ is true
with respect to the area being considered). The concept accessible, however, admits borderline
cases such that the area may be neither absolutely accessible nor absolutely not accessible, but
may instead be considered borderline. This is consistent with Parikh’s [55] view that a sentence
is absolutely true if it can be uncontroversially asserted, while a sentence being not absolutely
false means that it is acceptable to assert.
It is important to emphasise here that vagueness is not meant to capture epistemic uncer-
tainty. It is entirely possible for a person to believe that a proposition is borderline true with
absolute certainty. Instead, it is helpful to think of vagueness and its relation to uncertainty in
terms of conditioning: If we are informed that an area is ‘borderline accessible’, we learn that the
safety level associated with the access of the area lies within the truth-gap between absolutely
not accessible and absolutely accessible (i.e. that there is a fair amount of risk associated with
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entering the area). This is in contrast to being told that the area’s accessibility is unknown
from which we learn nothing. That is, being told that the area is ‘borderline accessible’ is not a
precise description of the levels of safety concerning the area’s access, but it does provide addi-
tional information than we would otherwise receive upon being told that the area’s accessibility
is unknown.
The use of Kleene logic as a representation of vagueness has been argued on the basis that
its use as a logic of uncertainty tends to overestimate the level of uncertainty that one might
possess. For example, suppose an operative possesses a belief in {0, 12 , 1}
2 about the accessibility
of two areas a1, a2 ∈ {0, 1}, where the value 12 denotes that the actual truth value of a proposition
is unknown. Supposing that the operative believes (12 , 1), to be interpreted as ‘a1 is unknown’
and ‘a2 is accessible’. Then it is clear that the operative is uncertain about whether a1 is true
or false, but that they are certain a2 is true (i.e. that (a1, a2) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 1)}). Similarly, any
belief in {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} corresponds to an operative’s complete certainty regarding
the truth values of both a1 and a2. However, supposing instead that the operative believes
(12 ,
1










{(0, 1), (1, 0)},
{(0, 0), (1, 1)},
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)},
{(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)},
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
By using Kleene logic as a logic of uncertainty, we would interpret the belief (12 ,
1
2) as representing
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, the set of maximal uncertainty. Yet, the operative’s belief could be
representative of any of the above sets of possible beliefs, where some are more or less certain
than others. Comparatively, if the third truth value represents a borderline state, as is the
interpretation when using Kleene logic as a logic of vagueness, then the operative’s belief does
not represent a state of uncertainty regarding which truth value is assigned to each proposition,
but that each proposition simply has a truth value of 12 , where it is considered to be borderline
true/false. A more detailed analysis of the difference between these two possible interpretations
of adopting a third truth state, representing borderline in this case, is given by Ciucci, Dubois
and Lawry [10]. Lawry gives a more detailed discussion on the relationship between vagueness
and uncertainty in [40].
Consensus. Throughout this thesis we will seek to form consensus between populations of
agents. However, the term consensus is itself rather vague. It is therefore necessary to describe
the properties of the kind of consensus that we are attempting to reach, and to compare those
properties with other kinds of consensus that may be desirable in other approaches. Specifically,
we define consensus by the following properties:
• Precision, where the resulting belief is completely precise (i.e. non vague, or Boolean);
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• Certainty, such that the population converges to a single belief.
The first property ensures that the agents are completely precise in their beliefs such that
they are able to come to a distinct decision about each proposition being either true or false.
In the aforementioned search and rescue application, agents need to come to a firm decision
whether an area is accessible or not, as to be vague is to risk indecision, and the operatives
involved need to be unanimous in their agreement about whether an area is safe or unsafe.
The second property means that the agents have converged to a single belief; that is, every
agent in the population has adopted the same belief with complete certainty. In combination
with the property of precision, having converged on a single precise and certain belief, the
population of agents is said to have reached a unanimous decision; to have achieved consensus.
Alternatively, some applications might require a different set of properties, such as:
• Preservation of vague beliefs;
• Convergence to a set of uncertain beliefs;
• A combination of the two, where beliefs can be both vague and uncertain.
These properties may well be useful for a variety of different scenarios, for example if you wish
to deploy a swarm of robots for a similar search and rescue operation, you may want the robots
to assign themselves to different areas depending on different features as mentioned earlier,
including population density and time-sensitive accessibility, without the need for operatives
to manage their resources manually. In such a scenario, it might be useful to allocate robots
probabilistically based on their uncertain beliefs, such that they might choose to visit one area
with probability 0.8 (an area believed to be highly accessible), while visiting a second area with
probability 0.2 (an area believed to be fairly inaccessible). By allocating robots in this way, areas
that are considered less safe are still allocated search and rescue resources, but the majority of
the operation’s resources are focussed on highly accessible areas. However, this extends beyond
the initial problem of consensus and into task allocation, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
We assume instead that the process of task allocation, in this example, would follow from the
population having already reached a consensus about the propositions that form the basis of





Figure 1.2: A depiction of bounded confidence where agents’ opinions are some real number, and each
agent defines their own symmetric confidence interval.
Agent interaction. In the Hegselmann-Krause model [31], the notion of ‘bounded con-
fidence’ was introduced in order to limit agents to only interacting with other agents whose
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opinions differ by less than some distance, defined as a confidence interval, from their own opin-
ion. Essentially, each agent ai in the population has an opinion oi ∈ R, usually restricted to the
interval [0, 1] or [−1, 1]. An agent then defines a threshold value εi ≥ 0 such that, for any agent
aj with opinion oj , agent aj influences the opinion of agent ai if |oi − oj | ≤ εi (see [31] for further
details). We can think of this bounded confidence as the uncertainty of an agent in their own
opinion, such that a larger interval is indicative of the agent being uncertain of their opinion,
and so is willing to allow differing opinions to influence them. Conversely, a very certain agent
would have a small confidence interval such that they will only be influenced by those agents
with very similar opinions to their own.
Figure 1.2 shows an example of three agents: a1, a2, and a3. Each agent’s opinon is rep-
resented by a black dot on the real number line, and also a symmetric confidence interval
surrounding this opinion. In this example, a1 is influenced by a2, and a2 by a1, because each
agent’s opinion is contained within the confidence interval of the other agent. Neither a1 nor a2
are influenced by a3, but a3 is influenced by both a1 and a2, due to a3 having a larger confidence
interval than either of the other two agents. Notice that it is not always the case that if an agent





Figure 1.3: A depiction of bounded confidence where agents’ opinions are some real number, and each
agent defines their own asymmetric confidence interval.
Alternatively, in Figure 1.3 we see that the three agents possess asymmetric confidence
intervals. In this example, a1 is influenced by both a2 and a3, but both a2 and a3 have confidence
intervals that are too small to be influenced by the opinions of other agents. In this example, an
agent ai would define both a lower and upper confidence interval, denoted εi and εi, respectively.
Then ai is influenced by aj if oj ∈ [oi − εi, oi + εi].
The notion of bounded confidence is important in the opinion dynamics literature because it
allows the set of influencing agents to change over time, such that an agent might update their
opinions based on a dynamic set of agents over the course of a simulation experiment. This was
not the case in earlier models of opinion pooling, where an agent’s set of influencers remained
unchanged. This is discussed in more detail in Section 1.3.
Around the same time that Hegselmann and Krause introduced bounded confidence [31],
related approaches proposed a global threshold adopted by the population [17, 80], rather than
having each agent define their own levels of confidence in their opinions. In addition, the notion
of relative agreement [18] was proposed as an extension of the bounded confidence model. In this
extension, instead of an agent’s confidence interval simply determining which opinions would
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influence them, the extent of the overlapping of agents’ confidence intervals would also determine
the extent to which those agents influenced one another. This is a natural generalisation of
bounded confidence in that we no longer have a binary relation determining whether or not
an agent is influenced by another. Instead, the level of influence is directly related to the
degree to which agents overlap confidence intervals. One benefit of this kind of approach is that
agents can assign individual weights to other agents, and that these weights can be based on
the similarity of their opinions, as opposed to some a priori knowledge. This kind of model,
however, is limited to opinions represented as real values and does not directly apply to the
logical approach taken in this thesis. Nevertheless, the approach is an important step towards
achieving intuitive combinations of opinions in a multi-agent system.
In this thesis, we adopt our own version of bounded confidence, based on an inconsistency
thresold described in Chapter 2. This is similar to bounded confidence in that a pair of agents
are either consistent according to some definition, in which case they go on to form consensus
by combining their opinions, or they are not. Unlike in the model of relative agreement, our
representation of opinions as truth assignments on some logical propositions means that the
extent to which a pair of agents are consistent with one another does not influence the outcome
of the consensus process between them. Agents combine their opinions in such a way that they
both adopt the same, minimally altered opinion so as to become consistent with one another;
their relative inconsistency only determines whether they attempt to reach consensus or not.
1.3 Related work
Opinion dynamics. A number of models for consensus have been proposed in the literature
which have influenced the research described in this thesis. In some cases these are more directly
comparable to our models for consensus, while others focus on an approach known as ‘opinion
pooling’ where agents aggregate the opinions of other agents in the population. Opinion pooling
dates back to the works of Stone [69], DeGroot [19] and Lehrer [45], with more extensive work on
opinion pooling by Genest et al. [26, 27]. DeGroot introduced a model for reaching a consensus
by iteratively aggregating a weighted (typically linear) combination of the opinions of the entire
population until an agreement is reached. In such a model, agents assign a weight distribution
to the population before forming a new opinion. By applying their assigned weights to the other
agents’ opinions, an agent can control the influence that others have on their own opinions.
Of course, when the weights are non-uniform it is assumed that agents possess a priori
knowledge about the trustworthiness or expertise of the other agents in relation to the proposi-
tions concerned. This is difficult to justify outside of very specific scenarios, and in multi-agent
systems it is often assumed that all agents begin with equally valid opinions until individuals
receive further information (e.g. through forming consensus with other agents, or by directly
sensing information) and adjust their opinions (both about the world and about one another)
accordingly. Another assumption made in opinion pooling is that agents have the ability to
communicate simultaneously with every other agent in the population. With the exception of
physical systems where spatial constraints are placed on individuals, such as in robotics, it is
unrealistic to model the dynamics of opinions in this way, given the volume of differing opinions
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that must be aggregated. As we have already discussed, this is typically achieved by means
of weighted averaging, but more meaningful forms of agreement should be preferred, even at
the cost of slower convergence due to limiting the number of opinions being aggregated at each
iteration.
While opinion pooling typically refers to the aggregation of a large number of opinions (i.e.
the entire population) at each iteration, the term opinion dynamics more generally refers to the
study of an iterative process in which agents revise their opinions based on the opinions of other
agents, and possibly other sources of information i.e. sensory information or external knowledge
from experts). One of the most well known models of opinion dynamics is the Hegselmann-
Krause model of bounded confidence [31], in which an agent updates their belief by averaging
the opinions of only those other agents whose opinions do not differ from their own by more
than a certain confidence level. This notion of bounded confidence has been adapted to other
models of opinion dynamics, such as a model in which agents are Bayesian decision makers
and bounded confidence is applied to agents’ prior probabilities [78]. In [32], several opinion
pooling functions are studied under bounded confidence, with axiomatic characterisations of the
different operators given in [20, 21].
An alternative to opinion pooling was proposed by Deffuant et al. in [17], in which the authors
sought to avoid the aggregation of opinions across the population. Instead, the proposed model
selected pairs of agents at random from the population, with each agent then adjusting their
opinion relative to the opinion of the other, provided that they were sufficiently similar according
to some predefined threshold. Of course, this is close to the model of bounded confidence, except
that agents update their opinions in a pairwise manner; an approach we adopt throughout this
thesis. Then, in [18] the authors proposed an extension of bounded confidence, in which the
extent to which an agent modifies their opinion so as to be more similar to the opinion of another
agent depends on the amount of overlap between their confidence intervals.
It is worth noting here that the same assumption made in models of opinion pooling is
also made in the previously mentioned models of opinion dynamics. These models assume
that all agents have some pre-existing notion of confidence; either in other agents, for which a
unique weight is assigned to each, or in themselves, such that an individual confidence interval
is declared. This creates a neighbourhood around each agent in the opinion space, similar to
that of a social network in which those of similar opinions are connected and may interact,
dependent upon the level of confidence each individual has in their own opinion. Instead, we
prefer to assume that all agents are initialised with equally valid opinions. Then, when we
introduce the notion of an inconsistency threshold to limit agent interactions to those pairs of
agents whose opinions are sufficiently similar, the same threshold is applied to all of the agents
in the population.
Three-valued approaches. In the opinion dynamics literature, there is considerable diver-
sity in regards to the representation of opinions. In opinion pooling, models typically represent
opinions as probability distributions defined over some underlying parameter, but often this
parameter is not explicitly defined beyond some abstract parameter space, as in [19]. More gen-
erally, representations in opinion dynamics are much more varied with many opting to represent
opinions as bounded real values, usually either in the range [0, 1] or [−1, 1] (see [17] and [18],
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respectively). A number of more relevant studies exploit a third truth state to aid convergence
of the system [1, 6, 16, 79]. A common motivation is that, when a population contains minority
groups of highly opinionated individuals, resolving conflict between these groups requires an
intermediate state for agents to transition more gradually between the more polarised states; a
form of ‘middle ground’. This is perhaps more relevant to discrete representations of opinions,
in contrast to bounded real values, where an intermediate state between two polarised opinions
does not already exist i.e. for binary opinions in {0, 1}, and similarly when opinions are truth
assignments in {true, false} on a (set of) propositional variable(s). A clear example of this is
given by de la Lama et al. [16], in which agents are in either one of three states: A, B, or I, where
A and B are states in which an agent is supporting either ‘party A’ or ‘party B’, respectively.
State I then indicates that an agent is undecided. Agents in support of either party A or party
B do not interact across parties, but instead interact with agents in the undecided state, where
there exists a non-zero probability of each agent spontaneously switching from one party to the
undecided state, and vice versa i.e. A I or B  I. Clearly the high-level intuition behind this
intermediate state is directly related to our proposed adoption of a third truth value, despite
the differences between the underlying models. In [79], Vazquez and Redner consider a similar
model of ‘leftists’ and ‘rightists’ which do not interact, except through a the third group referred
to as ‘centrists’.
Perhaps less directly related is the work of Balenzuela et al. [1], who present a model in
which agent opinions are represented as real values in [−1, 1], similar to the relative agreement
model [18]. However, in [1], the third truth state is defined by applying a partitioning threshold
to the underlying real value. In this model, updating takes place iteratively between pairs of
agents, where the magnitude and sign of the increments depends on the current truth states
of the agents involved. Cho and Swami [6] adopt a model of beliefs based on Dempster-Shafer
functions, essentially combining probability with a three-valued truth model. However, the
consensus operator [36] used by Cho and Swami is quite different from the consensus operator
described in Chapter 3 [41] and therefore results in rather different limiting behaviour, where
the former consensus operator can only be applied in the presence of uncertainty. This model
also employs iterative pairwise interactions in order for the population to converge towards
consensus.
Modelling approach. We have highlighted several approaches to modelling consensus in
the literature, some of which relate directly to our own approach. For example, while we men-
tioned how some models of opinion dynamics have opted for classical methods of aggregating
opinions across the population, we described several models favouring iterative pairwise interac-
tions between agents. In our approach we adopt a pairwise model of combining agents’ opinions
as in [1, 17, 18, 79]. We also propose our own method of limiting agent interactions related
to the concepts of bounded confidence and relative agreement (see [31] and [18], respectively),
and study the effect of this restriction on agent interactions. Our approach is most similar to
that of Deffuant et al. [17] and Weisbuch et al. [80] in that a global threshold is set for the
population. By varying an inconsistency threshold, we can study varying levels of connectivity
in the population, ranging from those in which only very similar opinions can interact and form
consensus, to a completely connected graph in which all agents can interact with any other agent
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in the population. In Chapter 2, we present results on how this threshold affects the overall
convergence of a population of agents.
We adopt a propositional logic setting (specifically, using Kleene’s strong three-valued logic),
but unlike in the works of Cholvy [7, 8] and Grandi et al. [29] on propositional opinion diffu-
sion which consider opinion aggregation, we assume pairwise agent interactions. In particular,
Cholvy [7] models opinions as propositional formulae, such that if an agent has the opinion
(Can 2026 ∨ Norway 2026) ∧ acroski, then the agent believes that either Canada or Norway
will host the 2026 Winter Olympics, and that there will be acroski trials. In Chapters 2 and 3,
we assume a uniform distribution of truth values for each propositional variable, and that they
are mutually independent. This necessarily differs in Chapters 4 and 5 due to the intended
applications, where in Chapter 5 we model opinions as compound sentences, but these are still
represented in terms of the underlying Kleene valuations on the propositional variables.
The consensus operator studied this thesis was first proposed by Lawry and Dubois [41] as an
extension of the approach of Perron et al. [57], who examined the binary consensus problem on
complete graphs in the single propositional variable case. The authors assumed unconstrained
random interactions between individuals, and showed that extending both signalling and mem-
ory of individuals from two states to three dramatically improved the reliability and speed of
convergence to a single shared Boolean opinion. In [13] we extended the operator of [57] to
languages with multiple propositions. In [41], Lawry and Dubois studied the logical properties
of this operator in greater depth, and also compared it to several other opinion combination
operators highlighted in Chapter 2. The authors then extended the operators to take account of
probabilistic uncertainty, which forms the basis of the model applied in Chapter 3. Indeed, the
work of [41] has yet to be studied (to our knowledge) in a multi-agent setting until our recent
work in [12], to be presented in greater detail in Chapter 3.
1.4 Contributions and outline
In this thesis we develop models of consensus for multi-agent systems and swarm robotics. In
particular, we develop symmetric and asymmetric models of consensus for large populations of
agents which are attempting to reach an agreement about a shared set of relevant propositions.
We define consensus to mean where the population of agents has converged to a single shared
viewpoint about the propositions, and where ‘convergence’ simply implies a significant reduction
in the number of unique opinions in the population.
In this chapter we have introduced several areas of active research related to the general topic
of consensus modelling, and we have given some background information and motivation for this
thesis, supported by relevant work from the literature. We have discussed more thoroughly those
works which have played an important role in sparking ideas and laying a foundation on which
we have developed our own approaches, as well as those which attempt to answer the same
questions but from rather different perspectives.
In Chapter 2 we explore a symmetric model of consensus in a propositional logic setting. We
examine relatively large populations of agents (up to 1 000) in which agents’ beliefs are modelled
as truth-valuations on propositional variables and where they combine their beliefs in pairs, such
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that each agent adopts the resulting combination and is therefore said to have formed a pairwise
consensus. Subsequently we introduce a feedback mechanism whereby agents receive a ‘payoff’
reflecting the quality of their current beliefs, and use this to bias the agent-selection process in
favour of agents with more accurate beliefs according to the payoff model. The intuition is that
this payoff model reflects the true state of the world and agents are more likely to be selected
to combine their beliefs with other agents if their opinions are closer to the truth. In order to
generalise this approach to consensus, we investigate group models in which small subsets of
the population are selected to combine their beliefs, with the intention being that increasing
the number of agents involved in the consensus process should improve the speed at which the
population converges on a single shared belief. As population sizes increase, so too does the time
required for the population to reach a consensus, due to the nature of the iterative, pairwise
process. By moving to groups of agents, we seek to circumvent this limitation. The first part of
this chapter is based on the model presented in [13] with expansions to explain several aspects
of the model in greater detail, as well as further discussions regarding the effects of increased
population sizes and how the model for group-wide consensus performs as a proposed solution.
In Chapter 3 we combine the three-valued propositional logic approach introduced in Chap-
ter 2 with a probabilistic model of uncertainty. Here, beliefs exhibit both vagueness and un-
certainty, and in this extended context we consider whether the addition of the third truth
value continues to play a beneficial role in the process of consensus formation in multi-agent
systems. The contents of this chapter are based entirely on the work presented in [12] which is
an extension of [13].
In Chapter 4 we investigate a different consensus scenario involving asymmetric belief-
updating and inspired by biological systems of quorum sensing [48, 66]. We describe a model in
which the population is divided into two sub-groups of agents: those in a disseminating state
and those in an updating state. This model is applied to the ‘best-of-n’ problem [56, 75], a
popular decision problem in swarm robotics in which the system must decide which is the best
of n possible options, where each option is associated with a perceived quality. Initially we run
experiments in a simulation environment for a swarm of simulated Kilobots, before implementing
our approach on a Kilobot swarm consisting of 400 robots. The contents of this chapter are
based on the three-valued ‘voter model’ presented in [15], a proposed extension of the ‘weighted
voter model’ [73] with improved robustness characteristics.
In Chapter 5 we explore how the three-valued model introduced in Chapter 2 can be
extended to simulations in which the agents in the population are required to reach consensus
about a set of compound sentences, rather than just about the propositional variables. Agents
combine their truth assignments on a small set of sentences, and then adjust their underlying
valuations on the propositional variables so as to remain consistent with their higher-level beliefs.
We present two models for compound sentence consensus, and discuss some preliminary results
obtained for both. This chapter is an extension of the work presented in [14].
Finally, in Chapter 6 we give some conclusions identifying remaining challenges and discuss
possible future avenues of research.
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CHAPTER 2
A Three-Valued Model for Consensus
In this chapter we aim to exploit vagueness as a feature of natural language for consensus and
apply this in a multi-agent setting. Typically, agents reason about propositions which are either
true or false, and this reflects an entirely precise world in which truth-gaps do not exist and
opinions are completely Boolean. Instead, we introduce a third truth value to represent the
borderline cases inherent to vague concepts where propositions can instead be either true, false
or borderline. Rather than simply being a more realist model of opinions, though, this third
truth value also provides a means for agents to reach consensus by adopting a ‘middle-ground’
for propositions about which their opinions are inconsistent. Such an approach is natural in the
presence of a third truth value but is not easy to achieve effectively when restricted to Boolean
propositions. This is also an important part of reasoning intelligently and acting rationally
amongst other agents in a system, where your opinions do not exist in isolation and your actions
have consequences that affect others that exist in the world.
Initially, we introduce a model for representing opinions which can be vague (but aren’t
necessarily so) and a consensus operator which is applied between a pair of agents in order to
merge their opinions. This operator allows even directly conflicting agents to form consensus by
first resolving any inconsistencies via adoption of the third truth value. Here we are assuming
that differences in opinions stem from differences in the ways in which each agent defines the
underlying concepts and, more specifically, the boundary definitions for absolutely true and
absolutely false; a separation between these two boundaries then indicates a truth-gap which we
exploit to form consensus. We propose to model consensus as a pairwise interaction between two
agents where the consensus operator is applied and both agents adopt the same resulting opinion,
repeating this process between pairs of randomly selected agents for a fixed number of iterations
or until consensus is reached. We opt to explore the use of a threshold parameter which limits
agent interactions to pairs with sufficiently similar opinions and how this affects the convergence
of the population. We then explore the idea of there being a ‘true’ state of the world which is
unknown to the agents. By biasing the agent selection process via the weighting of an agent’s
probability of being selected, based on the accuracy or ‘quality’ of their opinions, we show that
the three-valued consensus model outperforms a Boolean model in driving convergence of agents’
opinions towards the opinion which reflects the true state of the world. Finally, we explore an
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alternative model in which, instead of pairs of agents, small groups are selected and consensus
is applied iteratively between all consistent pairs in order to produce a probability distribution
over the propositional variables. Each agent then adopts a new opinion generated from their
resulting probability distribution which may differ from that of other agents in the group. While
this is not consensus as we define it, this method should still allow us to increase the number
of agents involved in the updating process with the intention being to achieve convergence to a
smaller set of opinions in a shorter amount of time than is possible with pairwise interactions.
2.1 Related work
Early work on consensus formation appeared in the early 1960s and 1970s in the field of ‘opinion
pooling’ [19, 69] where each agent aggregates beliefs across the entire population at each time
step according to an agent’s predefined distribution of weightings. In these models, beliefs
are often represented by probability distributions on some underlying variable, which is rather
different from the approach we take in this chapter, but nevertheless remains relevant to the
general idea of consensus in large agent populations.
More recent approaches, however, look to model realistic interactions in which individuals do
not assign static weights to others in the population [17, 18, 31, 32, 80]. Instead, these models
of ‘opinion dynamics’ seek a more intuitive form of consensus in which individuals combine their
beliefs only if they are sufficiently similar, and in some models they do so in a more distributed,
pairwise manner [17, 18], repeating this process across the population until convergence occurs.
Although these approaches still model agent opinions differently to our own, they form the basis
of the model presented herein; more specifically, the way in which agents interact amongst the
population is heavily inspired by [17]. We explore a method of limiting agent interactions in this
chapter which is heavily inspired by bounded confidence [31] but does not influence the extent
to which agents modify their beliefs as in [18]. Furthermore, these models do not assume some
a priori knowledge about every agent in the population in order to assign weights as much of
the opinion pooling literature does.
Most of the models mentioned here represent opinions as some continuous bounded real
number, but even these models are not consistent in their representations. In this chapter, we
model opinions in Kleene’s strong three-valued logic where an opinion is some truth assignment
(i.e. Kleene valuation) on the propositional variables of the language. Several existing models
for consensus exploit a third truth state to aid convergence [1, 16, 79], though most interpret the
third truth value as ‘uncertain’ or ‘unknown’, which we describe to be distinctly different from
our approach to using a third truth value to model vagueness, as outlined in the introduction.
Finally, the original pairwise three-valued consensus operator studied in this paper was
initially proposed by Perron et al. [57] for consensus across complete graphs, which is a special
case of our model. The logical properties of this operator and its relationship to other similar
aggregation functions are investigated by Lawry and Dubois in [41], where the authors also
introduce several other pairwise operators for combining opinions. The concept of orthopairs
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Table 2.1: Kleene truth tables.
2.2 Model
Overview. We introduce Kleene’s three-valued logic as a model of explicitly borderline cases
resulting from the vagueness of natural language propositions. We then exploit these truth-gaps
to allow agents to adopt a more vague interpretation of the underlying concepts about which
they are attempting to reach a consensus. Consensus is a pairwise process between agents, with
each agent either chosen at random or via a weighted selection process. We deal explicitly with a
symmetric updating process for consensus in which both agents adopt the newly formed opinion
as a combination of their previously held opinions. This differs to asymmetric models where
agents may adopt different opinions from others involved in the same updating process.
2.2.1 A three-valued model for pairwise consensus
We adopt a propositional logic setting based on Kleene’s strong three-valued logic [39] as follows:
Let L be a finite language of propositional logic with connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬, and propositional
variables P = {p1, ...pn}. Also, let SL denote the sentences of L generated by recursive applica-
tion of the connectives to the propositional variables in the usual manner. A Kleene valuation
then allocates the truth values 0, 12 , and 1 to the sentences of L denoting false, borderline and
true, respectively as follows:
Definition 2.1. Kleene valuations
A Kleene valuation v on L is a function v : SL → {0, 12 , 1} such that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL the following
hold:
• v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ)
• v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ),v(ϕ))
• v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ),v(ϕ)).
The truth table for Kleene valuations are shown in Table 2.1. Note that given this definition,
a Kleene valuation v on SL is completely characterised by its values on P. We also denote the
set of all possible Kleene valuations by V.
Orthopairs
It can also be convenient to represent a Kleene valuation v by its associated orthopair [42],
(P,N), where P = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 1} and N = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 0}. Then v(P,N) denotes
15
the valuation characterised by the orthopair (P,N). Notice that P ∩N = ∅ and that (P ∪N)c
corresponds to the set of borderline propositional variables. Orthopairs are particularly helpful
when discussing valuations as applied to the underlying propositional variables. Consider the
following example: Given two propositional variables pi and pj for j 6= i, an orthopair ({pi}, ∅)
represents the valuation v such that v(pi) = 1 and v(pj) =
1
2 , since pi ∈ P and pj ∈ (P ∪N)
c.
Why Kleene valuations?
Kleene valuations have been proposed as a suitable formalism in which to capture explicitly
borderline cases, as resulting from the inherent flexibility in the definition of vague concepts in
natural language [42, 44]. The concept ‘safe’, for example, is vague such that there exist cases
that would be considered neither absolutely safe nor absolutely not safe, but would instead be
considered borderline safe/not safe. Using Kleene’s three-valued logic to represent vagueness, we
can enable agents with conflicting beliefs to resolve their inconsistencies by having them adjust
their underlying definitions and adopt a more vague interpretation of the concept ‘safe’. For a
more detailed study of vague concepts see [70] which motivates the use of Kleene’s three-valued
logic in terms of lower and upper thresholds of distances from a prototype.
2.2.2 An overview of operators for combining valuations
A number of combination operators for Kleene valuations are proposed in [41] which aim to
combine a pair of valuations according to some underlying principle. However, in order to
adequately define these operators we must first introduce the notion of consistency.
Definition 2.2. Consistency [41, def. 6]
Kleene valuations v1 and v2 are consistent if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL,
min(max(v1(¬θ),v2(θ)),max(v2(¬θ),v1(θ))) 6= 0.
That is, given valuations v1 and v2 and associated orthopairs (P1, N1) and (P2, N2), then
two valuations are consistent if and only if P1∩N2 = P2∩N1 = ∅. In other words, two valuations
are consistent provided that, if a proposition is absolutely true according to one valuation then
it is not absolutely false according to the other [41]. Therefore borderline valuations do not
contribute a source of inconsistency. For the following operator, consistency is a necessary
condition by the definition of orthopairs as we have that P ∩ N = ∅ and so the union of two
valuations characterised by their respective orthopairs requires that (P1 ∪ P2) ∩ (N1 ∪N2) = ∅.
We can then go on to define the optimistic operator below.
The optimistic operator seeks to combine opinions by simply taking the union of two con-
sistent valuations as follows.
Definition 2.3. Optimistic operator [41, def. 14]
Let v1 and v2 be consistent Kleene valuations on L. Then the optimistic combination v1⊕v2
is defined as follows:
v1 ⊕ v2 = v(P1∪P2,N1∪N2).
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Table 2.2: Truth table for the
optimistic operator.











Table 2.3: Truth table for the
difference operator.
We can see here that given a consistent pair of valuations, we are preserving all agreed
upon truth values for all propositions, while adopting more precise (i.e. non-borderline) truth
values where one agent believes the proposition to be true/false and the other believes it to be
borderline. For inconsistent valuations v1, v2, ⊕ is undefined.
The second operator to be introduced is an asymmetric operator by which, for a pair of
agents, one agent can be made consistent with the other by minimally adapting their opinions
to align with those of the other agent.
Definition 2.4. Difference operator [41, def. 17]
Let v1 and v2 be Kleene valuations on L. Then the difference combination v1	v2 is defined
as follows:
v1 	 v2 = v(P1\N2,N1\P2).
Hence, this operator softens the precise values of v1 by adopting more vague interpretations
of the conflicting propositions, so as to become consistent with v2.
An operator for reaching consensus
We now introduce the consensus operator which seeks to merge two potentially conflicting opin-
ions into a single, consistent opinion.
The following operator is designed in such a way as to ensure that both agents, when ap-
plying the operator to their opinions, receive the same resulting opinion which they then both
adopt. This is similar to the optimistic combination operator, only without requiring that both
valuations be consistent, and is different to the difference operator in that the consensus oper-
ator is commutative and the resulting valuation is a minimally consistent combination of both
valuations.
Definition 2.5. Consensus operator [41, def. 22]
Let v1 and v2 be Kleene valuations on L. Then the consensus combination v1  v2 is the
Kleene valuation:
v1  v2 = v((P1∪P2)\(N1∪N2),(N1∪N2)\(P1∪P2)).
The corresponding truth table for this operator is shown in Table 2.4. The intuition behind
the operator is as follows: In the case that the two agents disagree then if one has allocated a
non-borderline truth value to pi, while the other has given pi a borderline truth value then the
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Table 2.4: Truth table for the
consensus operator.
I 1 12 0
1 0 0 1
1
2 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
Table 2.5: Truth table for the
inconsistency measure.
non-borderline truth value is adopted in the agreed compromise. In other words, if one agent has
a strong view about pi while the other is ambivalent then they will both agree to adopt the strong
viewpoint. In contrast if both agents have strong but opposing views i.e. with one valuation
giving pi truth value 0 and the other 1, then they will agree on a compromise truth value of
1
2 . Alternatively, from Definition 2.5 we can think of  as an operator which merges both the
optimistic and difference operators into a two-step process: initially, the operator weakens both
opinions so as to remove direct inconsistencies, before then combining them to form a single,
consistent opinion. An alternative formulation representing this two-step process is given by:
v1  v2 = (v1 	 v2)⊕ (v2 	 v1).
Measuring consensus
In order to analyse the resulting consensus we introduce two measures that will be used through-
out the subsequent simulation experiments. We begin with a measure of vagueness in order to
help us understand the effect that vagueness has on the resulting consensus, and also to verify
that the resulting consensus is meaningful in the sense that we do not converge to a completely
borderline valuation on the propositions. A vagueness measure of 1 indicates a completely vague
valuation such that every proposition is considered borderline. Conversely, a vagueness measure
of 0 is therefore reflective of a completely crisp valuation in which all propositional variables
have truth values either 0 or 1.
Definition 2.6. A vagueness measure
Let v be a Kleene valuation on L with n propositional variables. Then we measure the
vagueness of v by the proportion of propositional variables which it classifies as being borderline.
That is, for pi ∈ P:
V (v) =






Definition 2.7. An inconsistency measure
Let v1 and v2 be Kleene valuations on L. Then we define the inconsistency measure of v1
and v2 to be the proportion of propositional variables which are in direct conflict between the
two valuations i.e. v1(pi) 6= 12 , v2(pi) 6=
1
2 and v1(pi) = 1− v2(pi). That is, for pi ∈ P:
I(v1,v2) =




Notice that the inconsistency measure here is related to consistency (Definition 2.2) where the
measure of consistency of two Kleene valuations v1 and v2 is simply 1− I(v1,v2).
Table 2.5 shows the inconsistency truth table of two valuations for a propositional variable,
highlighting the cases where two valuations are inconsistent, and consistent otherwise. Assuming
that two valuations are picked at random from V, we can see that there is a probability of 29
that two valuations will be inconsistent for each propositional variable in the language. In the
following section we will propose a threshold γ ∈ [0, 1] on inconsistency so that valuations v1
and v2 can be combined only if I(v1,v2) ≤ γ.
2.3 Random selection experiments
In this section we introduce simulation experiments in order to investigate the convergence
properties of the three-valued consensus operator (Definition 2.5) when implemented across a
multi-agent system. The experimental set up is loosely based on those proposed in [18] and [50],
although our representation of opinions is quite different with opinions taking the form of Kleene
valuations on L, rather than vectors of bounded real numbers.
We will consider two distinct initialisations of the opinions of a population of agents, where
an opinion is simply a particular allocation of truth values to all of the propositions. The random
three-valued initialisation allocates the truth values 0, 12 and 1 to each agent and each proposi-
tional variable at random i.e. with probability 13 for each truth value. In contrast, the random
Boolean initialisation only allocates the binary truth values 0 and 1, each with a probability of 12 .
This latter initialisation will be required in order to directly compare the proposed three-valued
combination operator with a similar two valued operator. In this section we will use the random
three-valued initialisation in order to investigate the extent to which the three-valued operator
results in convergence to a shared set of opinions across the population of agents.
We set a fixed maximum number of 50 000 iterations1. At each time step a pair of agents
are selected at random from the population. An inconsistency threshold value γ ∈ [0, 1] is set,
so that for any pair of agents with respective valuations v1 and v2, if I(v1,v2) ≤ γ then both
agents replace their opinions with the consensus valuation v1  v2, while if I(v1,v2) > γ then
no combination is performed and both agents retain their original opinions. This is a form
of bounded confidence [17, 31] as detailed in Chapter 1 whereby we limit agent interactions
based on the consistency (and therefore similarity) of their opinions. For γ = 1 we obtain
what is equivalent to the totally connected graph model described in [57], in which any pair of
agents can combine their opinions, whilst taking γ = 0 corresponds to the most conservative
scenario in which only absolutely consistent opinions can be combined. It should be noted that
forming consensus between consistent opinions still allows for the merging of differing opinions
and a new consensus opinion to emerge, as borderline valuations maintain consistency and yet
will be replaced by a more precise value when merged. The parameters for the simulation
experiments are then as follows: we study a population of 100 agents, with language sizes (i.e.
|P| = n) of 5, 10, 50, and 100. opinions are initialised at random according to the three-valued
1In preliminary experiments we found that 50 000 was an upper bound on the number of iterations required
for the system to reach steady state across a range of parameter settings.
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initialisation as described earlier. We also set an inconsistent threshold γ ∈ [0, 1] in order to
study how a population of agents is affected by forming consensus with opinions of varying levels
of inconsistency.
2.3.1 Results with random three-valued initialisation of opinions
Figure 2.1 shows the results for the experiments after 50 000 iterations. In each case the plots
show mean values with error bars indicating the 10th and 90th percentiles across 100 independent
runs of the simulation. Figure 2.1a shows the average vagueness determined by taking the mean
value of V (v) (Definition 2.6) across the population. Note that for a random three-valued
initialisation of opinions we expect a mean vagueness value of 13 at the start of the simulation.
As the threshold γ increases then the average vagueness decreases to zero, so that for γ ≥ 0.3
we are left with almost entirely crisp (i.e. Boolean) opinions. In general the more conservative
the combination rules (i.e. requiring higher levels of consistency) then the more it is that vague
opinions are maintained in the population. Figure 2.1b shows the number of distinct valuations
(i.e. different opinions) remaining in the population after 50 000 iterations. Again this decreases
with γ and for γ > 0.4 agents have on average converged to a single shared opinion. This is
consistent with the analytical results presented in [57] for the single propositional, γ = 1 case.
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(b) Number of distinct valuations.
Figure 2.1: Three-valued consensus model with random selection and random three-valued initialisation
at steady state for different inconsistency thresholds γ and different language sizes |P|.
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To provide a more complete picture, we now examine trajectory results of the model for the
|P| = 100 case. In Figure 2.2 we show trajectory results of the three-valued consensus model for
the same experiments for an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.2. We choose γ = 0.2 specifically so
that we can see more clearly the convergence properties of the model for an inconsistency value
that does not lead to complete consensus to a single valuation. We see that even for a rather
strict inconsistency threshold, where only relatively consistent agents are able to interact and to
form consensus, the population converges on a much smaller set of distinct valuations which are
more precise than the initial distribution of opinions. In just over 13 000 iterations the average
vagueness of the population of 100 agents has been reduced from 0.33 at initialisation to just
above 0.04 in Figure 2.2a. In Figure 2.2b we see that, at approximately 17 000 iterations the
population converges to a steady state in Figure 2.2b, averaging below 25 distinct valuations
across the 100 independent runs.
In Figure 2.3 we see that a small increase in γ from 0.2 to 0.3 leads to a large difference in
the convergence of the system. The population now reaches consensus, converging on a single
valuation in approximately 2 000 iterations (Figure 2.3b), this being considerably fewer than the
17 000 iterations it took for γ = 0.2. Similarly, we see in Figure 2.3a that for a sufficiently high
inconsistency threshold γ vagueness is eliminated at steady state but with almost immediate
convergence to crisp opinions in under 2 000 iterations. It seems to be the case that applying
a more restrictive inconsistency threshold slows convergence and maintains a certain level of
vagueness in the opinions of the population, albeit a reduced amount. It is only for inconsistency
thresholds γ ≥ 0.4 that we see complete convergence occurring incredibly quickly.
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(b) Number of distinct valuations.
Figure 2.2: Three-valued consensus model with random selection and random three-valued initialisation
shown as trajectories for an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.2 and |P| = 100.
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(b) Number of distinct valuations.
Figure 2.3: Three-valued consensus model with random selection and random three-valued initialisation
shown as trajectories for an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.5 and |P| = 100.
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2.3.2 Summary
From experiments in the previous section, we can see that effective convergence occurs in the
three-valued model and that a population of agents converges to a single valuation for a suffi-
ciently high inconsistency threshold γ. Furthermore, we see that this valuation is completely
precise i.e. has non-borderline truth values for all propositional variables. We say this population
has reached consensus because it has converged to a single, shared position regarding the state
of the world by agreeing on a single truth assignment on all of the propositions in L, and that
this truth assignment is not vague. The consensus operator is therefore best suited to decision
problems where the true state of the world may be assumed to be some precise truth assignment
over the propositional variables, or where the agents reaching a precise consensus allows them
to act with certainty as to which choices the rest of the population will make. There may be
scenarios in which borderline propositions are made more precise via some stochastic reduction
to Boolean truth values, and therefore where some agents may assume the proposition is true
while others assume it to be false, causing a split in the population where agents are no longer
acting in unison on the same underlying opinions.
These experiments also show the effect that restricting agent interactions has on the conver-
gence of the population overall. In general, the effect of the inconsistency threshold is dependent
on a combination of the language size, population size and the inconsistency measure in Defini-
tion 2.7 (Table 2.5). Given a small language size (e.g. |P| = 5) and a relatively small population
of 100 agents, then the likelihood of two consistent agents being selected, even for an inconsis-
tency threshold γ = 0, is sufficiently high to allow agents whose opinions only differ by borderline
truth values to form consensus. Indeed we see this in Figure 2.1 where for a language size of
5 the population of agents have reached an average vagueness value of approximately 0 for an
inconsistency threshold γ = 0. Meanwhile, there are more than 20 distinct opinions that persist
at steady state. For a much larger language size of 100 propositional variables, however, this
is no longer the case. Instead, the average vagueness at steady state is essentially unchanged
from the initial distribution of opinions and, similarly, there are 100 distinct valuations despite
the ability for agents to form consensus between opinions where truth values differ only by bor-
derline valuations. Given that there are 100 propositional variables, the agents are extremely
unlikely to be paired with other agents whose valuations differ only by vague propositions during
consensus formation. This is due to the limited pool of valuations present at initialisation: For
100 agents there can be, at most, 100 distinct valuations, yet there are a possible 3100 valuations
for initialisation. Given the disparity between the population size and the number of possible
valuations, it becomes increasingly unlikely that any two valuations will be consistent for γ = 0
in the case of 100 agents and 100 propositional variables. In contrast, for |P| = 5, there are only
35 = 243 distinct opinions possible for initialisation. As such, the likelihood of one of the 100
agents encountering another consistent agent in the population is far greater. If we briefly ex-
amine the single propositional variable case, there are just 31 = 3 possible valuations, and from
Table 2.5 we see that the likelihood of two randomly selected truth values being inconsistent is 29
or 0.22 so it is closer to this value for the inconsistency threshold that we see a dramatic increase
in convergence in the system. We believe it is also likely that as |P| increases, the steady state
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results of Figure 2.1 will come to greatly resemble the step function.
2.4 Incorporating feedback
In the following section we extend the three-valued model to incorporate a form of feedback
based on the quality of the opinions of agents, such that higher quality opinions increase the
likelihood of the agents holding those opinions being selected during the consensus formation
process2. In this section, ‘payoff’ is introduced as a proxy for performance, and is motivated
by the intuition that different opinions result in different actions which then, over time, lead to
different levels of performance and different accuracies of opinions about the true state of the
world. Here we adopt an abstract simplification of this process in which each Kleene valuation
is allocated a real valued payoff. Then, instead of being selected at random for combination,
an agent is picked from the population according to a probability which is proportionate to the
payoff value of their opinions. The idea, then, is that agents with ‘better’ or more useful/well-
informed opinions will be more successful and furthermore, it will be these successful agents who
will be most likely to need to reach a consensus between them. Here the underlying intuition
is that, in real systems it is the most successful agents, with the highest payoff values, who
are most likely to find themselves in conflict with one another, and who will most benefit from
reaching an agreement.
To better motivate the introduction of a payoff model, consider the example from Section 1.2
in which a group of operatives, who are about to conduct a search and rescue operation, must
reach a consensus about which areas in a region are accessible. We might then consider a scenario
in which certain areas are prioritised, perhaps due to the population density of a given area, or
due to the degradation of an area’s accessibility over time. In this scenario, a payoff model is a
method of biasing the selection process in an attempt to rescue a greater number of people, or to
prioritise areas that will only remain accessible for a limited period of time. Similarly, the payoff
model acts to suppress low-priority areas so that resources can be prioritised in favour of areas
with greater need. Consider the following scenario in this context: An operative believes that an
area is currently inaccessible due to the low safety levels associated with that area. However, the
area is known to have been densely populated and so to conduct a search and rescue operation in
the area would result in a large number of potential lives being saved. Consider, now, that there
are other operatives that believe the area is in fact safe enough to be accessible. Then it would
be preferable to disseminate those operative’s opinions more often than others so that there is a
greater potential to save additional lives. Of course, if the population believes overwhelmingly
that the area is unsafe, then it is likely that this opinion will remain dominant, despite the
negative feedback associated with having that opinion.
2.4.1 Extending the three-valued model
We assume that the true state of the world is a Boolean valuation v∗ on L so that v∗(pi) ∈
{0, 1} for pi ∈ P. Given the interpretation of the third truth value as meaning ‘borderline’,
2This is typically referred to as ‘roulette wheel selection’ for fitness proportionate selection in genetic algo-
rithms [28].
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this is clearly a simplification from that perspective. For example, consider the proposition
‘Ethel is short’, then an experiment could consist of measuring Ethel’s height according to some
mechanism, and then comparing it to the experimenter’s definition of the term ‘short’ in order
to determine the truth value of the proposition. If that definition is three-valued then the
outcome of the experiment could well be to identify a borderline truth value for the proposition.
However, the convention in science is to establish an agreed crisp definition of all the terms
used to express a hypothesis so that the resulting proposition is falsifiable. This would then
be consistent with our identifying the true state of the world with a Boolean valuation. In the
following definition we adopt a simple summative payoff model which we use to determine how
close a valuation is to the truth. We use this measure in order to bias the selection of agents
during the consensus process (as detailed later in this section), and also to analyse the resulting
convergence in relation to the true state of the world.
Definition 2.8. A quality measure
Let f : L → {−1, 1} be such that f(pi) = 2v∗(pi) − 1 is the payoff for believing that pi has
truth value 1 and −f(pi) is the payoff for believing that the truth value of pi is 0. Furthermore,
it is always assumed that believing that pi has truth value
1
2 has payoff 0. Then we define the








Another perspective on this type of payoff function is as follows: For each propositional
variable pi, a truth value of 1 results in a payoff f(pi) (which can be either positive or negative),
a truth value of 0 results in the opposite signed payoff −f(pi), and a borderline truth value
1
2 results in a payoff of 0. The payoff value for a Kleene valuation v is then simply taken to
be the sum of the payoffs for each propositional variable under the truth values allocated by
v. This payoff function is symmetric as only a single payoff value is assigned to a proposition,
and a positive or negative payoff for a given valuation differs by sign only. Additionally, a
borderline valuation resulting in a neutral payoff of 0 maintains this symmetry. Alternatively,
an asymmetric payoff model would give payoff of different magnitudes to the truth values 0 and
1 for given propositions, and/or non-zero payoff for the truth value 12 .
2.4.2 Adapting the selection process
We now detail a payoff-based weighted selection process as a replacement for the previous
random selection process described in Section 2.3. Based on payoff values we define a probability
distribution over the agents in the population according to which the probability that an agent
with valuation v is selected for possible consensus combination is proportional to f(v) + n +
1, where n is the language size. At each iteration a pair of agents are selected at random
according to this distribution. For each such pair the inconsistency measure (Definition 2.7)
is evaluated and either both the valuations are replaced with the consensus valuation, or both
are left unchanged, depending on the threshold γ as in Section 2.3. The parameters for the
simulation experiments are as follows: We show results for populations of 100 agents with
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binary operator 0 1
0 0 0 : 12 , 1 :
1
2
1 0 : 12 , 1 :
1
2 1
Table 2.6: Truth table for the stochastic Boolean consensus operator.
language sizes in {5, 10, 50, 100} are initially studied for comparisons with the random selection
model, before settling on |P| = 5 for a more detailed analysis of results. This time opinions
are initialised as random Boolean opinions, whereby we do not allocate borderline valuations as
part of agents’ opinions; instead we allocate Boolean true/false truth values for all propositions
pi ∈ P for both the Boolean consensus model and the three-valued consensus model. As before,
we study various values for an inconsistency threshold γ ∈ [0, 1].
2.4.3 Random Boolean opinion initialisation
Notice that here we are initialising the opinions as random Boolean valuations (see Section 2.3)3.
This allows us to make a direct comparison between the performance of the three valued com-
bination operator and a similar two valued operator. For the latter we assume that only binary
truth values are available to represent an agent’s opinions. In this context, in order for two
agents with conflicting truth values for pi (i.e. one 0 and the other 1) to reach consensus, we
propose that they simply agree to pick one of the truth values at random e.g. by tossing a fair
coin. Table 2.6 gives the truth table for the operator in which directly conflicting truth values
leads to a stochastic outcome.
2.5 Payoff-based selection experiments
We now present results for the three-valued model with payoff-based selection, briefly comparing
this payoff model to that of the random selection model of Section 2.3 under the same random
three-valued opinion initialisation. We study the cases of |P| ∈ {5, 10, 50, 100} for which we
compare the three-valued model to the newly introduced Boolean model, with the opinions of
both models being initialised as random Boolean valuations.
2.5.1 Comparing the three-valued payoff model with the random selection
model
In Figure 2.4 we show results for the population at steady state (after 50 000 iterations) for
various language sizes as we did in Figure 2.1. The results shown are mean values with error
bars taken over 100 independent runs of the simulation, indicating the 10th and 90th percentiles.
The model changes little in terms of convergence, as is clear when comparing Figure 2.4a with
Figure 2.1b. Here we see very similar reductions in the number of distinct valuations across
all language sizes as the inconsistency threshold increases, with each language size following a
3As a result of this Boolean initialisation, a language size of 5 now produces a total of 25 (32) possible valuations,
as opposed to 35 (243) possible valuations.
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similar curve as for random agent selection. However, for γ ≥ 0.4, convergence is not quite
as strong as in the random selection case where most models had converged to just a single
valuation.
Figure 2.4b shows the average payoff of the population for different language sizes as a
percentage of the maximal possible payoff value i.e. the payoff for the valuation v∗ where f(v∗) =
|P|. It is here that we see the effect of the payoff-based selection process, as well as the impact
that the language size has on performance. We can see that payoff does indeed increase as the
population begins to converge towards a single valuation, and that for an inconsistency threshold
γ = 0.5 where the system has almost completely converged, for |P| = 5 the average payoff of the
population of agents is averaging above 60%, and with error bars indicating that for some runs of
the experiment, this can even exceed 90% of the maximal payoff. It becomes immediately clear,
however, that for different language sizes this effect diminishes greatly. For 10 propositional
variables we see an average payoff of below 50%. For 100 propositional variables we see that the
average payoff of the population is reduced even further to around 5% of the maximal possible
payoff value, with a language size of 50 propositional variables performing a little better with
an average of around 10% for γ = 0.5. As discussed in the previous section, this is most likely
due to the sparsity of the initial opinions for a small population size of 100 agents relative to
the number of possible three-valued valuations. We believe that, for a fixed population size, as
the language size increases, the effect that the payoff-based selection process has on the average
payoff of the system is reduced dramatically to the extent that it will eventually achieve no
additional performance gain over the random selection model.
Finally, it is worth noting that the weighted stochasticity of the agent selection process results
in a huge variation in average payoff across the different independent runs of the simulation,
as is clear from the large error bars in Figure2.4b. This suggests that the performance of the
payoff model is hugely dependent on the initial distribution of opinions being sufficiently diverse,
so as to possess enough high quality opinions (i.e. valuations associated with large payoffs) to
reinforce the payoff-based selection process. An increased number of high quality opinions
allows the payoff-based selection process to more easily disseminate such opinions throughout
the population. If the initial population of opinions is sparse in relation to the total number of
possible opinions for that language size, then it is likely that for some runs of the simulation, the
valuation with maximal payoff is not present at initialisation and so the system faces increased
difficulty in converging to a high-payoff valuation.
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(a) Number of distinct valuations.










































(b) Average payoff shown as a percentage of the maximal possible payoff.
Figure 2.4: Three-valued consensus model with payoff-based selection and random three-valued initial-
isation at steady state, for different inconsistency thresholds γ and different language sizes |P|.
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Figure 2.5: Average payoff for the three-valued and Boolean consensus models with random and
weighted selection at steady state for a |P| = 5 and different inconsistency thresholds γ.
2.5.2 Results with random Boolean initialisation of opinions
We now look exclusively at simulation experiments for 5 propositional variables and random
Boolean opinion initialisation, where each proposition pi ∈ P can have a value of either 0 or
1 at initialisation (at the 0th iteration). For the Boolean model, valuations will only be able
to form opinions in {0, 1}n according to the Boolean consensus operator defined in Table 2.6,
whereas for the three-valued model, from iteration 1 onwards, agents are free to adopt opinions
in {0, 12 , 1}
n which naturally occur through application of the three-valued consensus operator
of Definition 2.5 (Table 2.4), as normal.
Simulations with a population of 100 agents
In Figures 2.5 and 2.6 we present results comparing the three-valued payoff model with the
Boolean payoff model, and for each of these we also include comparisons to their random selection
variants. As such, those labelled ‘3-valued’ and ‘Boolean’ refer to the models with payoff-
based selection, while those with ‘random’ appended refer to the random selection models.
Immediately, from Figure 2.5, we see that one model in particular - the three-valued payoff
model - far exceeds the others in average payoff for an inconsistency threshold γ ≥ 0.2. All the
other models are averaging close to 0 for all values of γ, though with large variation as shown by
their error bars. The three-valued model, however, is able to average above 60% for γ ≥ 0.6; an
increase in inconsistency threshold from γ = 0.5 as required by the three-valued model for similar
performance under random three-valued opinion initialisation in Figure 2.4a. It is natural to
expect that, averaged over 100 independent runs, both the three-valued and Boolean models
31
































Figure 2.6: Number of distinct valuations for the three-valued and Boolean consensus models with
random and weighted selection at steady state for different inconsistency thresholds γ.
with random selection would show an average payoff around 0 as there is no bias present in
the population to favour opinions of greater payoff. However, the Boolean payoff model also
averages around 0 for all values of γ. This is probably due to the stochastic nature of the Boolean
consensus operator, which compensates for agents being unable to adopt an intermediate truth
value as a means of compromise, making them more likely to adopt completely opposite opinions
during their next pairing. Instead, one agent forces the other to adopt their truth value. This
dominance is not maintained across all propositions, however, and so the resulting opinion is
likely to be a mixture of truth values between the two agents, possibly negating any positive
gain that could have occurred had one agent simply adopted the valuation of the other, and
potentially resulting in a valuation of lower payoff than either of the opinions prior to forming
consensus. The stochastic resolution to conflicting opinions is the most obvious approach to take
for this model, and yet it is clear that even by weighting agent selection based on payoff, this
stochasticity prevents any measurable convergence to higher-payoff opinions from occurring.
To obtain a more complete picture, we can also consider other properties of the system.
Figure 2.6 shows the number of distinct valuations at steady state for the four models, and
we can see immediately that for γ = 0.0, there is some noise around the 32 possible opinions
resulting from the random Boolean initialisation, with the models averaging around 31 distinct
valuations at steady state as a result of some duplication (all models) or a minute amount
of convergence (three-valued models only) occurring in the populations. As γ reaches 0.2, or
1
5 , we start to see a drastic reduction in the number of distinct valuations present at steady
state. This is due to the language consisting of 5 propositional variables where, as soon as the
inconsistency threshold reaches or exceeds 1n , then Boolean opinions become consistent when
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Figure 2.7: Average vagueness for the three-valued and Boolean consensus models, with random and
weighted selection at steady state for different inconsistency thresholds γ.
just one proposition differs in truth value between a pair of valuations. This is why we see
convergence for γ = 0.2.
While all four models are initialised with random Boolean opinions, it is worth considering
the level of vagueness that might be present at steady state for the three-valued models as a
result of applying the three-valued consensus operator. In Figure 2.7 we see that the vagueness
levels across both three-valued models are negligible at steady state. The three-valued payoff
model does exhibit some vagueness of opinions at steady state for 0.2 ≤ γ ≤ 0.8, but the level
of vagueness is small, and the population has effectively converged to Boolean opinions. We
can also consider trajectory results in Figure 2.8. Here we fix the inconsistency threshold at
γ = 0.2 and we note that a large and sudden increase in vagueness occurs within the first 1 000
iterations from the beginning of the simulation experiment, as shown in Figure 2.8a. In this
period agents go from having completely Boolean valuations to valuations with average levels
of vagueness between 0.07 and 0.10 for the three-valued payoff model and three-valued random
model, respectively. This sharp increase is then followed by a slow decline in vagueness until
the system eventually converges to close to 0 vagueness on average after 50 000 iterations.
From Figure 2.8b, we can see that this sudden increase in vagueness is aligned with a similar
increase in the variation in the number of distinct valuations in both of the three-valued models.
Unlike in the Boolean models, where the number of distinct opinions consistently decline from
the beginning of the experiments, the three-valued models vary between runs, with the three-
valued random model seeing increases in the number of opinions on average after 1 000 iterations,
and the three-valued payoff model seeing similar variation in the number of distinct opinions,
though still reducing to below 30 on average. Interestingly Figure 2.8b suggests that convergence
33
of the Boolean models are initially much quicker, and slow as the size of the opinion pool for the
population reduces, levelling off to below 10 distinct valuations. For the three-valued model, we
see that there is slower convergence early on in the experiments where vagueness and the number
of distinct valuations initially increases, before both models begin converging more quickly. The
three-valued random model converges extremely quickly compared with the other models, while
the three-valued payoff model converges more slowly than its random counterpart, but still
converges more quickly to a smaller set of distinct opinions than both the Boolean payoff model
and the Boolean random model. It may therefore be the case that by introducing a small level
of vagueness into the population of opinions allows for the agents to form consensus more easily
and for the system to converge more quickly overall when compared with a strictly Boolean
population of opinions.
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(b) Number of distinct valuations.
Figure 2.8: Comparison of the three-valued and Boolean consensus models, with random and weighted
selection as trajectories for an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.2.
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Figure 2.9: Comparison of the three-valued and Boolean consensus models, showing the number of
distinct valuations with random and weighted selection as trajectories for an inconsistency threshold
γ = 1.0.
Finally, we briefly analyse the convergence properties of all four models when all selected
pairs of agents combine their opinions, regardless of how inconsistent they are. Figure 2.9 shows
the number of distinct valuations for both the three-valued model and the Boolean model, and
for both agent selection strategies with an inconsistency threshold γ = 1.0. We can see that
both of the three-valued models converge very quickly, reaching 2 distinct valuations on average
after just 1 000 iterations and fully converging by 2 000 iterations. This is in contrast to the
much slower convergence of both of the Boolean models which do not converge until after 30 000
iterations. It is to be expected that, as the population sizes increase, so too does the time
required by both models to reach consensus, as each iteration corresponds to only a single pair
of agents combining their opinions.
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2.5.3 Summary
With the introduction of payoff we have demonstrated that the three-valued payoff model (where
agent selection is based on their associated payoff values) enables populations of agents to reach a
more meaningful consensus. Opinions of agents in this setting can be thought of as representing
some perceived states of the world which the agents believe to be true. Some opinions will
inherently be more accurate than others, and this should be reflected in the consensus formation
process. To this end, payoff serves to bias the agent selection process to favour opinions which
more accurately represent the true state of the world, as specified by the underlying payoff
model. This way, agents which possess high-payoff opinions are favoured in the consensus
formation process proportional to the accuracy of their opinions, resulting in being chosen more
often to combine their opinions with others in the population. We have shown that the effect of
payoff-based selection of the agents is reduced as the language size increases, and is due to the
diversity of opinions in the population. For larger language sizes and a proportionately small
population size, it becomes increasingly likely that more accurate opinions are not present in
the population at initialisation and so are unable to drive initial convergence towards the more
accurate valuations.
We also introduced a Boolean model for consensus which is stochastic in its resolution of
inconsistent truth values during opinion combination. Simulation experiments highlighted that
the three-valued payoff model was the most effective at increasing the average level of payoff
in the population and that for large inconsistency threshold γ the three-valued model achieved
over 65% of the maximal possible payoff, on average, for a language size of 5. Meanwhile, both
the three-valued random model and both of the Boolean models were ineffective at achieving
any substantial improvements in performance, remaining close to 0% payoff averaged across the
population. For the same population size, we saw how payoff-based selection did not come at a
cost to convergence time for either of the three-valued or Boolean consensus models, as most of
the convergence properties remained unchanged.
While convergence does appear to be quick for sufficiently large inconsistency values, par-
ticularly for the three-valued models, we would expect for there to be a proportional increase
in the time required to reach consensus for both the three-valued and Boolean models as the
population size increases. An iteration corresponds to a single pair of agents combining their
opinions and this is restricted further by the inconsistency threshold. As such, a dramatic in-
crease in population size would require much longer running times to reach similar convergence
across the populations. Of course, the length of time to convergence is a significant issue with
the models presented here. Given that the consensus process taking place is symmetric, meaning
that both agents adopt the resulting opinion combination as their new opinions, attempting to
apply the consensus operator to additional pairs of agents within the same iteration will in-
evitably lead to issues stemming from the fact that the consensus operator is not associative,
and so the order of interactions between agents will likely change the outcome of the consensus
process, where different orderings may lead to different opinions as a result. Should consensus
be a serial process, then one could expect the agents to adopt their new opinions before the
operator is applied to the next pair of agents, which may contain reoccurring agents. However,
37
this would negate the payoff-based selection process, as agents selected multiple times will not
necessarily possess the same payoff value for each interaction processed during the iteration.
The weighted selection process is based on an agent’s current payoff value, and so is only ef-
fective at selecting agents when it has accurate information. Altering an agent’s opinion, and
therefore payoff value, after selection would adversely affect this process. Similarly, it would
not be possible to process multiple opinion combinations in parallel because reoccurring agents
would receive multiple opinions and there would be no intuitive method of determining which
opinion should be adopted, and which ones should be discarded. Given that the purpose of the
consensus operator is to combine two potentially different opinions into a single, shared opinion
adopted by both agents, this would defeat the purpose. As such, we now look to improve the
speed of convergence for larger populations through means of group consensus formation.
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2.6 A model for group-wide consensus
Pairwise interactions form a natural approach to multi-agent consensus where pairs of agents
combine their opinions through a combination operator. The consensus operator introduced in
Definition 2.5 is an extreme form of operator which merges two different opinions into a single,
shared opinion which is then adopted by both agents. This merging of opinions inevitably
leads to a reduction in the number of unique opinions that exist in the population as two
differing opinions are replaced by a single, new opinion which may or may not already be
present in the population. At the end of Section 2.5 we discussed some problems that arise
when the population size increases with regards to the efficiency of this kind of symmetric
model of opinion updating. The pairwise property of the three-valued consensus model is highly
desirable for modelling human behaviour when it comes to opinion formation and dissemination
in populations of individuals, but is somewhat of a hindrance when the system ought to converge
quickly. For decision-making applications, agents typically need to make a collective decision by
forming consensus about the state of the world, on which they base their future actions. The
proposed three-valued model is restricted by this pairwise property to smaller populations if the
system is time-sensitive, and so we now propose a new model for group consensus in the hopes
of addressing this limitation.
2.6.1 Model
Overview. Pairwise conversations are just one way in which people discuss their opinions and
try to change the opinions of others. Perhaps a more efficient way of achieving a similar result is
through group-wide discussions; either where a speaker is disseminating their opinion to a group
of people (a sort of one-to-many relation, such as a lecture), or where each member of the group
converses with one another (many-to-many). In this model, we opt to implement the latter as a
means of forming ‘consensus’ between groups of agents in the population, rather than restricting
interactions to a single pair of agents at each iteration. This should be effective at speeding up
the convergence of opinions in a population by involving more agents in the consensus process
at each iteration, as is the motivation behind this proposed model. However, it is no longer
necessarily the case that agents in the group adopt the same opinions. Instead, each agent in
the group adopts an individualised opinion of their own: this opinion is based on a probability
distribution generated from a set of consensus valuations formed by systematically applying the
consensus operator to all of the agent pairs in the group, where each agent stores the resulting
valuations for pairs in which they participate. For this model, consensus is not enforced at the
group level, or even between pairs of agents. Instead, agents attempt to align their opinions
closer to one another as a collective.
Group-wide consensus as collective pairwise interactions
As in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 the underlying model remains the same, with the predominant change
affecting the interaction of agents and the way in which the consensus operator is applied. At
every iteration in the simulation, a set of k agents is selected according to the chosen selection
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strategy (e.g. random or payoff-based). For each agent r ∈ {1, ..., k} and associated valuations
{v1, ...,vk}, we then systematically identify all agents s ∈ {1, ..., k : s 6= r} which are consistent
with agent r according to the inconsistency threshold γ ∈ [0, 1]. For each consistent pair of agents
r, s, such that I(vr,vs) ≤ γ, the chosen consensus operator is applied to the agents’ valuations
vr  vs (Table 2.4 for the three-valued model and Table 2.6 for the Boolean model), forming a
set of consensus valuations for each agent in the group. Then, for every agent r ∈ {1, ..., k} that
is consistent with at least one other agent, we generate a probability distribution Pr on V based
on agent r’s set of consensus valuations such that:
Pr(v) =
|{s ∈ {1, ..., k} : s 6= r, I(vs,vr) ≤ γ,vs  vr = v}|
|{s ∈ {1, ..., k} : s 6= r, I(vs,vr) ≤ γ}|
.
Agent r then adopts a new valuation v′r as follows: For each propositional variable pi ∈ P
we select a valuation at random according to Pr, and set v
′
r(pi) = v(pi). Each agent therefore
generates a new valuation according to their own probability distribution, which may be unique
amongst the group, or may be similar to other agents should they have interacted with one
another.
Notice that for the group model, a group size of k = 2 is equivalent to the pairwise model of
Section 2.2. That is, for a pair of agents, either they are consistent with one another, in which
case they form consensus and the probability that they each select the resulting consensus valu-
ation is equal to 1, or they are inconsistent and the agents do not form consensus. Additionally,
in the case where every agent in the group is only consistent with one other agent, then the
model behaves as if we had selected multiple pairs of agents per iteration, rather than a single
pair, where each pair forms consensus once only, and do not interact with agents of other pairs
within the group.
2.7 Simulation experiments for iterative group-wide consensus
In this Section we focus on comparing the three-valued group model of Section 2.6 with its
pairwise version of Section 2.2. There is likely to be a trade-off in terms of the speed of con-
vergence and performance with regard to payoff between the two models, due to there being a
difference between symmetric and asymmetric opinion updating, where pairwise interactions are
of the former and group-wide the latter. For larger group sizes, we might expect to see faster
convergence than for smaller groups, simply because of the increase in the number of agents
realigning their opinions to be closer to those of other agents in the population. Of course, this
is not necessarily the case, given that for larger groups, there will be a greater variety of opin-
ions presented and this may even detract from the convergence of the group depending on their
similarity, leading to less effective convergence as a result. Larger groups will also suffer under
more restrictive inconsistency thresholds: if a group of agents contains a number of dissimilar
opinions, and an inconsistency threshold prevents most agents from interacting with more than
just one or two other agents, then it can be expected that there will be smaller subgroups of the
selected agents that converge closer to one another, but may in fact be diverging from the more
‘central’ opinion for all opinions in the group. Following these initial comparisons between the
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Figure 2.10: Number of distinct valuations at steady state for the three-valued group model, with
payoff-based selection and random three-valued opinion initialisation for group sizes k ∈ {2, 3, 5, 10} and
different inconsistency thresholds γ.
pairwise and group model, we compare the three-valued group model with a Boolean variant,
just as we did in Section 2.4 where the operator applied between each pair of agents is the same
as in Table 2.6.
Simulation experiments for the group model are conducted for a population of 1 000 agents,
ten times the population size of previous experiments as we are interested in seeing if there
is a scalable alternative to the pairwise three-valued model. We therefore also restrict studies
to a language size of 5 propositional variables just as before, alongside the same range for the
inconsistency threshold γ ∈ [0, 1]. We are interested in the payoff-based selection strategy as a
measure of performance, as we expect the group model to lead to faster convergence for a large
population, but do not expect that this will necessarily correlate with improved average payoff
if the population converges quickly to an opinion of low payoff, compared with a slower conver-
gence to a more ‘correct’ opinion of higher payoff. We examine group sizes of k ∈ {2, 3, 5, 10}
agents, with k = 2 a special case of the general group model in which consensus is formed at
every iteration (provided both agents are sufficiently consistent according to γ) just as in the
pairwise three-valued model, allowing us to make a direct comparison between the two models.
Experiments are run for 50 000 iterations, and with random three-valued opinion initialisation
unless otherwise stated (i.e. for comparisons with the Boolean group model).
2.7.1 Results
Under the group model, we wish to examine whether increasing the number of agents involved in
the agreement process improves the speed of convergence for larger populations, which necessar-
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ily require longer running times under pairwise consensus. If the model fails to achieve signifi-
cant convergence, then it is unfit for use in multi-agent settings where no significant convergence
provides no additional information over partial convergence, which might even be preferable de-
pending on the scenario concerned (e.g. for workload division between agents). In Figure 2.10
we show the number of distinct valuations for three-valued group model at steady state with
payoff-based agent selection plotted against inconsistency thresholds γ. For a group size of 2, we
see the pairwise three-valued payoff model for a larger population than was previously studied.
For 1 000 agents, it is clear that convergence across the range of γ differs significantly. Rather
than being monotonically decreasing in the number of distinct valuations (as seen in Figure 2.1b
for a population size of 100 agents) we instead see an increase for 0.2 ≤ γ < 0.4. This is unusual
when compared with the number of valuations for γ = 0.0 where the consensus operator is
applied only to the most consistent opinions, as we see greater convergence for a more strict in-
consistency threshold than we do for one that allows for the combination of opinions which differ
by more than just borderline truth values. Despite this difference, we do still see quite strong
convergence in terms of reducing the number of distinct valuations present in the population.
For 5 propositional variables and 1 000 agents we expect the 243 possible valuations to be present
at least once for the majority of the simulation runs, with roughly 4 copies per population on
average at initialisation. Yet, there is a reduction to under 50 distinct opinions at steady state
for γ = 0.0, and still below 70 on average even with the increase for 0.2 ≤ γ < 0.4. The pairwise
model, as expected, struggles to achieve the same performance as it did for a population of 100
agents without extending the simulation runs beyond 50 000 iterations for γ < 1.0. When the
inconsistency threshold does allow for all agents to form consensus (γ = 1.0), however, we do
finally see the model achieve consensus.
For a group size of 3 and above, the model achieves a decrease in the number of distinct valu-
ations as the inconsistency threshold increases. This is because a larger inconsistency threshold
increases the likelihood that agents selected as part of the group are able to combine their opin-
ions with the other agents. The more agents in the group that are sufficiently consistent, the
closer their resulting opinions will be to one another and the stronger the convergence at that
iteration. Even an increase from 2 agents to 3 provides considerable performance improvements
in terms of convergence. Despite the lack of consensus for γ < 0.8, after 50 000 iterations and for
group sizes 3, 5 and 10, the model shows effective partial convergence, achieving complete con-
sensus for γ ≥ 0.8 and even outperforming the pairwise model across all inconsistency thresholds
γ ∈ [0, 1]. It should be noted here that for all group sizes above 2, the population converges to
32 distinct valuations, on average, for γ = 0.0. Given that this inconsistency threshold limits
combinations to completely consistent valuations which differ by borderline truth values only,
it is expected that the population has essentially converged from all possible three-valued val-
uations at initialisation, to the set of Boolean valuations by simulation’s end. Indeed we can
verify this in Figure 2.11 where, under the three-valued initialisation of opinions, we see the
average vagueness in the population. For γ < 0.2, the average vagueness is reduced from 0.33 to
0 for the group model, leaving 32 completely precise valuations in the population: the Boolean
valuations. For 0.2 ≤ γ < 0.4 we see that for both k = 2 and k = 3 the average vagueness in the
population by the end of the simulations remains above 0. While still quite precise, given the
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Figure 2.11: Average vagueness at steady state for the three-valued group model, with payoff-based
selection and random three-valued opinion initialisation for group sizes k ∈ {2, 3, 5, 10} and different
inconsistency thresholds γ.
consensus operator used this is indicative of a population having not reached a steady state.
In Figure 2.12 we show the number of distinct valuations as trajectories for two different
inconsistency thresholds: γ ∈ {0.0, 0.2}. It becomes clear from Figure 2.12a that, for γ = 0.0,
the model converges increasingly quickly for larger group sizes, whereas the pairwise model fails
to converge before 50 000 iterations, even though it is likely to eventually converge to the set
of Boolean valuations at steady state, given sufficient time. We see that with a group size
of 3, the model converges fully in just under 50 000 iterations, while for a group size of 10
convergence occurs in less than 5 000 iterations. We have therefore confirmed our predication
that by increasing the number of agents involved in the consensus formation process at each
iteration, we can reduce the time required to achieve significant convergence and can even reach
consensus for a population of 1 000 agents. For an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.2 (Figure 2.12b),
the models behave very differently with less consistent opinions being allowed to combine. We
see fast convergence initially, particularly for the larger group sizes, but then a significant slow
down in the reduction of distinct valuations at various stages for the different group sizes. While
we do see convergence to a smaller set of valuations for γ = 0.2 in the group model, it appears
that for pairwise and k = 3 group models, neither model reaches a steady state before the
simulations end.
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(a) Number of distinct valuations for γ = 0.0.






























(b) Number of distinct valuations for γ = 0.2.
Figure 2.12: Three-valued group model with payoff-based selection and random three-valued opinion
initialisation shown as a trajectory for group sizes k ∈ {2, 3, 5, 10}.
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Figure 2.13: Number of distinct valuations for the three-valued group model with payoff-based selection
and random three-valued opinion initialisation, shown as a trajectory for group sizes k ∈ {2, 3, 5, 10} and
γ = 1.0.
Finally, in Figure 2.13 we show the same graph but for an inconsistency threshold γ = 1.0
where all agent pairs in the group combine their opinions via the consensus operator, where the
resulting opinions are then used to generate the probability distribution from which their new
opinions are formed. Of course, these opinions are not necessarily the same, but instead the
agents simply generate their new opinions from the same probability distribution in the case of
γ = 1.0. As we would expect, all values of k reach a consensus under this extreme inconsistency
threshold, with the pairwise model taking under 25 000 iterations, while a group size of 10 agents
achieves consensus in under 3 000 iterations. We can see clearly from this graph that a larger
value of k increases the speed of convergence when presented with a large population size, while
pairwise interactions are no longer sufficient to reach a steady state within 50 000 iterations and
would require much much longer simulation times in order to converge fully to either a steady
state or to reach a consensus amongst the population. We now look to examine the performance
of the group model in terms of payoff, and consider whether an increased convergence speed
affects the overall quality of the opinions persistent in the population.
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Figure 2.14: Average payoff for the three-valued and Boolean group models with random selection and
random Boolean opinion initialisation at steady state for different inconsistency thresholds γ and different
group sizes.
Comparing the Three-valued and Boolean group models
We analyse the performance of the three-valued group model alongside a Boolean group model
under random Boolean opinion initialisation, and use the same operator as defined in Table 2.6
to apply to each pair of agents in the group, just as we do the three-valued consensus operator
(Table 2.4). Figures 2.14 and 2.15 show results for both the three-valued and Boolean models af-
ter 50 000 iterations and for different group sizes k ∈ {2, 3, 5, 10}. Specifically, Figure 2.14 shows
the average payoff as a percentage of the maximal possible payoff for both models. Examining
the three-valued model first, we see that the average payoff is increasing with the inconsistency
threshold γ. This increases in steps of 15 = 0.2 as we have come to expect for a language size
|P| = 5, as this increase allows for a propositional variable to be inconsistent between valuations
and still be combined. Even for a strict inconsistency threshold γ = 0.2 we see an immediate
increase in average payoff, greater than that seen in the same experiments for a population of
100 agents in Section 2.5. The increased density of opinions means there are a greater number of
high quality opinions, and this seems to have a strong effect on the convergence of the system to-
wards valuations which more accurately reflect the payoff model. As γ increases, we see that this
increase continues with more severity, such that for γ = 0.4, the smallest value of average payoff
across all values of k is above 80% for groups of 2 agents, with all other group sizes averaging
above 90% of the maximal payoff. However, for group sizes 3, 5 and 10, payoff appears to remain
unchanging for more lenient values of γ > 0.4. For k = 2, however, we see that payoff continues
to increase in steps, eventually reaching a consensus of 100% payoff. This is an impressive result
for mere pairwise interactions: given its slow convergence, the three-valued model manages to
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Figure 2.15: Number of distinct valuations for the three-valued and Boolean group models with random
selection and random Boolean opinion initialisation at steady state, for different inconsistency thresholds
γ and different group sizes.
converge to a single, shared valuation which is of maximal payoff and it does so in under 50 000
iterations. Even though larger group sizes converge faster for all values of γ compared with the
pairwise model, the system performs more poorly when a meaningful consensus is sought.
For the same experiments and parameters, the Boolean model performs rather differently.
In Figures 2.14 and 2.15 the Boolean model is indicated by dashed lines of the same colour as
three-valued model. We see that the pairwise Boolean model (dashed red) behaves the same as it
did for a population size of 100 agents as it now does for 1 000 in Figure 2.14, but the rest of the
results differ greatly. For the group model, we see the Boolean model increase in average payoff
for 0.2 ≤ γ < 0.6, although the model averages less payoff for each group size than the three-
valued model does. For γ ≥ 0.6, the Boolean model behaves very differently, with average payoff
decreasing for larger values of γ until the model eventually averages back around 0% for γ = 1.0.
This surprising result can be better explained by Figure 2.15 where we present the number of
distinct valuations for both the three-valued and Boolean variants of the group model. As we
again see the three-valued model converging towards a smaller subset of distinct valuations with
each increase in γ of 0.2 (except for in the pairwise case), the Boolean model behaves rather
differently, just as it does in relation to average payoff. The pairwise Boolean model retains all
32 Boolean valuations across most of the range of inconsistency thresholds γ, never achieving
consensus as in the three-valued model for γ = 1.0, and only deviating from the 32 valuations
for 0.2 ≤ γ < 0.4 where the inconsistency allows for the combination of opinions for which one
propositional variable is conflicting. What is more interesting perhaps is the performance of the
group model for k > 2 where we see the model begin to converge for γ ≥ 0.2, though never
47
quite reaching consensus. Then for γ = 0.6 we see the opposite effect as the Boolean group
model fails to reach any further convergence, and instead convergence is weakened across the
population, until we reach γ = 1.0 where once again all 32 Boolean valuations persist amongst
the population, just as at initialisation.
In Figure 2.16 we study the case of γ = 1.0 more closely as trajectories for both the average
payoff and the number of distinct valuations so that we might understand why the Boolean model
performs so poorly after having performed much better for lower inconsistency thresholds. For
Figure 2.16a we see that the three-valued model converges to high average payoff in around 5 000
iterations for k > 2, and the pairwise model looks to have converged in under 18 000 iterations.
For the Boolean model, however, we notice very little change regarding performance. Across the
full running times of the experiments, all 50 000 iterations, we do see variation increasing as the
number of iterations increases, but we see that this leads to very little performance gain which is
likely as much noise as it is improved performance, with small deviations from 0% matched with
increasing variation both in positive and negative payoff. In Figure 2.16b, for the number of
distinct valuations, we see the three-valued model increase this number dramatically within the
first 1 000 iterations where vagueness is introduced in the population, followed by a rather swift
decline. All values of k > 2 for the three-valued group model converge by 10 000 iterations, with
the pairwise model converging later at just under 30 000 iterations. The Boolean model presents
a stark contrast with the three-valued model. The inability of the Boolean model to introduce
vagueness into the opinions of agents causes the population to change little for well over 20 000
iterations. By 30 000 iterations the group size of 10 sees some convergence to a smaller subset
of distinct valuations but by 50 000 iterations the model remains far from consensus, with the
other group sizes achieving little to no reduction in the number of distinct valuations.
Clearly, then, the Boolean model struggles to achieve any meaningful convergence for more
extreme values of γ within a reasonable time, when compared with the three-value model. it is
likely that the model would eventually converge provided enough time, but we have seen that
the three-valued pairwise model achieves 100% of the maximal possible payoff at steady state
for a language size of 5 and an inconsistency threshold γ = 1.0. Furthermore, it does so in under
20 000 iterations, where the Boolean model with a group size of 10 agents would likely require
beyond 150 000 iterations to reach a consensus and smaller group sizes further still. For larger
group sizes, the three-valued model converges more quickly, and it does so with higher average
payoff for lower values of γ, but is eventually succeeded by the pairwise model for γ = 1.0.
Therefore, there is a trade-off to be made between speed of convergence to a valuation of high
quality, and slower convergence to maximal payoff; the most accurate of valuations.
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(b) Number of distinct valuations.
Figure 2.16: Three-valued and Boolean group models with random selection and random Boolean
opinion initialisation at steady state for an inconsistency thresholds γ = 1.0 and different group sizes.
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2.8 Conclusions
At this point it is worth discussing the contributions of the work so far, as well as some motiva-
tions for the following chapters of this thesis. We have shown, through simulation studies, how a
three-valued model for consensus exhibits strong convergence in a multi-agent setting, enabling
the system to form consensus (that is, to converge unanimously to a single, shared valuation)
for a range of different language sizes and sufficiently large inconsistency threshold values. We
discussed some properties of the inconsistency threshold applied throughout our experiments as
a means of preventing inconsistent combinations between pairs of strongly conflicting agents,
and how, for a fairly conservative inconsistency threshold γ = 0.2, the population manages to
achieve strong convergence across the range of language sizes studied. We also mentioned earlier
that the inconsistency threshold is inspired by similar means of limiting agent interactions, such
as bounded confidence [31] and relative agreement [18]. Perhaps more interestingly, we have
been able to show that the introduction of vagueness into the opinions of agents does not nega-
tively affect the decision making process, either by causing the population to adopt completely
vague opinions (i.e. where all propositional variables are assigned the borderline truth value 12)
as a means of avoiding further conflict, or by allowing highly conflicting agents to diverge and
form a population of bipolar opinions. Indeed at lower values of γ it may be surprising to still
see reasonable convergence occurring, but due to the way the inconsistency measure is defined,
borderline valuations remain consistent with more strong valuations. As such, the three-valued
model is capable of reducing the initial population of uniformly distributed three-valued opinions
from 100 (for a population of 100 agents) to under 25 unique opinions on average, at steady
state, for a language size of 5. Similarly, for a language size of 10 we see the population converges
on a subset of the initial opinions, averaging just over 50 unique opinions at steady state. While
this had been shown to be the case for the single propositional variable case in [57], it has not,
until now, been extended for the multi-propositional variable case.
We have also introduced a feedback mechanism in the form of payoff which allows us to bias
agent selection in order to drive convergence to opinions that more accurately reflect the ‘true’
state of the world, according to the chosen payoff model. We also introduced a stochastic Boolean
version of the consensus operator with which we compared the three-valued consensus model
with a Boolean version to further study how the ability to adopt a more vague interpretation of
propositions improves the convergence of agents with highly conflicting opinions. As a result, we
have shown through direct comparisons that the three-valued model outperforms the Boolean
model both in terms of convergence speed, as well as average payoff, with the Boolean model
often achieving no significant gain in average payoff and the three-valued model achieving an
average payoff above 60% for a population of 100 agents and a language size of 5. This supports
the motivating hypothesis of this work which is that a three-valued model of consensus improves
convergence across both language sizes and population sizes. We see that the third truth value
allows for the introduction of vagueness as a means of smoothing the combination of agent
opinions, allowing both agents to adopt a consistent, intermediary valuation. Otherwise, agents
would either be unable to reach an agreement, or one agent would be forced to adopt the opposite
valuation for each inconsistent propositional variable, which seems counter-intuitive given that
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we are attempting to make the minimal changes to achieve consistency, without agents having
to adopt a new opinion which is in direct conflict with their current opinion.
Finally we introduced a group-based consensus model in which small groups of agents are
selected from the population at each iteration, rather than a single pair of agents. Within the
group, agents attempt to update their opinions to reflect the opinions of those other agents
with which their opinions are consistent. The intention of this model is to improve the speed of
convergence in large populations of agents where the pairwise model slows with the increasing
population size. By involving a larger number of agents in the consensus process, we achieved
a speed up in convergence over the pairwise model, albeit at the cost of reduced average payoff
after the 50 000 iterations. We saw that for the three-valued model, pairwise combinations of
opinions actually achieves 100% of the maximal payoff in the population whereas for the group
model, payoff suffers as the group size increases. However, convergence occurs more quickly for
larger group sizes. Therefore we see that both models have their advantages and the context





From Vague Opinions to Uncertain Beliefs
In the preceding chapter, we introduced a formalism for representing vague opinions using
Kleene’s three-valued logic where the third truth value represented an intermediate state be-
tween absolutely true and absolutely false meaning borderline. We then exploited this third
truth value through the use of a consensus operator. This allowed conflicting agents to reach an
agreement about a set of propositions for which their opinions were inconsistent i.e. where one
believes a proposition to be true and the other believes it to be false; an issue that has no obvious
resolution when using Boolean logic. In this chapter we transition from Kleene valuations as a
representation of vague opinions to Kleene belief pairs as a representation of vague and uncertain
beliefs [41]. This is an important distinction as we are allowing agents to express uncertainty
as to which Kleene valuation they believe to be correct as opposed to a single, certain opinion
being held by each agent, as was the case throughout the previous chapter.
We begin this chapter by redefining many aspects of the model presented in Chapter 2 in
order to take account of the presence of probabilistic uncertainty. We then present simulation
results in order to examine how well our new model is able to combine vagueness with uncertainty
across a population of 1 000 agents in order to assess the ability of our model to scale to such
large numbers of agents and to still form consensus. Following this, we examine how our model
performs when we select agents based on the accuracy of their beliefs according to the ‘true’
state of the world, just as we did in Chapter 2. Given that agents may now express uncertainty,
we must re-examine the model’s ability to converge towards a perceived ‘true’ belief as opposed
to random consensus. Finally we highlight how consensus in multi-agent systems may provide
additional utility beyond forming an agreement for the purpose of decision-making. We do
so by combining our model of consensus for vague and uncertain beliefs with evidential belief
updating. We then study the resulting model’s ability to disseminate evidence when compared
with an evidence-only model in which agents do not form consensus, but instead receive direct
evidence with which they update their beliefs. We believe that combining evidential updating
with consensus greatly improves evidence dissemination across a large population of agents, even
for very low rates of evidence delivery.
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3.1 Related work
This chapter is an extension of the model presented in Chapter 2 and hence all of the work
highlighted in Section 2.1 remains relevant. For example, we continue to employ an inconsistency
measure as in Definition 2.7 which (although adapted) still follows from the similar idea of
bounded confidence [18, 31] as a means of limiting agent interaction to those pairs of agents
whose inconsistency measure is below a threshold denoted by γ. Several models for consensus
also exploit a third truth state to aid convergence as also mentioned in the previous chapter
[1, 16, 57, 79].
The aggregation of uncertain beliefs in the form of a probability distribution over some
underlying parameter has been widely studied with work on opinion pooling dating back to De-
Groot [19] and Stone [69]. Usually this aggregate of a set of opinions takes the form of a weighted
linear combination of the associated probability distributions. Aside from the aforementioned
assumption that agents are able to assign weights a priori to all other agents in the popula-
tion, such a method relies on the ability of agents to communicate with all other agents in the
population, as well as the ability to merge large numbers of probability distributions in a more
meaningful manner. The convergence of alternative opinion pooling functions therefore has been
studied by Hegselmann and Krause [32] and axiomatic characterizations of different operators
are given in [20]. However, all of these approaches assume Boolean truth states; indeed, there
are very few studies in this context that combine probability with a three-valued truth model.
One such is [6] in which the authors adopt a model of beliefs in the form of Dempster-Shafer
functions. The combination operator proposed in [6], however, is quite different from those
described in this thesis and results in quite different limiting behaviour. The consensus operator
investigated in this chapter was first proposed by Lawry and Dubois in [41], as the previous
version was in Chapter 2, as an extension of the approach of [57] to take account of probabilistic
uncertainty.
Later in this chapter we consider how consensus can be used to propagate a form of direct
evidence through a large population of agents and compare this with only evidential updating
taking place. A recent review by Douven [22] covers several computation models in the field
of social epistemology that combine a form of agent compromise and evidential updating, in-
cluding [31, 32] and [61], before concluding that models which combine both aspects of belief
updating lead to agents having more accurate belief states than systems which rely solely upon
evidential updating.
3.2 Model
Overview. Consensus formation is investigated for multi-agent systems in which agents’ be-
liefs are both vague and uncertain. Vagueness is represented by a third truth state meaning
borderline, as discussed in Chapter 2. We combine this model with a probabilistic model of
uncertainty, and then propose a modified belief combination operator which exploits border-
line truth values to enable agents with conflicting beliefs to reach a compromise. It should be
noted that there is an important distinction to be made between the role of three-valued logic
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in conveying vagueness and the role of probability representing uncertainty. In this model, the
third truth state models inherently borderline cases resulting from the existence of truth-gaps
for vague propositions, while probability quantifies uncertainty about the state of the world i.e.
it is possible for an agent to be completely certain that a proposition is borderline.
3.2.1 A restatement of the three-valued model for consensus of vague beliefs
As in Chapter 2 we adopt a propositional logic setting based on Kleene’s strong three-valued
logic [39] and combine this with a probabilistic model of uncertainty. We consider a finite lan-
guage L consisting of the connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬, and n propositional variables P = {p1, . . . , pn},
where each propositional variable can have one of the three truth values 0, denoting false, 12 ,
denoting borderline and 1, denoting true. A valuation on L corresponds to an allocation of a
truth value to each of the propositional variables, following from Definition 2.1. Consequently,
a valuation may be naturally represented as an n dimensional vector v ∈ {0, 12 , 1}
n; a simpli-
fication we adopt for the remainder of this chapter. We let v(pi) denote the i’th dimension of
v as corresponding to the truth value of the propositional variable pi in the valuation v. In
the absence of any uncertainty we assume than an agent’s opinion is represented by a single
valuation. For two agents with distinct and possibly conflicting opinions v1,v2 ∈ {0, 12 , 1}
n to
reach a compromise position or consensus we apply the operator in Definition 2.5 and based on
the truth table given in Table 2.4 which is applied to each propositional variable independently
so that:
v1  v2 = (v1(p1) v2(p1), . . . ,v1(pn) v2(pn)).
See Section 2.2 for additional information regarding the intuition behind this operator.
3.2.2 A representation of vague and uncertain beliefs
Here we extend the model described in Chapter 2 so as to allow agents to hold opinions which
are uncertain as well as vague. More specifically, an integrated approach to uncertainty and
vagueness is adopted in which an agent’s belief is characterised by a probability distribution w
over {0, 12 , 1}
n so that w(v) quantifies the agent’s belief that v is the correct valuation of L.
This naturally generates lower and upper belief measures on L quantifying the agent’s belief
that a given proposition is true and that it is not false respectively [44]. That is; for pi ∈ P, 1
µ(pi) = w({v : v(pi) = 1}) and
µ(pi) = w({v : v(pi) 6= 0}).
The probability of each of the possible truth values for a propositional variable pi can be re-
captured from the lower and upper belief measures such that the probabilities that pi is true,
borderline and false are given by µ(pi), µ(pi) − µ(pi) and 1 − µ(pi), respectively. Hence, if we
assume that the truth value of each propositional variable is independent, we can represent an
1In the following we slightly abuse notation and also use w to denote the probability measure generated by
the probability distribution w.
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agent’s belief by a vector of pairs of lower and upper belief values for each variable as follows:
µ = ((µ(p1), µ(p1)), . . . , (µ(pn), µ(pn))).
Here we let µ(pi) denote (µ(pi), µ(pi)), the pair of lower and upper belief values for pi. In the
case that a belief µ gives probability zero to the borderline truth value for every propositional
variable in P so that µ(pi) = µ(pi) = µ(pi) for i = 1, . . . , n, then we call µ a crisp belief.
The following definition expands the consensus operation  from three-valued valuations to
this more general representation framework.
Definition 3.1. Consensus operator for beliefs
For beliefs µ1 and µ2 we define the consensus operator as follows:











(pi) = µ1(pi)× µ2(pi) + µ1(pi)× µ2(pi)− µ1(pi)× µ2(pi)
and




If µ1 and µ2 are generated by the probability distributions w1 and w2 on {0, 12 , 1}
n respec-
tively, then µ1  µ2 corresponds to the lower and upper measures generated by the following
combined probability distribution on {0, 12 , 1}
n [41]:




In other words, assuming that the two agents are independent, all pairs of valuations supported
by the two agents are combined using the consensus operator for valuations and then aggregated.
Interestingly, this operator can be reformulated as a special case of the union combination
operator in Dempster-Shafter theory (see [67]) proposed by [24]. To see this notice that given a
probability distribution w on {0, 12 , 1} we can generate a Dempster-Shafer mass function m on
the power set of {0, 1} for each propositional variable pi such that:
m({1}) = w({v : v(pi) = 1}) = µ(pi)
m({0}) = w({v : v(pi) = 0}) = 1− µ(pi)
m({0, 1}) = w({v : v(pi) =
1
2
}) = µ(pi)− µ(pi).
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 1 : 0.6 12 : 0.2 0 : 0.2
1 : 0.4 1 : 0.24 1 : 0.08 12 : 0.08
1
2 : 0.3 1 : 0.18
1
2 : 0.06 0 : 0.06
0 : 0.3 12 : 0.18 0 : 0.06 0 : 0.06
Table 3.1: Probability table for the consensus operator.
In this reformulation then the lower and upper measures µ(pi) and µ(pi) correspond to the
Dempster-Shafer belief and plausibility of the focal set {1}, as generated by m, respectively.
Now in this context the union combination operator is defined as follows: Let m1 and m2 be
two mass functions generated as above by probability distributions w1 and w2. Also let c be a
set combination function defined as:
c(A,B) =
A ∩B : A ∩B 6= ∅A ∪B : otherwise.










(pi) and µ1  µ2(pi) as given in Definition 3.1.
Example 3.1. Suppose two agents have the following beliefs about propositional variable pi:
µ1(pi) = (0.6, 0.8) and µ2(pi) = (0.4, 0.7). The associated probability distributions on valua-
tions, w1 and w2, are then such that:
w1({v : v(pi) = 1}) = 0.6,
w1({v : v(pi) =
1
2
}) = 0.8− 0.6 = 0.2,
w1({v : v(pi) = 0}) = 1− 0.8 = 0.2, and
w2({v : v(pi) = 1}) = 0.4,
w2({v : v(pi) =
1
2
}) = 0.7− 0.4 = 0.3,
w2({v : v(pi) = 0}) = 1− 0.7 = 0.3.
From this we can generate the probability table shown in Table 3.1. Here the corresponding
truth values are generated as in Table 2.4 and the probability values in each cell are the product
of the associated row and column probability values. From this table we can then determine the
consensus belief in pi by taking the sum of the probabilities of the cells with truth value 1 to
give the lower measure and the sum of the probabilities of the cells with truth values of either
57





(pi) = 0.24 + 0.08 + 0.18 = 0.5
µ2  µ2(pi) = 0.24 + 0.08 + 0.18 + 0.18 + 0.06 + 0.08 = 0.82.
3.2.3 Measures for uncertain beliefs
We now introduce three measures which will subsequently be used to analyse the behaviour of
multi-agent systems applying the operator given in Definition 3.1.
Definition 3.2. A measure of vagueness






Definition 3.2 is simply the probability of the truth value 12 averaged across the n propositions
in P. Since in this model vagueness is associated with borderline truth values then this provides
an intuitive measure of the degree of vagueness of an opinion. Accordingly the most vague belief
has (µ(pi), µ(pi)) = (0, 1) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Definition 3.3. A measure of uncertainty







H(pi) = −µ(pi) log2(µ(pi))− (µ(pi)− µ(pi)) log2(µ(pi)− µ(pi))
−(1− µ(pi)) log2(1− µ(pi)).
Definition 3.3 corresponds to the entropy of the marginal distributions on {0, 12 , 1} averaged
across the n propositions. Hence, according to this measure the most uncertain belief allocates


















The most certain beliefs then correspond to those for which for every proposition (µ(pi), µ(pi)) =
(0, 0), (0, 1) or (1, 1).
Definition 3.4. A measure of inconsistency





































Figure 3.1: Number of unique beliefs after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ and
various language sizes |P|.
Definition 3.4 is the probability of a direct conflict between the two agents’ beliefs, i.e. with
agent 1 allocating the truth value 1 and agent 2 the truth value 0 or vice versa, this being then
averaged across all n propositions.
3.3 Experiments with random agent selection
We now describe simulation experiments in which pairs of agents are selected to interact at
random. For each selected pair of agents the consensus operation (Definition 3.1) is applied if
and only if the measure of inconsistency between their beliefs, as given in Definition 3.4, does
not exceed a threshold parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that with γ = 0 we have a very conservative
model in which only entirely consistent beliefs can be combined, while for the case that γ = 1
we have a model which is equivalent to a totally connected interaction graph, whereby any pair
of randomly selected agents may combine their beliefs. In the following, results are presented
for a population of 1 000 agents and for the language sizes |P| ∈ {1, 3, 5}. The agents’ beliefs are
initialized by sampling at random from the space of all possible beliefs {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 : x ≤ y}n.
Each run of the simulation is terminated after 50 000 iterations2 and the results are averaged
over 100 independent runs, with error bars indicating the 10th and 90th percentiles.
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Figure 3.2: Average vagueness after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ and various
language sizes |P|.
3.3.1 Results
Figure 3.1 shows that the mean number of unique beliefs after 50 000 iterations decreases with
γ and for γ ≥ 0.5 there is on average a single belief shared across the population for all language
sizes |P|. Furthermore, Figure 3.2 shows that the vagueness of beliefs, as given in Definition 3.2,
averaged both across the different agents and across the independent simulation runs, also
decreases with γ so that for γ ≥ 0.5 the population has converged to crisp beliefs, i.e. those
with a vagueness measure value of 0. Similarly, from Figure 3.3 we can see that the entropy of
beliefs, as given by Definition 3.3, decreases with γ and for γ ≥ 0.5 at the end of the simulation
the population hold beliefs with mean entropy 0. Hence, summarising Figures 3.1 to 3.3, we
have that provided the consistency restrictions are sufficiently relaxed, i.e. for γ ≥ 0.5, then a
population with beliefs initially allocated at random and with random interactions will converge
to a single belief which is both crisp and certain. Unsurprisingly, given the random nature of
the agent interactions, the 2n beliefs of this form occur with a uniform distribution across the
100 independent runs of the simulation.
In addition to the overall consensus reached between agents when γ ≥ 0.5, intermediate
values of γ between 0.15 and 0.35 tend to result in a population with highly polarised opinions.
To see this consider Figure 3.4 showing the average pairwise inconsistency measure value between
agents at the end of this simulation and plotted against γ. For example, consider the case when
|P| = 1 shown as the red line in Figures 3.1 to 3.4. In this case we see that the mean inconsistency
value obtains a maximum of 0.5 at around γ = 0.3. Furthermore, from Figures 3.1 to 3.3 we
2We found that 50 000 iterations was sufficient to allow simulations to converge across a range of parameter
settings.
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Figure 3.3: Average entropy after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ and various
language sizes |P|.
see that for this value of γ the average number of unique beliefs, the vagueness, and entropy are
all relatively low. Consequently, we are seeing a polarisation of opinions where individuals are
holding a small number of highly inconsistent beliefs which are also relatively crisp and certain.
Such behaviour, while still present, is less pronounced for language sizes |P| = 3 and 5. This
may be due to the fact that, since Definition 3.4 is an average of inconsistency values across
the propositions in P, increasing the language size reduces the variance of the inconsistency
values in the initial population. Furthermore, as |P| increases, the distribution of inconsistency
values is approximately normal with mean 29 . Hence, for γ ≥
2
9 the probability that a randomly
selected pair of agents will have an inconsistency value exceeding γ decreases as |P| increases.
This in turn will increase the probability of agreement in any interaction, reducing the likelihood
of opinion polarisation for γ ≥ 29 .
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Figure 3.4: Average pairwise inconsistency after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds
γ and various language sizes |P|.
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3.4 Experiments with agent selection influenced by belief qual-
ity.
In the following definition we propose a measure of belief quality which quantifies the similarity
of an agent’s beliefs to the true state of the world. This will subsequently be used to assess
the extent to which the population has converged to the truth. Furthermore, it will also be
employed in the next section as a mechanism for providing indirect information about the state
of the world. As in Section 2.4.1 we assume that the true state of the world is chosen at random
from {0, 1}n. This represents complete certainty in the true state being reflected by a Boolean
valuation v∗(pi) ∈ {0, 1} for pi ∈ P. Then we can define a measure of quality for vague and
uncertain beliefs.
Definition 3.5. A measure of quality
Let f : L → {−1, 1} be such that f(pi) = 2v∗(pi) − 1 is the payoff for believing that pi has
truth value 1 and −f(pi) is the payoff for believing that the truth value of pi is 0. Furthermore,
it is always assumed that believing that pi has truth value
1
2 has payoff 0. Then we define the




f(pi)(µ(pi) + µ(pi)− 1)
)
.
Notice that f(pi)(µ(pi) + µ(pi)− 1) = f(pi)µ(pi) + (−f(pi))(1− µ(pi)) corresponding to the
agent’s expected payoff from their beliefs about proposition pi. Definition 3.5 then takes the
sum of this expected payoff across the propositions in P as a reformulation of Definition 2.8
incorporating probabilistic uncertainty.
In this section we consider a scenario in which agents receive indirect feedback about the
accuracy of their beliefs in the form of payoff or reward obtained as a result of actions that
they have taken on the basis of these beliefs. Furthermore, we assume that the closer that an
agent’s beliefs are to the actual state of the world then the higher their rewards will be on
average. Hence, we use the payoff measure given in Definition 3.5 as a proxy for this process
so that agent selection in the consensus formation process is guided by the payoff or quality
measure of their beliefs. More specifically, we now investigate an agent-based system in which
pairs of agents are selected for interaction with a probability that is proportional to the product
of the quality of their respective beliefs. For modelling societal opinion dynamics this captures
an assumption that better performing agents, i.e. those with higher payoff, are more likely
to interact in a context in which both parties will benefit from reaching an agreement. In
biological systems there are examples of a similar quality effect on distributed decision making.
For instance, honeybee swarms collectively choose between alternative nesting sites by means of
a dance in which individual bees indicate the direction of the site that they have just visited [48].
The duration of the dance is dependant on the quality of the site and this in turn affects the
likelihood that the dancer will influence other bees. Artificial systems can of course be designed
so that interactions are guided by quality provided that a suitable measure of the latter can de
defined, as is typically the case in evolutionary computing.
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Figure 3.5: Number of unique beliefs after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ and
|P| = 5.
3.4.1 Results
We now describe the results from running agent-based simulations mainly following the same
template as described in Section 3.3 but with an important difference. Instead of being selected
at random, agents were instead selected for interaction with probability proportional to the
quality value of their beliefs as given in Definition 3.5. These experiments therefore follow the
same template as those in Section 2.3 but where beliefs are now both vague and uncertain. The
true state of the world v∗ was chosen at random from {0, 1}n prior to running the simulation
and the payoff function f was then determined as in Definition 3.5. As in the previous sections
the population consisted of 1 000 agents with initial beliefs selected at random from {(x, y) ∈
[0, 1] : x ≤ y}n. All results in this section relate to the language size |P| = 5.
Figure 3.5 shows the mean number of unique beliefs for the consensus operator after 50 000
iterations plotted against the inconsistency threshold γ. For γ ≥ 0.5 applying the consensus
operator results in the population of agents converging on a single shared belief. Figures 3.6
and 3.7 show the average vagueness and entropy of the beliefs held across the population of
agents at the end of the simulation. In Figure 3.6 we see that for γ ≥ 0.5 the beliefs resulting
from applying the consensus operator are crisp. Figure 3.7 shows that the mean entropy values
decreases as γ increases resulting in an average entropy of 0 for γ ≥ 0.5. Overall then, as in
Section 3.3, for γ ≥ 0.5 the population of agents converge on a single shared belief which is both
crisp and certain.
Figure 3.9 shows the average quality of beliefs (Definition 3.5) at the end of the simulation,
plotted against γ and given as the percentage of the maximum possible quality value. For
γ ≥ 0.5 the consensus operator converges on a single shared crisp and certain belief with a
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Figure 3.6: Average vagueness after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ and |P| = 5.






















Figure 3.7: Average entropy after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ and |P| = 5.
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Figure 3.8: Average pairwise inconsistency after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds
γ and |P| = 5.






































Figure 3.9: Average payoff after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ and |P| = 5.
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quality value which is on average over 80% of the maximum. Hence, unlike in Section 3.3 in
which convergence can be to any of the 2n crisp and certain beliefs at random, agent interactions
guided by relative quality converge with higher probability to those beliefs amongst the 2n that
are the closest to the actual state of the world.
3.5 Combining consensus formation and evidential belief updat-
ing
Hegselmann and Krause [32] investigated an opinion model in which agents receive direct evi-
dence about the state of the world, perhaps from an ongoing measurement process, as well as
pooling the opinion of others with similar beliefs. The original Hegselmann-Krause model [31]
involves real valued beliefs but this has been adapted to the case in which beliefs and evidence are
theories in a propositional logic language [61]. The fundamental question under consideration
is whether or to what extent dialogue between individuals, for example scientists, helps them
to find the truth or instead whether they are better off simply to wait until they receive direct
evidence? In this section we investigate this question in the context of vague and uncertain
beliefs and where consensus formation is modelled using the combination operator in Definition
3.1. Direct evidence is then provided to the population at random instances when an individual
is told the truth value of a proposition. That agent then updates their beliefs by adopting a
compromise position between their current opinions and the evidence provided.
The simulations consist of 1 000 agents with beliefs initially picked at random from {(x, y) ∈
[0, 1]2 : x ≤ y}n as before. Furthermore, the true state of the world v∗ is picked at random
from {0, 1}n prior to the simulation and the payoff f calculated as in Definition 3.5. Each run
of the simulation is terminated after 50 000 iterations and the results are averaged over 100
runs. At each iteration two agents are selected at random and apply the consensus operator
(Definition 3.1) provided that the inconsistency level of their current beliefs does not exceed γ.
Furthermore, at each iteration there is a fixed α% chance of direct evidence being presented to
the population. In the case that it is, an agent is selected at random and told the value of v∗(pi)
for some proposition also selected at random from those in P. The agent then updates their
current beliefs µ to µ′ where
µ′ = µ µ∗ = µ ((0, 1), . . . , (v∗(pi),v∗(pi)), . . . , (0, 1)) .
In other words, the agent adopts a new set of beliefs formed as a compromise between their
current beliefs and the evidence, the latter being interpreted as a set of beliefs where µ∗(pi) =
(v∗(pi),v
∗(pi)) and µ
∗(pj) = (0, 1) for j 6= i. That is they form consensus with an alternative
opinion which is certain about the truth value of pi and is neutral about the other propositions.
Notice that in this case it follows from Definition 3.1 that µ′(pi) = (µ(p1), 1) if v
∗(pi) = 1,
µ′(pi) = (0, µ(pi)) if v
∗(pi) = 0 and µ
′(pj) = µ(pj) for j 6= i. The combined consensus and
evidential belief updating approach can then be compared with simulations in which only the
above belief updating model is applied and in which there is no consensus formation.
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3.5.1 Results
In this section we focus on evidence rates of α = 5, 15 and 30% and we assume that the
language size is |P| = 5. For these parameter settings Figure 3.10a shows that for γ ≥ 0.4,
all three cases in which evidential updating is combined with consensus formation converge on
shared belief across the population. Furthermore, the higher the evidence rate α, the greater the
convergence for any given threshold value γ. It is also clear from Figure 3.10a that combining
consensus formation with evidential updating leads to much better convergence than evidence
based updating alone. For instance, we see that for evidential updating alone it is only with
an evidence rate of 30% that there is a large reduction in the number of distinct beliefs in the
population after 50 000 iterations, with the population still containing over 950 different opinions
for both the 5% and 15% rates. Furthermore, Figure 3.10b shows a typical trajectory for the
average number of unique beliefs against iteration when γ = 0.8. Notice that after 25, 000
iterations all three of the combined models have converged to a single shared belief. In contrast
the evidence-only approaches have still not converged after 50 000 iterations, where even with a
30% evidence rate there are still over 600 distinct opinions remaining in the population.
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(a) Number of unique beliefs after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ.






















(b) Number of unique beliefs over 50 000 iterations for γ = 0.8.
Figure 3.10: Unique belief results for |P| = 5 and evidence rates α = 5, 15 and 30%. The solid lines
refer to evidential updating combined with consensus formation while the dotted lines refer to evidential
updating only.
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Figure 3.11: Average vagueness after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ, |P| = 5
and evidence rates α = 5, 15 and 30%. The solid lines refer to evidential updating combined with
consensus formation while the dotted lines refer to evidential updating only.
Taken together with Figure 3.10a, Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show that, assuming a sufficiently
high threshold value γ ≥ 0.4, the combined consensus formation and updating approach results
in convergence to a shared belief which is both crisp and certain. Again, increasing the evidence
rate leads to a reduction in both the average vagueness and average entropy for any given
threshold value and evidence based updating alone results in much higher values for the same
evidence rate. The overall convergence of the population is also shown by the average pairwise
inconsistency values in Figure 3.13. The convergence of the combined approach to a shared
opinion for all evidence rates and thresholds γ ≥ 0.4 is reflected in a zero average inconsistency
level for this range of parameters. Notice, however, that for all evidence rates the average
inconsistency for the combined approach has a peak value in the range 0 < γ < 0.4, suggesting
that there is some polarisation of opinion for thresholds in this range. For evidence updating
only the level of inconsistency is relatively higher than for the combined approach for all evidence
rates suggesting that there is a much higher level of disagreement remaining between agents after
50 000 iterations.
Finally, Figure 3.14 shows the average payoff values calculated as in Definition 3.5 and given
as a percentage of the maximum possible value i.e. in this case 5. These values reflect the extent
to which the population has converged to a set of beliefs close to the true state of the world.
For each of the three evidence rates, given a sufficiently high threshold value, the combined
approach results in an average payoff which is significantly higher than for evidential updating
alone. Indeed for a 30% evidence rate and γ ≥ 0.3 the combination of consensus formation
and belief updating results in close to the maximum payoff value on average i.e. the population
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Figure 3.12: Average entropy after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ, |P| = 5 and
evidence rates α = 5, 15 and 30%. The solid lines refer to evidential updating combined with consensus
formation while the dotted lines refer to evidential updating only.

































Figure 3.13: Average pairwise inconsistency after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds
γ, |P| = 5 and evidence rates α = 5, 15 and 30%. The solid lines refer to evidential updating combined
with consensus formation while the dotted lines refer to evidential updating only.
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Figure 3.14: Average payoff after 50 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ, |P| = 5 and
evidence rates α = 5, 15 and 30%. The solid lines refer to evidential updating combined with consensus
formation while the dotted lines refer to evidential updating only.
has learnt the state of the world with an average accuracy of close to 100%. Perhaps a more
interesting result is that combining an evidence rate of 15% with consensus outperforms double
the evidence rate of 30% for γ ≥ 0.6. That is, with a 15% rate of evidence dissemination, the
process of consensus propagates the evidence more effectively than if we double the evidence
rate without consensus taking place. In comparison to the payoff-based experiments described
in Section 3.4 we see that the payoff shown in Figure 3.5 when combining a 15% direct evidence
rate with consensus formation and based on random interactions, is similar to that obtained
when biasing agent selection based on belief quality (see Figure 3.9).
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have investigated consensus formation for a multi-agent system in which
agents’ beliefs are both vague and uncertain. For this we have adopted a formalism which
combines three truth states with probability, resulting in opinions which are quantified by lower
and upper belief measures. The combination operator from Chapter 2 is extended in order to
incorporate this additional uncertainty, as have the several measures that are used to analyse
the convergence results of the model. In simulation experiments we have applied this operator to
random agent interactions constrained by the requirement that agreement can only be reached
between agents holding beliefs which are sufficiently consistent with each other. Provided that
this consistency requirement is not too restrictive then the population of agents is shown to
converge on a single shared belief which is both crisp and certain. While we had shown that
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agent populations converge to crisp beliefs in Chapter 2 under similar constraints, we have now
shown additional convergence results for an enlarged population of 1 000 agents with uncertain
beliefs. We have also studied smaller values of |P|, including the single propositional variable
case for completeness.
Furthermore, we have investigated the use of consensus as a means of propagating informa-
tion through a distributed system of agents, where at each iteration and for a given evidence
rate α, there is an α% chance that a randomly selected agent shall receive evidence about the
state of the world and then incorporate it into their current belief. We show that, if combined
with evidence about the state of the world, either in a direct or indirect way, then consensus
formation of the kind presented in this chapter results in better convergence to the truth than
just evidential belief updating. This reaffirms the claims of Douven [22] and Kelp [23] in which
the authors argue that evidence propagation is greatly improved when combining evidential
updating with some form of belief compromise between agents, after highlighting several other
models which also support this argument.
An avenue for future research in this context is to consider noisy evidence. Evidential
updating is rarely perfect and, for example, experiments can be prone to measurement errors.
An interesting question is therefore, how does the combined consensus formation and updating
approach described in Section 3.5 cope with such noise? Later in Chapter 4 we apply our
approach to distributed decision making scenarios such as, for example, in swarm robotics, where
we consider another kind of robustness in our approach, namely robustness to malfunction.
Overall, these results provide some evidence for the beneficial effects of allowing agents to
hold beliefs which are both vague and uncertain, in the context of consensus formation. However,
in this chapter we have only studied pairwise interactions between agents, while in the literature
it is normally intended that pooling operators should be used to aggregate uncertain beliefs
across a group of agents [19, 20]. In Chapter 2 we investigated a form of group-wide belief
updating and showed that this detracted from the consensus formation process in relation to
increasing the average payoff of the population, although it did speed up the convergence process
for larger groups. We have not repeated similar experiments in this chapter, however, due to the
similarity of the results between both models as we felt that this similarity would be reproduced
in group-wide consensus experiments. It is also not entirely obvious how we would develop a
group model which takes into account the uncertainty of agents’ beliefs, and so further work
is needed in this area. Probabilistic pooling operators also take account of different weights
associated with the beliefs of different agents and it would be interesting to investigate if this
can be incorporated in our approach. It is our belief, however, that to assume agents possess
preassigned weights about one another is unintuitive, though certain scenarios may invoke such





In preceding chapters we have proposed a model for consensus in multi-agent systems, extended
the model by combining vagueness with epistemic uncertainty, and studied some of the system-
level convergence properties. We have focused primarily on a pairwise model for combining
beliefs, but have also proposed a model for combining beliefs in small groups of agents and have
identified several limitations associated with this model, which was developed in order to achieve
faster convergence by combining beliefs in larger numbers per iteration. In these simulation ex-
periments, the only restriction on agent interactions is that the beliefs of the agents involved
are relatively consistent with each other, where the latter is modelled using a threshold on the
inconsistency measure (see Chapter 2, Definition 2.7). However, in robotic systems there are
often additional constraints on interactions, the effects of which are disregarded in most theo-
retical models. For example, there are typically communication constraints according to which
individuals can only communicate directly with others within their range of communication.
This can be either due to hardware limitations, or a feature of the environment in which these
robotic systems are deployed. Therefore, in this chapter we explore a model of consensus applied
to robotic systems which includes these spatial constraints.
Decentralised methods are also considered to be more robust than their centralised coun-
terparts because there is no single point of failure, but this is seldom tested [51]. In many
applications it is crucial for robot swarms to be robust to a variety of different types of noise
as well as hardware and software failure. In particular, the lack of calibration and the use of
low-cost hardware can sometimes cause catastrophic failure [63]. In [81] five distinct ways are
identified in which a swarm can be robust, including being tolerant to noise and uncertainties in
the environment, or because it has no common-mode point of failure. The notion of robustness
that concerns us here relates to ‘individual robots who fail in such a way as to thwart the overall
desired swarm behaviour’. For the best-of-n problem [56] (discussed in Section 4.1), the desired
swarm behaviour is that of convergence to the best decision, and we will investigate the effect of
malfunctioning robots with the potential to disrupt this desired behaviour by making decisions
on the basis of random beliefs.
One way of building fault tolerance into robot swarms is to enable individual robots to
detect faults in their neighbours so that they can compensate for them. This approach is
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referred to as exogenous fault detection [51]. For example, [9] propose an approach inspired
by the synchronised flashing behaviour of fireflies in which each robot flashes by lighting up its
on-board LEDs. Neighbouring robots then flash in synchrony unless they are malfunctioning.
The non-periodic flashing of faulty individuals can then be detected by other members of the
swarm. However, in the following we do not allow for exogenous fault detection and we assume
that individual robots have no way of distinguishing between neighbours which are functioning
correctly and those which are malfunctioning. Instead, robustness to the presence of faulty
individuals should be inherent to the distributed decision-making algorithm employed. In this
context we aim to study our model for distributed decision-making in large robot swarms and
examine its robustness to the presence of malfunctioning robots when compared with a modified
version of an existing two-valued approach: the weighted voter model [73].
In this chapter we deviate from a symmetric model for consensus, in which all agents involved
in the consensus process adopt a newly formed belief, to an asymmetric model, in which agents
are either in an updating state (and therefore update their beliefs), or in a signalling state, such
that they do not update their beliefs, but instead signal their beliefs to other agents. This differs
from the kind of subgroup consensus considered in earlier chapters in that while combinations
remain pairwise, unlike the serial nature of symmetric pairwise combinations, a large number
of combinations can occur in parallel due to the separation of the population into two discrete
subgroups of agents, where the agents are not synchronised in their states, such that a portion
of the population will be in the updating state, while the remainder will be in the signalling
state. This can potentially increase speed of convergence without having to be concerned with
the order in which agents combine beliefs.
Initially, we explore distributed decision-making in a multi-agent setting before applying this
to robotic systems; specifically swarm robotics. Inspired by biological systems, a large number of
robots are programmed with a set of simple updating and signalling rules, from which complex
behaviour emerges at the population level. Specifically, we address the best-of-n problem in
which a set of agents must choose between n alternatives where each choice differs in quality
and there exists a preferred, or correct, choice. We develop a three-valued model for distributed
decision-making based on the same consensus operator introduced in Chapter 2. Initially, we
study the n = 2 case of the best-of-n decision-problem for a range of parameter values and
compare our model directly to a Boolean model. Finally, we explore the robustness of both
models in this setting to a particular type of malfunction, before extending these models to the
n > 2 case.
4.1 Related work
There has been considerable interest in the ‘best-of-n’ decision problem in the literature [56, 65,
75] with a number of approaches heavily inspired by social-insects searching for potential nest
sites e.g. honey bees and Temnothorax ants [4, 38, 48, 49, 54, 58, 66]. In this decision problem
a population of individuals is concerned with identifying which is the best choice (e.g. nest site)
and the individuals receive feedback on their choices based on the quality of the n alternatives.
System convergence to the optimal choice is then driven by this feedback mechanism. For
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example, in [48] honey bees advertise their nest site of choice by dancing for a length of time
proportional to the quality of that nest site. As such, honey bees that choose the best site are
dancing for longer periods of time and in turn are recruiting more members of the swarm to
favour their chosen site. Those dancing for sites of lower quality are less effective at recruitment
and so support for these sites eventually declines.
There have been numerous studies applying the bio-inspired approaches to swarm robotics [2,
59, 71, 72] where small, affordable robots can be deployed in large numbers for carrying out
distributed tasks. Distributed decision-making on this scale tends to greatly improve redundancy
and robustness in such systems as faulty individuals are limited in their affects on the rest of
the system so long as the majority remain functional. The work presented in this chapter is
most closely related to the weighted voter model [73], itself an extension of the classic voter
model [11, 33]. Network science methods are commonly applied to voter models, to understand
the coupling between states of the agents and the dynamics of the network which connects
them [5, 34]. In contrast to this previous work our proposed model will be three-valued and
based on the consensus operator given in Chapter 2, Definition 2.5. For both the weighted
voter model and the proposed three-valued model, a population of agents attempts to reach
consensus about which is the best of n discrete choices by individuals sampling a portion of
the population that are signalling their preference for one of the n choices, before updating
their beliefs accordingly. In this setting, the voting is weighted by the number of individuals in
the sample signalling for each of the n different sites, while the feedback mechanism is directly
inspired by the same mechanism found in honey bee swarms [48, 65] where signalling times are
directly proportional to the quality associated with each choice. For the weighted voter model,
an agent randomly selects an agent that is signalling within its communication radius and adopts
that agent’s choice, before transitioning into the signalling state where it begins to signal for the
newly adopted choice. In the proposed three-valued model, however, agents instead combine
their beliefs for which choice they believe to be correct and, when an agent attempts to combine
with an agent which is signalling for a conflicting choice, a compromise is adopted according
to Definition 2.5. The intuition here is that an intermediate state prevents those signalling for
lower quality choices from affecting the population signalling in favour of high quality choices.
We see in [73] that the weighted voter model indeed has strong convergence properties, as we
confirm later in this chapter, and we directly compare this model with the proposed three-valued
model both in convergence speed and in accuracy of convergence, as well as the extent to which
each model is robust in the presence of malfunctioning agents in the population.
In recent robotics literature, a general overview of swarm robotics can be found in [3]. More
relevant to our focus, Valentini et al. [74] investigate the trade-off between convergence speed
and accuracy in the context of the majority rule as applied to a swarm of 100 Kilobots, while
in [60] the effects of spatiality are considered for a population of 150 Kilobots. Both studies
are conducted in the context of the best-of-n decision problem. Other related work on robot
swarms includes a honey bee nest-site inspired decision model implemented on Jasmine micro-
robots [38]. An extensive overview of research on the best-of-n problem can be found in [75].
Finally, [59] presents a general model of decentralised decision-making for the best-of-n problem.
Interestingly this also employs a third truth state representing ‘uncommitted’, and is perhaps
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inspired by the earlier work of Seeley et al [66] in which honey bees are observed to employ use
of a ‘stop signal’ in which they revert from a signalling state to an uncommitted state. The
updating model proposed, however, is inherently probabilistic with probabilities dependent on
quality values. This is in contrast to our approach in which updating is a purely logical operation
(as given in Table 4.1). Another significant difference concerns the case in which n > 2, for which
according to [59] an agent must be in one of n + 1 states; one for each choice and an overall
uncommitted state. However, in our approach there are 2n− 1 states which include the cases in
which certain choices are ruled out by the agent but where it is uncertain about the remaining
options.
4.2 Model
Overview. In this section we assume a best-of-n decision problem where n = 2 and associate
each choice with a discrete quality value. The aim is for a population of agents to be able
to reach a consensus (that is, to make a definitive decision) about which site is the best choice
compared to all other alternatives, and that this process of consensus formation be efficient both
in terms of time and accuracy. Where in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 and Section 3.4 of Chapter 3
agents received feedback on their beliefs in the form of biased selection taking account of payoff,
feedback now forms a more integral role in the decision-making process.
Unlike previous approaches to consensus discussed in this thesis, we divide the population
into two states: a signalling state; and an updating state. Consensus is therefore asymmetric with
only the agents in the updating state adopting a new belief. We also deviate from the previous
approaches in that the problem has only a single, correct choice, and so at a propositional level
it cannot be the case that both propositions ‘site A is the best site’ and ‘site B is the best site’
are true simultaneously. This is straightforward in our model for the n = 2 case, as it is similar
to the single propositional variable case of the model introduced in Chapter 2, however we later
consider cases for n > 2 in this chapter and highlight the difficulties that arise when extending
beyond the case where n = 2.
4.2.1 Best-of-n decision problem
In this section we describe the decision-making procedure at the individual level, where each
agent has the same state-transitioning behaviour, just as would individuals of an insect colony.
This is the fundamental property that makes systems such as these scalable to large populations
i.e. 1 000 or more individuals. Here we directly compare the three-valued model with the weighted
voter model for the n = 2 case. It may be helpful to think of the weighted voter model as a
Boolean version of the proposed three-valued model, where instead of applying the three-valued
updating operator (Table 4.1), an agent in the updating state will simply adopt a signalling





agent 1 12 0





0 12 0 0
Table 4.1: Truth table for the three-valued updating operator.
Three-valued voter model
For the n = 2 case, a population of agents must decide between two choices labelled A and B.
Each agent is then in one of three possible belief states: 0, meaning ‘B is the best choice’; 1,
meaning ‘A is the best choice’; or 12 meaning ‘I have no preference between A and B’, suggesting
that the difference between the two sites is indeterminate. Each choice is associated with a fixed
quality value in the form of a positive integer that agents receive as feedback once a choice has
been made. Agents receive the feedback ρA for choosing A and ρB for choosing B. Once a
decision is made, the agent begins to broadcast their current belief to all other agents within
communication range for a number of iterations based on the feedback they received. After
signalling their belief, the agent then transitions to an updating state in which they observe
the broadcasts of other agents before updating its belief by randomly selecting a signalling
agent within its radius of communication and applying the consensus operator in Definition 2.5.
The updating agent’s new belief is thus a function both of its current belief and that of the
selected signalling agent. The difference between the models in Chapters 2 and 3 and the
model we present here is that in this model only the updating agent adopts the new consensus
belief. It should be noted that, in order to maintain parity between the simulation and robotic
experiments, agents are asynchronous across the population with respect to their transitioning
between states.
As before, the underlying intuition behind the consensus operator (the truth-table for which
is shown in Table 4.1) is that the stronger belief dominates, as is the case where a belief of
1 (0) combines with a belief of 12 . Here, the stronger belief dominates the weaker belief with
the updating agent adopting 1 (0) as their belief. The exception to this is when there exists
a direct conflict between two beliefs, in which case the intermediate state of 12 is adopted to
form a compromise. It is through this method of compromise that agents are able to reach an
agreement with the intention that a consensus can begin to form in a population with initially
diverse and conflicting beliefs.
State transitions
In this model, there are 4 distinct states following the state transition diagram in Figure 4.1: a
signalling state, S, in which agents broadcast their current belief for a length of time directly
proportional to the feedback they received when they made their most recent choice; state U is





Figure 4.1: State transition diagram for the three-valued voter model, with states S (signalling), U
(updating), A and B (choose A and B respectively).
held belief and the belief of a randomly selected agent in the signalling state; and states A and
B corresponding to the agents choosing A and B respectively. Those agents in state A receive
the feedback ρA while those in state B receive ρB. Choices are made immediately after agents
update their beliefs and feedback is received thereafter, before agents transition back into the
signalling state.
Given the three-valued updating operator in Table 4.1, we can identify the probabilities for
choosing A and B, denoted by PA and PB respectively, based on the belief states of signalling
agents within communication range: Letting ∆i denote the proportion of other signalling agents
in an updating agent’s communication radius with belief state i, for i = 0, 12 or 1, the probabilities
that the agent will choose A or B after updating are given by
PA =

∆1 + ∆ 1
2




: current belief = 12 ,
1








: current belief = 12 ,
∆0 + ∆ 1
2
+ 12∆1 : current belief = 0.
It should be noted that we have not included any exploration state as modelled in [74]. We choose
instead to focus exclusively on the decision-making process that follows from the exploration
of the swarm, simplifying the model by providing immediate feedback when the agent has
updated their belief and chosen either A or B. From this abstraction, the absolute times
to convergence are considerably reduced, thus enabling multiple runs of both simulation and
embodied experiments. For example, a physical experiment on the Kilobot platform takes
roughly 4 minutes, dramatically less than the 90 minutes required for each experiment in [74].
This also increases the number of experiments that can be run in each charging cycle, enabling
us to deploy a swarm of 400 Kilobots for the experiments that follow.
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4.3 Kilobot swarms
Figure 4.2: A Kilobot robot with an LED light for signalling, an underside IR transceiver for commu-
nication and side-mounted motors for movement.
Here we use Kilobots as a robotic platform for studying swarm decision-making. These
are tri-pedal robots 33mm in diameter and 34mm tall, specifically designed to interact in large
collectives, or ‘swarms’ [62]. Each Kilobot is an independent unit possessing, amongst other
features, two motors providing left/right orientation and forward motion, an RGB LED indicator
for signalling to an observer (e.g. an overhead camera) and an infrared transceiver (see Figure
4.2). Kilobots have a communication range of approximately 10 cm, over which they can send
and receive messages of up to 9 bytes in length. However, the simulator allows for communication
radii exceeding this limit and we exploit this feature to explore a range of communication radii
r between 0 and 20 cm. Given that the number of Kilobots and the size of the arena are fixed, r
can serve as a proxy to allow us to vary the density of Kilobots involved in the updating process.
We consider this effect in Section 4.4 (Figure 4.8). Alternatively, by varying r we can also
study directly the robustness of the two algorithms to different constraints on communications
as might be relevant to different robotic platforms.
For both the simulation (Section 4.4) and embodied experiments (Section 4.6), a swarm of
400 Kilobots are deployed in a square 1.2m2 arena. Whilst in the signalling state S, Kilobots
move randomly1 by either turning left or right, moving forward, or remaining stationary, i.e. at
each time one of these 4 options is chosen with equal probability. At initialisation Kilobots are
distributed randomly across the arena but then, as a result of random motion, they may collide
and cluster together. Simulations are implemented according to the state transition diagram
shown in Figure 4.1.
As described in Section 4.2 the experiments only model the mixing and information sharing
part of the decision process, and the Kilobots do not visit specific physical locations or take
other actions on the basis of their current beliefs. Instead, feedback is received immediately on
the basis of their latest choice. While this is clearly a simplification, we believe that it still allows
us to explore properties of the decision-making algorithms thanks to the reduction in run-time
which allows us to repeat experiments multiple times.
1Due to the use of uncalibrated Kilobots, movement speed varies across the population.
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4.4 Simulation experiments
In this section we describe experiments in which the Kilobots are simulated in a virtual en-
vironment and interact at random, iteratively updating their beliefs using the rules described
in Section 4.2, in order to form a consensus about which is the best choice, A or B. Here we
assume that choice A is of higher quality than choice B with respective quality values ρA = 9
and ρB = 7. These values represent two choices which are of similar quality but where A is
slightly preferable to B.
4.4.1 Kilobot simulator
Figure 4.3: The Kilobot simulation environment used for all simulation experiments [35].
We employ a Kilobot simulation environment shown in Figure 4.3 which captures many of
the physical properties of a Kilobot swarm including motion, direction, collisions, and commu-
nication between robots. The simulator is built on the open-source Box2D physics engine2 and
also implements the same API3 as used on the actual robots which makes it easier to transfer
code from simulations to the real world. In effect, the simulator allows for the development of
a testing environment where you set the arena dimensions, swarm size, and where you may also
alter properties of the robots if desired. You can then run repeated experiments using the same
experimental setting each time. For example, in this section we explore communication radii
which far exceed the capabilities of the physical Kilobots, but we do so in order to study the
effect that an increased communication radius has on the convergence properties of the swarm.




where we can stream data from each Kilobot during the experiments to output files. We can
then analyse run-time performance of the models with much greater accuracy than we could
with the physical Kilobots given that LED indicators are the only straight-forward method of
data extraction; accomplished for large numbers via video processing.
The black Kilobots are in the updating state U . The red Kilobots are signalling for choice
B while the blue Kilobots are signalling for choice A. In this particular experiment we see
pockets of Kilobots that remain in favour of choice B despite the majority of the population
having shifted in favour of choice A. The green covering the majority of the arena indicates the
area in which signalling Kilobots are broadcasting (this effect is more apparent with Kilobots
at the edges of the arena where the circular range of communication can be seen more clearly).
4.4.2 Results
In this section we present results for both the weighted voter model [73] and the three-valued
model, comparing their convergence to consensus for different communication radii. Results are
averaged over 50 independent runs, each of which terminate after 1 000 iterations; we found this
to be a sufficient number of iterations for the system to reliably reach a steady state in which
a consensus is formed. We begin by considering consensus in swarms of stationary Kilobots
where robots are placed uniformly throughout the simulated arena. Here we aim to study the
effect of motion on the consensus dynamics of the swarm by comparing the resulting decisions
of stationary Kilobots with those undergoing random motion.
Stationary Kilobots
Figures 4.4a and 4.4b show the percentages of Kilobots in the signalling and updating states
after 1 000 iterations for a range of communication radii, for both the weighted voter and three-
valued models respectively. In this figure, the lines labelled A and B respectively refer to the
percentage of Kilobots who are currently in the signalling state having previously chosen A or
B prior to entering that state. For r < 4 cm we see that the population remains equally split
between choices A and B; this is due to a combination of the Kilobots being stationary during
the decision-making process and an insufficient communication radius that prevents Kilobots
from being able to send/receive messages from their initial positions. Without a sufficiently
large radius of communication, Kilobots in the updating state are therefore unable to receive
messages from those in the signalling state, and so no updating takes place. The resulting effect
is seen more clearly in Figure 4.5, where 0 messages are received by the population until the
communication radius is extended to 4 cm, at which point Kilobots begin receiving 2 messages on
average. It should therefore be expected that the initial positioning of stationary Kilobots would
affect results for different communication radii r, but that this might be avoided by introducing
random motion as in the following section.
For r ≥ 4 cm we see an immediate shift in convergence of the swarm as the population adapts
to the increase in communication. Although only 2 messages on average are being received by
Kilobots in the updating state, it is sufficient for the population to converge in favour of choice
A. For both the weighted voter model (Figure 4.4a) and the three valued model (Figure 4.4b)
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this corresponds to a partial consensus of more than 80% of Kilobots choosing to signal for
choice A and around 2% signalling for choice B, on average, with the remaining Kilobots in
the updating state. The extent of convergence continues to increase as r increases, reaching a
population-wide consensus in choice A on average for r ≥ 6 cm for both models.
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(a) Weighted voter model.































Figure 4.4: Percentage of stationary Kilobots signalling for choices A and B at steady state for different
communication radii r.
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Following the results for experiments where Kilobots remain stationary, we now study exper-
iments in which Kilobots perform a random walk through their environment. They do so by
selecting one of four states of motion: stationary; move forward; turn left; and turn right. Each
robot then selects one state uniformly at random from these four states at each iteration. As in
Figure 4.4, Figure 4.6 shows the percentages of Kilobots in the signalling and updating states
after 1 000 iterations for a range of communication radii, for both the weighted voter model
and the three-valued model. As before, the lines labelled A and B respectively refer to the
percentage of Kilobots who are currently in the signalling state having previously chosen A or
B prior to entering that state. For r ≥ 5 cm we see that a clear majority have chosen A for
both the weighted voter and the three-valued models.
A more direct way of measuring convergence is to evaluate the average belief state of the
Kilobots. In a population of k individuals we define the average belief state in a given iteration
as follows: Let Bi denote the belief state of agent i for that iteration, then;






This corresponds to a weighted average of 0 and 1 in the weighted voter model and of 0, 12
and 1 in the three-valued model. For the weighted model there is a direct relationship between
the average belief state and the percentage of the population choosing either A or B. This is
because an agent chooses A(B) if and only if their belief state is 1(0). For the three-valued
model, however, the relationship between these two measures is less direct since, while an agent
will definitely choose A when in belief state 1, they may also choose A (with probability 0.5)
when in the intermediate belief state 12 . Hence, on average we would expect the percentage of
agents choosing A to be proportional to the number of agents in belief state 1 plus 50% of the
number in belief state 12 .
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(a) Weighted voter model.































Figure 4.6: Percentage of Kilobots in motion signalling for choices A and B at steady state for different
communication radii r.
88



















Figure 4.7: Average belief states at steady state for different communication radii r.
The average belief states are shown in Figure 4.7 where for r ≥ 5 cm we can see that both
models result in almost all Kilobots adopting the belief state 1 after 1 000 iterations. More
precisely, for r = 10 cm the average belief states for the weighted voter model and the three-
valued model after 1 000 iterations are 1.00 and 0.99 respectively. It is interesting to note that
for the three-valued model the intermediate truth state is also totally abandoned, suggesting
that there is convergence to total certainty that A is the best choice. This convergence to non-
vague belief states reflects the kinds of convergence seen for the models studied in Chapters 2
and 3. The average number of messages per unit time received by each Kilobot in the updating
state as a function of communication radius is shown in Figure 4.8. Notice that for r = 5 cm
Kilobots receive just under 2 messages per unit time suggesting that both algorithms are robust
to a relatively low population density of Kilobots.
If we measure quality of convergence either by the percentage choosing A or by the average
belief state, then Figures 4.7 and 4.9 all suggest that convergence to A is slightly better for the
weighted voter model than for the three-valued model, although the difference is very small for
r ≥ 5 cm. Furthermore, speed of convergence also appears to be faster for the weighted voter
model. For example, Figure 4.9 shows the trajectory of average beliefs against iterations for
both models when the communication radius is 10 cm. In this case the weighted voter model
converges after about 200 iterations, while the three-valued model needs around 600 iterations
to converge.
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Figure 4.8: Average number of messages received by the Kilobots at steady state for different commu-
nication radii r.




















Figure 4.9: Average belief states against iterations for a communication radii r of 10 cm.
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4.5 Robustness experiments
We now use the simulation environment to investigate the robustness of both models to the pres-
ence of malfunctioning Kilobots amongst the population. We know that, typically, distributed
systems provide additional robustness in decision-making and similar decentralised processes
when compared with their centralised counterparts. However, distributed systems are still sub-
ject to several types of malfunction that can occur at the individual level and may propagate
throughout the population, so it is crucial that systems be robust to common types of malfunc-
tion. Given that we do not include exploration as part of the decision-making process, we choose
to model malfunction occurring in the signalling/updating states.
In the updated model, we assume that a certain percentage λ of the Kilobots malfunction
by selecting their beliefs at random. This allows us to simulate malfunction arising from either
a signalling error, where a malfunctioning Kilobot is unable to signal their belief correctly and
so appears to be signalling at random, or from an updating error, where a Kilobot incorrectly
updates their internal beliefs based upon the received messages from signalling Kilobots.




Figure 4.10: State transition diagram for malfunctioning Kilobots. R denotes randomize beliefs.
In the state transition diagram in Figure 4.10, R refers to a state in which the Kilobot
simply selects its new belief state at random by picking uniformly from {0, 1} in the case of
the weighted voter model and from {0, 12 , 1} for the three-valued model. Consequently, for both
models there is then a probability of 0.5 that they will choose either A or B and receive the
associated feedback value. As for functioning Kilobots, malfunctioning Kilobots then enter the
signalling state and remain there for time ρA or ρB depending on their latest choice. We have
adopted this particular model of malfunction as one which is likely to disrupt convergence to
the desired belief state, by broadcasting randomized belief states to functioning Kilobots when
the latter are updating their beliefs.
4.5.2 Results
Figure 4.11 shows the average belief states after 1 000 iterations for the weighted voter and
the three-valued model respectively, with different percentages of malfunctioning agents (i.e.
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Figure 4.11: Average belief states against malfunction rates λ for a communication radii r of 10 cm.
λ ∈ [0, 100]) for a communication radius of 10 cm. Here the belief states are averaged across
functioning Kilobots only4, as the population will never appear to fully converge while the
randomly-signalling, malfunctioning agents are included. From these figures it is apparent that
the three-valued model is more fault tolerant than the weighted voter model in that it achieves
average belief state values closer to 1 for each of the values of λ. For example, given a commu-
nication radius of 10 cm and assuming that 10% of the population is malfunctioning, then the
three-valued model converges to an average belief state of 0.99 in the highest-value choice while
the weighted voter model converges to an average belief state of 0.87. Indeed, even if 50% of the
population is malfunctioning then the three-valued model still converges to an average belief of
0.83 while the average belief of the weighted voter model drops to 0.67. This is most likely due
to the consensus operator providing a sort of ‘buffer’ between the two distinct choices (A and
B) via the intermediate state. In the weighted voter model, even when a large majority of the
population believes choice A to be the best, a malfunctioning agent can still cause another agent
to immediately signal for choice B, and in doing so, increase the likelihood of additional agents
switching to signal for choice B. In the three-valued model, however, if an agent is signalling
for choice A, then it would require that they pick an agent signalling for choice B twice in a row
before they also begin signalling for choice B. Of course, given the population’s preference for
choice A, it is more likely that an agent in the intermediate state will revert back to signalling
for choice A than for choice B. The third truth state therefore slows the transition between the
two choices enough that the malfunctioning agents do not affect the functioning population as
severely as in the weighted voter model.
4Except for the case where λ = 100%, in which results are averaged across all Kilobots due to the lack of any
functioning Kilobots present in the population.
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4.6 Kilobot experiments
Figure 4.12: 1.2 m2Arena used for experiments in which Kilobots interact while moving amongst one
another.
We now describe a series of experiments conducted on actual swarms of 400 Kilobots which
follow the same template as the simulation studies in section 4. Figure 4.12 shows the 1.2 m2
arena used. Note that it has a smooth and reflective surface so as to allow good communication
between Kilobots and to enable motion. During the experiments each Kilobot in the signalling
state displays a coloured light using its LED to indicate its most recent choice; blue for A and
red for B. A video was made of every experiment and analysed using standard image processing
algorithms (OpenCV) to identify the different coloured lights and to determine a time series of
the percentage of A and B choices made. Each experiment was run independently 10 times with
mean and percentiles (10% and 90%) then being determined. These are shown in Figures 4.13
and 4.14 with error bars indicating the 10th and 90th percentiles.
4.6.1 Experimental procedure
An overhead controller (OHC) was used to upload programs and initialisation instructions to
each Kilobot. This resulted in non-uniform starting times across the population, leading to
high variance in the results for the first 60 iterations. There are approximately 4 iterations per
second, so that an experiment conducted over 1 000 iterations lasts just over 4 minutes.
4.6.2 Results
Figure 4.13a shows the percentage of Kilobots signalling A or B as a function of time for the
weighted voter model. In this case we can see that the swarm converges on choice A after
approximately 240 iterations. In contrast, the three-valued model only fully converges to A
after 800 iterations as can be seen in Figure 4.13b. Hence, as is consistent with the simulation
studies we see that the weighted voter model significantly outperforms the three-valued model
in terms of speed of convergence. However, after 1 000 iterations the level of convergence is the
same for both models.
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We also conducted experiments to test how fault-tolerant the two models were to the pres-
ence of malfunctioning Kilobots in the population. Here we introduced faulty Kilobots which
malfunctioned according to the state transition diagram in Figure 4.10 and which made up
λ = 10% of the population. As in the simulation experiments, the Kilobots signalling for each
choice are recorded as a percentage of the functioning individuals only. Figure 4.14a shows
the percentage of functioning signalling Kilobots which have chosen A and B, as a function
of time, for the weighted voter model. After 1 000 iterations we see that 86.5% of the func-
tioning Kilobots have chosen A. In contrast, Figure 4.14b shows that the three-valued model
still maintains almost total convergence to A, notwithstanding the 10% of Kilobots that are
malfunctioning, with 99.7% of functioning Kilobots choosing A after 1 000 iterations. On the
other hand, Figure 4.14a shows that the weighted voter model achieves steady-state after about
120 iterations, while from Figure 4.14b we can see that the three-valued model requires around
700 iterations to achieve steady-state. Hence, as is consistent with the simulation experiments
in section 4, these results suggest that while the weighted voter model converges more quickly
than the three-valued model, the latter is much more fault tolerant than the former.
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(a) Weighted voter model.


























Figure 4.13: Percentage of Kilobots signalling for choices A and B against iterations for a communica-
tion radii r = 10 cm.
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(a) Weighted voter model.


























Figure 4.14: Percentage of Kilobots signalling for choices A and B against iterations for a communica-
tion radii r = 10 cm and malfunction rate λ = 10%.
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4.7 Best-of-n for n > 2
Much of the existing literature on the best-of-n problem for swarms concerns the n = 2 case,
and so far we have dealt exclusively with this case in the interest of making a direct comparison
between the weighted voter model and our three-valued approach. However, while we can
directly extend the weighted voter model to the n > 2 case, it is less immediately clear how best
to extend the three-valued model.
In this section, we therefore extend the weighted voter model and propose a possible extension
of the three-valued model to the n > 2 case, before presenting simulation experiments for the
n = 3 and n = 5 cases. We examine consensus formation for both models again with varying
communication radii r, as well as comparing the robustness of both models to the presence
of malfunctioning Kilobots. An important discussion then follows regarding the quality values
assigned to each choice for different values of n, and how these changes are reflected in the
performance of the models to reach a consensus.
4.7.1 Extending the three-valued model for n > 2
For the models presented in Chapters 2 and 3, we applied the consensus operator from Defini-
tion 2.5 to all of the propositional variables on which the pair of agents were trying to reach
consensus. In doing so, we assumed that the propositional variables were independent, such
that the truth value of one proposition did not affect the truth value of another. By definition
of the best-of-n problem, however, this assumption does not hold; there may only be one option
that is considered to be the ‘best’ choice, while the rest consequently must be considered to be
measurably worse than the best choice. For the n = 2 case we modelled the belief state of an
agent using a single variable, where a belief state of 0 represented ‘B is the best choice’ and 1
as ‘A is the best choice’, with the belief state of 12 meaning ‘I have no preference between A
and B’. As we extend the model to the n > 2 case, the use of a single belief state is no longer
plausible. Therefore, in order to apply the consensus operator to multiple belief states, we must
adopt a an alternative representation.
One natural approach is to define belief states as n-dimensional vectors in {0, 12 , 1}
n, so
that, for example, the belief state < 0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0, . . . , 0 > is interpreted as meaning that choices
2 and 3 are believed to be better than all the other choices, but that there is no preference
between them. The updating operator in Table 4.1 could then be applied independently to
each dimension of the relevant belief states. For example, updating < 0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0, . . . , 0 > given
the signalled state < 12 ,
1
2 , 0, . . . , 0 > results in the updating agent adopting the new state
< 0, 12 , 0, . . . , 0 >. However, the latter is a belief state in which, although the agent has ruled
out all except the second choice, they still remain uncertain that this is the best choice. In effect
they are not taking account of the fact that in the best-of-n problem the n choices are assumed
to be exhaustive. Our approach is then to incorporate a form of normalisation into the model
so that, for example, < 0, 12 , 0, . . . , 0 > is normalised to < 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0 >. Similarly, if there is
more than one choice with a belief state of 1, then those choices are normalised to 12 with all
others set to 0, e.g. < 1, 1, 12 , . . . ,
1




2 , 0, . . . , 0 >. An all-0 belief state
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Figure 4.15: Average belief states at steady state for different communication radii r with n = 3 and
δρ = 3.
< 0, . . . , 0 > is normalised to < 12 , . . . ,
1
2 >. More generally, the normalisation rules assume that
there can only be one choice believed to be the best choice i.e. with a belief state of 1, and that
to believe none of the choices are the best is to believe that all choices are borderline.
4.7.2 Results
Using this approach we now present results for the n = 3 and n = 5 cases using the simulation
environment. For n = 3 we assume that the choices are A, B and C with quality values ρA = 11,
ρB = 8, ρC = 5. Notice that compared to the n = 2 case we have increased the difference in
quality values between each choice to 3 rather than 2; we shall denote this quality interval by
δρ. We found that while the previous quality interval was sufficient for Kilobots to differentiate
between two choices effectively, for the n = 3 case, a δρ of 3 was required such that the Kilobots
were once again able to reach a consensus.
Figure 4.15 shows the average belief states for the highest-value choice for both the weighted
voter and three-valued models. For a communication radius r = 10 cm we see that both models
have effectively converged on the best choice, with an average belief value of 1.00 and 0.99 for the
weighted voter model and the three-valued model respectively. The performance of these two
models for the n = 3 case with δρ = 3 is very similar to the n = 2 case presented in Figure 4.7,
with the weighted voter model performing just the same, while the three-valued model requires
a slightly larger radius of communication to fully converge. In Figure 4.7 the three-valued model
averages a belief state of 0.99 for r > 6 cm, while in Figure 4.15 we see that it doesn’t quite
achieve the same level of consensus until r ≥ 10 cm. It is likely that matching performance
would be observed if the experiment runtime were to be extended beyond 1 000 iterations.
For the n = 5 case, we consider two quality assignments for the choices A, B, C, D and E.
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Figure 4.16 shows the average belief states for both models with quality values ρA = 25, ρB = 20,
ρC = 15, ρD = 10 and ρE = 5 for δρ = 5, and with quality values ρA = 33, ρB = 26, ρC = 19,
ρD = 12 and ρE = 5 for δρ = 7. In Figure 4.16a, we see that by matching the quality interval
to the number of choices such that δρ = n, the weighted voter model eventually converges the
highest-value choice averaging a belief state of 1.0 for a communication radii r ≥ 6 cm, while
the three-valued model averages a belief just above 0.9.
Preliminary results indicated that as the number of choices n increases, so too must the
quality interval δρ. As such, we ran the same experiments for the n = 5 case for δρ = 7 and
present the results in Figure 4.16b. Given a wider spread of quality values, it can be expected that
the Kilobots would more easily distinguish between choices considering the increased differences
in signalling time. This is because high quality choices are being signalled for by Kilobots for an
increased period of time compared to choices of lesser quality. However for δρ = 7 the weighted
voter model is unable to converge fully to an average belief state of 1.0 in the highest quality
choice, while the three-valued model performs noticeably poorer than for δρ = 5 across the
full range of communication radii r. As previously noted, this is likely to be the result of an
insufficient runtime for experiments which have been limited to 1 000 iterations for the purpose
of timely decision-making. Increasing the number of iterations beyond 1 000 would likely lead to
eventual convergence of both models for δρ = 7, but as δρ increases so does the required length
of the experiments due to the nature of the signalling periods forming the feedback mechanism
upon which the models rely in order to form consensus. The larger the values of δρ, the longer
the time required to reach a clear decision as increased signalling time will reduce the number of
consensus operations occurring in the population if the length of the experiment’s runtime is not
extended accordingly. This leads to further implications for both models in dealing with larger
numbers of n as we have seen so far that increasing n must be accompanied by a proportional
increase in δρ.
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(a) δρ = 5.



















(b) δρ = 7.
Figure 4.16: Average belief states at steady state for different communication radii r with n = 5 and
δρ ∈ {5, 7}.
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Figure 4.17: Average belief states against malfunction rates λ for a communication radii r of 10 cm
with n = 3 and δρ = 3.
Robustness
Figures 4.17 and 4.18 show the average belief values for both algorithms plotted against the
percentage of malfunctioning Kilobots λ ∈ [0, 100]. Overall, in all cases the three-valued model
is more robust to malfunction than the weighted voter model. Although, as can be seen in
Figure 4.18 the three-valued model performs worse for lower malfunction rates where λ ≤ 15%.
This may be a result of reduced overall convergence of the three-valued model as the number
of choices, n, increases. Further research is required in order to explore this effect more fully
and, in general, to provide a more extensive analysis of the n > 2 case. In particular, analysis
of the role that the quality interval δρ plays in the dynamics of consensus requires further work
as we believe that increasing the number of choices requires a similar increase in the difference
between the associated quality values. This would lead to undesirably long signalling times
and drastically slow the decision-making process; this may be catastrophic for time-sensitive
applications such as search and rescue operations. These results likely make the case that an
alternate feedback mechanism should be devised for the n > 100 case to avoid the signalling
state altogether, perhaps via exploitation of Kilobot memory or message buffer lengths, but this
requires additional research.
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(a) δρ = 5.





























(b) δρ = 7.
Figure 4.18: Average belief states at steady state against malfunction rates λ for a communication radii
r of 10 cm with n = 5 and δρ ∈ {5, 7}.
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4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have proposed a three-valued model for belief updating in the best-of-n
distributed decision-making problem, and compared it to the weighted voter model. We have
applied elements of our work from Chapters 2 and 3 on the consensus operators in multi-agent
systems to a robotic system both in simulation and practice. Experiments were conducted using
a realistic simulation environment, as well as on actual Kilobot swarms of 400 robots which pro-
vided an affordable distributed system in which group decisions can be made via a combination of
environmental sensing and communication between individuals. We have analysed each model’s
performance in respect to speed of convergence and have focussed primarily on robustness of
the swarm to individual malfunction or error as a measure of suitability of models to be applied
in a real-world setting. The results from both simulation and embodied experiments show that
the three-valued model is more robust to the presence of malfunction in the population than the
weighted voter model. However, we have seen that the weighted voter model has the advantage
of converging more quickly to the best choice, and we believe this speed of convergence is closely
linked with the lack of robustness shown by the weighted voter model. As the three-valued
model’s intermediate belief state slows convergence to a decision, an individual’s ability to make
accurate decisions may be less affected by malfunction given the ability to resample from the
population before becoming completely committed to an alternative choice.
We note that in both models, belief updating is based on the belief state of only one signalling
agent. This property may be advantageous in scenarios where there is either very limited
communication or low swarm density. Nonetheless, future work on robustness should consider
decision algorithms which take account of larger samples of belief states drawn from the signalling
agents within an individual’s radius of communication. This could include majority rule models
as studied in [74] and [75], as well as probabilistic pooling operators of the kind reviewed in [20].
One might hypothesise that by taking account of a larger sample of signalling agents, models
would tend to be more robust to noise, error and malfunction. However, this robustness still
needs to be considered in a broader context which also takes account of speed and overall
level of convergence. Typically, models for distributed consensus or decision-making focus on
systems of limited capabilities (e.g. communication or sensing) but it is clear that even low-cost
systems such as the Kilobots possess greater capabilities than are often accounted for, including
for the models discussed in this chapter where the assumption that Kilobots forget previous
choices (and associated qualities) is made. For example, on-board memory is often not taken
into consideration, and neither is communication bandwidth, and yet both of these aspects of
the systems could be fully exploited. It would be possible for robots to remember previous
choices and their respective qualities, and to disseminate additional information that would aid
in the decision-making process, particularly for the n > 2 case. Therefore another approach
to distributed decision-making for the best-of-n problem could involve the communication of
preferences between a subset of the n choices. This would be particularly helpful when n becomes
quite large (≥ 100 choices) as preferences between choices could be aggregated (exploiting the
memory available to each individual Kilobot) to discard choices which are rarely signalled for.
In our experiments we have investigated robustness to the presence of a particular type of
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malfunctioning agent, in which error results from a proportion of the population continually
selecting their beliefs at random rather than as part of the belief updating process. Clearly
there are other models of error which should also be studied. For example, we might consider
the errors resulting from some agents constantly broadcasting the same fixed beliefs or when
agents maliciously broadcast the ‘wrong’ belief. Furthermore, while we have focussed on the
case where there is a fixed proportion of malfunctioning or erroneous agents, and all other agents
are error-free, it is also important to consider noise resulting from generic errors or sensing and
processing limitations to which all agents are equally susceptible.
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CHAPTER 5
From Propositions to Compound
Sentences
In previous chapters we considered consensus in multi-agent and robotic systems, where the
underlying values were propositional variables intended to represent statements about the state
of the world. Adopting a third truth value then allows us to capture borderline cases inher-
ent to vague statements, e.g. ‘it is borderline raining/not raining’. It is clear, however, that
propositional variables are not sufficient to express the rich complexity of opinions and beliefs
about which agents may desire or need to reach consensus. Consider conditional beliefs such
as ‘if it is raining, then the ground will be wet and vision will be impaired’. These kinds of
beliefs are common in natural language since it identifies relationships between events and their
consequences. Hence, representing and reaching consensus about compound statements so as to
come to a shared position on causal relationships is central to decision-making. For example,
referring to the search and rescue application introduced in Section 1.2, it is imperative that the
operatives be able to draw conclusions about the accessibility of areas based on their perceived
state of the world. If the operatives know that it is raining in an area, then they will be able
to draw the conclusion that the area will be more dangerous to enter, perhaps due to visibility
issues or the increased likelihood of the ground being unstable. Similarly, the operatives may
wish to reach a consensus about whether the accessibility of area a1 implies that areas a2 and
a3 are also accessible, perhaps via area a1.
In this chapter we adapt the model for multi-agent consensus introduced in Chapter 2 to
accommodate truth assignments on the compound sentences of a propositional language. Unlike
in previous models, agents form consensus on the truth assignments at the sentence level, and
adopt a new underlying valuation which is consistent with this newly adopted truth assignment.
We then carry out simulation experiments and analyse some preliminary results, before propos-
ing an alternative model which seeks to address constraints and limitations of forming consensus
directly on the truth assignments on sentences, rather than on propositional variables.
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5.1 Related work
As discussed in earlier chapters, much of the opinion dynamics [18, 19, 31, 32, 69] literature is
primarily concerned with reaching a consensus about the value of a given variable, typically a real
number in [0, 1] or [−1, 1] and an agent’s belief corresponds to a real value, e.g. the probability
of an event. The primary focus of opinion dynamics is then on the way in which opinions change
and evolve over time in multi-agent systems. More specifically, the area is concerned with how
agents should update their own beliefs based on the beliefs of other agents in the system in order
to achieve certain macro-level properties such as convergence.
More recently we have seen studies of belief formation in multi-agent systems where beliefs
are defined on some propositional language. An extension of the Hegselmann-Krause model
presented in [61] transitions from representing agents’ beliefs numerically to formulating them
as theories in some finite propositional language. Belief revision games (BGRs) are introduced
in [64] in which agents update their beliefs in an iterative manner, incorporating the beliefs of
their peers at each iteration. In this model, different belief revision operators are then proposed
for merging groups of beliefs. Other studies of belief formation include [29] and [7, 8]. In
particular, [29] proposes a model of iterative belief formation and diffusion, where agents’ beliefs
are Boolean assignments on the variables of a propositional language and each agent determines
a network of influence in the form of a directed graph. Agents update their beliefs iteratively by
aggregating the beliefs of the other agents in their network of influence. Multiple aggregation
procedures are then investigated, including majority rule and distance-based belief merging.
Convergence is studied as a property of the networked structure adopted for a given population,
independent of the initial beliefs.
In the recent works of Cholvy [7, 8], a similar model of iterative belief diffusion is proposed
in which agents are influenced by a network of other agents, and beliefs of all such influencers
are aggregated and used to update the influenced agent’s beliefs. In this case beliefs are mod-
elled as Boolean propositional formulae and, according to Cholvy, may even express a level of
uncertainty i.e. for the formula (p1 ∨ p2) ∧ r the disjunction allows for an agent to express un-
certainty about which proposition of p1 or p2, if not both, is true. We are doubtful, however,
of whether this representation is really capable of capturing uncertainty. This work differs from
the models proposed here in several important ways. Firstly, agents’ beliefs are not represented
by propositional formulae; rather, they are represented by Kleene valuations on the underlying
propositions, which naturally lead to truth assignments on the sentences about which agents are
attempting to form consensus. These sentences are preselected for experiments so that we can
investigate the dynamics of the population in relation to the underlying Kleene valuations, as
different sentences are satisfied by a varying number of underlying Kleene valuations. Secondly,
beliefs are three-valued, rather than Boolean. Where other proposed models might rely on ma-
jority rule and other such aggregation procedures, we rely on exploiting this third truth value
to improve consensus formation between pairs of agents and, in the second proposed model,
to ease transitioning between conflicting states such that agents do not unnecessarily come to
adopt completely new beliefs which are inconsistent with their current beliefs. Thirdly, we do
not impose an arbitrary influence relation on agents such that their beliefs are more drastically
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ϕ
→ 1 12 0
θ







0 1 1 1
Table 5.1: Truth table for Kleene’s strong implication of θ → ϕ.
altered by those considered of greater influence, and less affected by others. We instead examine
consensus according to an inconsistency threshold to study the convergence of the population
when we limit the extent to which conflicting agents can combine beliefs, as well as when agent
interactions are unconstrained.
5.2 Model
Overview. We propose a model for consensus of compound sentences in which agents’ valu-
ations on the underlying propositions remain private. Instead, agents share the truth values
they believe most accurately reflect the true state of the world regarding a set of compound
sentences. Agents combine their truth values on a set of sentences Θ without revealing their
underlying valuations on the propositions. Each agent then selects the valuation in the set of
consensus valuations that is the most similar to their own. As a result, agents form consensus
directly on the sentence truth values, but not necessarily on the underlying valuations.
5.2.1 A combination operator for compound sentences
We consider a simple language L based on Kleene’s strong three-valued logic, with propositional
variables P = {p1, ..., pn} and connectives ¬, ∨, ∧ and →. Here we are referring explicitly
to Kleene’s strong implication, such that θ → ϕ ≡ ¬θ ∨ ϕ. Let SL denote the sentences
of L formed by recursive application of the logical connectives to the propositional variables
in the usual manner. A Kleene valuation is then the allocation of truth values 0 (false), 12
(borderline) and 1 (true) to the sentences of L as defined in Definition 2.1. The truth tables
for Kleene’s strong three-valued logic can be found in Tables 2.1 and 5.1. We reuse notation
from Chapter 2 to represent a Kleene valuation v by its associated orthopair [41], (P,N), where
P = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 1} and N = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 0}. Notice that P ∩ N = ∅ and that
(P ∪ N)c corresponds to the set of borderline propositional variables. We also use the same
consensus operator  from earlier chapters as defined in Table 2.4 for combining a pair of truth
values t1, t2 ∈ {0, 12 , 1}.
We now extend the consensus operator to vectors of truth values on the sentences of L.
Given a set of sentences Θ = {θ1, ..., θk} for Θ ⊆ SL, then a truth assignment on Θ is denoted
by ~t ∈ {0, 12 , 1}
k where the ith element of ~t is the truth value of θi for i = 1, ..., k. For a pair
of truth assignments ~t1,~t2 on Θ, we can then apply the consensus operator such that ~t1  ~t2 is
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given by
(t1,1, ..., t1,k) (t2,1, ..., t2,k) = (t1,1  t2,1, ..., t1,k  t2,k).
Also, let V be the set of all Kleene valuations on L. Then V~t = {v ∈ V : v(θi) = ti, i = 1, ..., k}
is the set of Kleene valuations consistent with the truth assignment ~t on Θ.
Given that consensus then takes place at the level of the truth assignments on the sentences
Θ, for each of which it is possible that multiple Kleene valuations v ∈ V produce the same
truth assignment on Θ, we propose that agents would then adopt the corresponding underlying
Kleene valuation that was the most similar to their currently held belief. To this end, we now
introduce a similarity measure on V.
Definition 5.1. A measure of similarity








Then, for a pair of agents with initial valuations v1, v2 and a consensus truth assignment
~t1~t2 adopted by both agents, v1 and v2 are replaced with new valuations v′1,v′2 ∈ V~t1~t2 given
by
v′1 = arg max {S(v1,v) : v ∈ V~t1~t2}
and
v′2 = arg max {S(v2,v) : v ∈ V~t1~t2}.
In this model, it is possible that V~t1~t2 = ∅, in which case there is no obvious resolution and so
we simply skip the current iteration so that the selected pair of agents do not form consensus.
We now introduce a measure of inconsistency quantifying direct conflict between two truth
assignments ~t1 and ~t2 as follows:
Definition 5.2. A measure of inconsistency
The degree of inconsistency between two truth assignments ~t1,~t2 on the set of sentences Θ =
{θ1, ..., θk} is the proportion of truth values in direct conflict between the two truth assignments,
expressed as a function I(~t1,~t2)→ [0, 1], and is given by
I(~t1,~t2) =
|{j ∈ {1, ..., k} : |t1,j − t2,j | = 1}|
k
.
We will employ this measure to study the resulting convergence properties of the model
under varying restrictions on the level of inconsistency between pairs of agents. If, for a pair
of agents, I(~t1,~t2) > γ for an inconsistency threshold γ ∈ [0, 1], then the consensus operator
is not applied and both agents retain their current beliefs. If, however, I(~t1,~t2) ≤ γ then the
108







































Figure 5.1: Number of agents with truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2}.
consensus operator is applied and both agents adopt the resulting truth assignment ~t1  ~t2 as
well as updating their underlying beliefs. Notice that an inconsistency threshold γ = 1 means
that every pair of agents chosen from the population will combine, given that by definition the
inconsistency measure cannot exceed 1. Conversely, an inconsistency threshold γ = 0 would
therefore allow only the most consistent pairs of agents to form consensus for I(~t1,~t2) ≤ γ. In
other words, only when the truth assignments on the sentences are either exactly the same, or
one of the truth assignments assigns a borderline truth value 12 while the other assigns either 1
or 0.
5.3 Simulation experiments for sentence-level consensus
We now illustrate this approach by running a number of simulation experiments in which agents
aim to reach consensus on a set of sentences Θ; these sentences have been chosen to highlight
interesting behaviours exhibited by the proposed models. We set a fixed limit of 1 0001 iterations
for each experiment, unless stated otherwise, and average results over 100 independent runs. Ini-
tial beliefs of agents are distributed uniformly at random across V; we realise that this naturally
generates a bias in favour of truth assignments with a greater number of associated valuations,
however we felt that the most natural approach to belief initialisation was to initialise agents’
internal beliefs, which consequently lead to truth assignments on the sentences.
While agents openly broadcast their truth assignments on Θ during the consensus process,
their valuations on the propositions remain private. Given the consensus set of valuations V~t1~t2 ,
agents adopt the most similar valuation to their currently held beliefs, with each agent remaining
unaware of which valuation v′ ∈ V~t1~t2 has been adopted by the other.
5.3.1 Simulation results for Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2}
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are histograms showing the number of agents with varying truth assignments
on the sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2}, and varying valuations on P = {p1, p2}, respectively,
at steady state plotted against inconsistency threshold γ. Results are averaged across the 100
1Preliminary experiments had shown this was more than sufficient to allow a population of 100 agents to reach
consensus.
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Figure 5.2: Number of agents with valuations on L for sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2}.




























Figure 5.3: Number of distinct truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2} against
iterations for an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.5.
independent runs, such that if all 100 agents have the truth assignment (1, 1) averaged across
all runs, then the population always converges on this truth assignment. From this, it is clear
from Figure 5.1 that the population does converge on a single truth assignment on Θ, with the
population forming consensus on the truth assignment (1, 1) for γ ≥ 0.5. However, Figure 5.2
provides a more detailed insight of the resulting consensus and from this we can see that, despite
having reached an agreement on Θ, on average the population has not in fact converged on a
single underlying valuation on the propositional variables. Instead, the majority of the popula-
tion are effectively split between the two most precise valuations (i.e. admitting no borderline
cases) on the propositional variables, and with a minority believing that p2 is borderline. Even
for an inconsistency threshold γ = 1.0 where all randomly selected pairs of agents combine to
form consensus, the population still fails to converge to a single valuation on the propositional
variables.
Figure 5.3 shows the number of distinct truth assignments on Θ as a trajectory plotted
against iterations for γ = 0.5, providing a more detailed picture of the system’s convergence.
From this we can see that the population converges to a single truth assignment on Θ after
just 600 iterations. There are three valuations consistent with the truth assignment (1, 1) and
every other possible truth assignment is associated with a set of Kleene valuations V~t with lower
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Figure 5.4: Number of distinct valuations on L against iterations for an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.5.
cardinality. Therefore we might consider if convergence at the sentence level corresponds to
convergence at the propositional level. In this regard, Figure 5.4 shows the number of distinct
valuations as a trajectory against iterations. From this, we can confirm that the population does
not converge to a single valuation, despite converging to a single truth assignment, and instead
converges to the three valuations in V(1,1). Hence, Figure 5.2 is indicative of the system-level
convergence at steady state for a typical run.
Given that consensus occurs at random, the primary factor we believe to be driving con-
vergence to these three valuations appears to be that the set V(1,1) is the set with maximal
cardinality for the chosen Θ. That is, we hypothesise that the model favours the truth assign-
ment ~t∗ such that
~t∗ = arg max{
∣∣ V~t ∣∣ : ~t ∈ {0, 12 , 1}k}.
where V~t∗ is the set with maximal cardinality, and therefore ~t∗ is the maximal truth assignment.
This effect is highlighted further for different sentences in Θ. More specifically, we suggest
that since beliefs are initialised by selecting a valuation v uniformly at random from the set of
all Kleene valuations V on L, there is an inherent bias in favour of truth assignments with a
greater number of corresponding valuations. Indeed this certainly appears to be the case for
convergence results from this example. However, preliminary studies where agents’ beliefs are
initially selected uniformly at random across the truth assignments, with valuations then being
assigned randomly from V~t, show that convergence to (1, 1) still occurs.
5.3.2 Simulation results for Θ = {p1 ∧ p2,¬p1 ∧ ¬p2}
We now present experimental results for Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∧ ¬p2}. Figure 5.5 shows the aver-
age number of agents with varying truth assignments on the sentences Θ plotted against the
inconsistency threshold γ. In these experiments, the population converges to the truth assign-
ment (0, 0) on Θ. V(0,0) contains two completely precise valuations represented by the orthopairs
({p1}, {p2}) and ({p2}, {p2}), and there is close to uniform division between these two valuations
at steady state for γ ≥ 0.5 (see Figure 5.8).
111







































Figure 5.5: Number of agents with truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2,¬p1 ∧ ¬p2}.















































































, ∅)∈ (1, 0)
Figure 5.6: Number of agents with valuations on L for sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2,¬p1 ∧ ¬p2}.
Interestingly, the truth assignments (0, 12) and (
1
2 , 0) are also each consistent with two valua-
tions on p1 and p2. For V(0, 1
2
), the associated valuations are (∅, {p}) and (∅, {q}), and for V( 1
2
,0)
they are ({p}, ∅) and ({q}, ∅). Note, however, that these valuations are more vague than either
of those in V(0,0). This is again consistent with the hypothesis that the population converges
to the most precise truth assignment ~t on Θ when there is more than one truth assignment
~t∗, where V~t∗ has maximal cardinality. In other words, when two or more sets have the same
cardinality, and that their cardinality is larger than the cardinality of any other set, then the
most precise truth assignment is favoured. This aligns with our expectations in relation to the
properties of the consensus operator for which precise truth values dominate borderline truth
values.
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Figure 5.7: Number of distinct truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2,¬p1 ∧ ¬p2} against
iterations for an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.5.

























Figure 5.8: Number of distinct Kleene valuations on L against iterations for an inconsistency threshold
γ = 0.5.
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Figure 5.9: Number of agents with truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2}.















































































, ∅)∈ (1, 1)
Figure 5.10: Number of agents with valuations on L for sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2}.
5.3.3 Simulation results for Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2}
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show similar results to those in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. For the sentences
Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2}, there are three possible truth assignments each consistent with two
underlying valuations on the propositional variables. These are (0, 12), (0, 1) and (
1
2 , 1). As in
Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, we see from Figure 5.9 that the population converges to the most precise
truth assignment, in this case corresponding to (0, 1). Furthermore, from Figure 5.10 we can see
that the population is then split evenly between two precise valuations which are consistent with
this assignment i.e. ({p1}, {p2}) and ({p2}, {p1}). Furthermore, Figures 5.11 and 5.12 display
similar convergence behaviour to that shown in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.
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Figure 5.11: Number of distinct truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2} against
iterations for an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.5.

























Figure 5.12: Number of distinct Kleene valuations on L against iterations for an inconsistency threshold
γ = 0.5.
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5.3.4 Simulation results for Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2,¬p1 → p2,¬p1 → ¬p2}
We now present results for a larger set of four sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2,¬p1 →
p2,¬p1 → ¬p2}. For simplicity, we omit the truth assignments figure shown in the previous
sections and focus instead on Figure 5.13 in which the number of agents at steady state with
varying valuations on p1 and p2 is given. Here, the resulting convergence behaviour is somewhat
different from previous sections. We must note here that due to the size of Θ in relation
to P, some issues arise as a direct result of the application of the consensus operator under
this model, which focuses on forming consensus between truth assignments on Θ as opposed
to valuations on the underlying propositions. When applying the consensus operator at the
propositional level, the resulting consensus valuation naturally corresponded with an overlying
truth assignment on the sentences in Θ, by Definition 2.1 as a valuation on any sentence θ in SL
is completely characterised by its values on P. In this model, however, we apply the consensus
operator directly on the truth assignments on Θ. For some sets of sentences, this can lead to
inconsistencies in the consensus process as we mentioned earlier in Section 5.2. Specifically, it
is possible that V~t1~t2 = ∅ and such inconsistencies become quite frequent under the current
model for the chosen Θ. As such, the current model must be adapted slightly.
Experiments are now run for 4 000 iterations, rather than 1 000, due to the increased conver-
gence time. This is due to the inconsistent consensus between pairs of agents whose resulting
consensus set V~t1~t2 = ∅. For example, there are two valid truth assignments, (0, 1, 1, 1) and
(1, 1, 1, 0) which, when combined via the consensus operator (see Definition 2.5), produce the
truth assignment (12 , 1, 1,
1
2) which has no corresponding valuation on the propositions. This
kind of combination is invalid under the set of sentences in Θ and leads to an inconsistent com-
bination of beliefs between agents. In such a case, we opt to not apply the consensus operator
for the chosen pair of agents and continue on to the next iteration in the simulation. Therefore,
we need to increase the number of iterations and, as a result, the number of times agents are
selected at random to form consensus. In the previous experiments, there also exist truth as-
signments without corresponding valuations, but such invalid truth assignments could not result
from the application of the consensus operator because of the types of sentences in Θ. It would
seem that both the size of Θ and the kinds of sentences θ ∈ Θ determine the ability to apply the
consensus operator at the sentence level; directly on pairs of truth assignments. We present an
alternative model in Section 5.4 which addresses this issue while providing a reasonably intuitive
approach to consensus at the valuation level.
Unlike in the experiments described in the previous sections, all truth assignments for these
experiments correspond to a single valuation only; a motivating factor when choosing Θ to
further study our model. That is, |V~t| = 1 for Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2,¬p1 → p2,¬p1 →
¬p2} and any ~t. In Figure 5.13 we observe quite different convergence behaviour compared
to Θ = {p1 → p2 and p1 → ¬p2}. There is no longer a dominant truth assignment with a
majority of corresponding valuations. In fact, simply from Figure 5.13 it is not clear that the
population converges to any kind of consensus. However, we can clarify the situation by looking
at Figures 5.14 and 5.15, which show trajectories for the number of distinct truth assignments
and valuations, respectively. Here we see that there is clearly convergence in the population, but
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Figure 5.13: Number of agents with valuations on L for sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2,¬p1 →
p2,¬p1 → ¬p2}.




























Figure 5.14: Number of distinct truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2,¬p1 →
p2,¬p1 → ¬p2} against iterations for an inconsistency threshold γ = 0.5.
it remains split between two truth assignments and, similarly, between two underlying valuations.
The four dominant truth assignments are naturally the most precise, just as we have seen in
all previous experiments, and their corresponding valuations are equally precise in line with our
expectations. In light of our earlier comments, we suggest that a possible explanation for why
the population is converging to two distinct truth assignments, rather than a single assignment,
is as follows. Given the inconsistent combinations that can result from applying the consensus
operator at the sentence level (i.e. when V~t1~t2 = ∅), it is likely that skipping the consensus
of these kinds of pairs is resulting in a split population without the possibility to merge these
minority groups of agents. This can happen with the previous example, where agents with
an associated truth assignment of (0, 1, 1, 1) attempt to form consensus with agents with an





These two truth assignments are associated with two of the four total precise valuations on p1
and p2, namely ({p1}, {p2}) ∈ V(0,1,1,1) and ({p1}, {p2}) ∈ V(1,1,1,0). Similarly, the combination































Figure 5.15: Number of distinct Kleene valuations on L against iterations for an inconsistency threshold
γ = 0.5.
5.3.5 Summary
It appears, from these preliminary results, that forming consensus at the sentence level by
applying the consensus operator to the truth assignments on Θ produces fairly intuitive results
for a reduced set of simple sentences. For the example sentences Θ where |Θ| = 2 we see that
our approach results in consensus at the sentence level, but that it may not result in consensus
at the level of the valuations. We also saw that when |Θ| > |P| (for the set of sentences Θ
studied here), there are an increased number of possible consensus combinations which lead to
an inconsistent truth assignment such that V~t1~t2 = ∅.
Perhaps more significantly, it is evident that the relative cardinality of V~t (e.g.
∣∣V~t∣∣), for
different truth assignments ~t on Θ, has an impact on the convergence of the system. Specifically,
we hypothesised that the population tends to converge to the truth assignment ~t∗ such that
the corresponding set of valuations has maximal cardinality, denoted by V~t∗ in Section 5.3.1.
Furthermore, there tends to be convergence to the most precise truth assignments at both the
sentence and valuation levels; particularly when there is more than one truth assignment ~t∗ on
Θ.
5.4 A consistent sentence-level consensus model for compound
sentences
In Section 5.2 we considered a scenario in which agents communicated their truth assignments on
the sentences of Θ while keeping their chosen underlying valuations private from one another.
The idea is that this reflects a system in which agents are intent on forming consensus on
certain compound sentences but are not principally concerned with forming consensus on their
underlying beliefs (the valuations assigning truth values to the propositional variables). In this
context, we proposed a consensus model in which pairs of agents initially applied the consensus
operator to the truth assignments of the compound sentences to generate a new agreed truth
assignment. The two agents then adopted the valuation on the propositional variables which
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was consistent with the new truth assignment but which was most similar to their previous
beliefs; that is, most similar to their own previously held beliefs such that the two agents may
not have adopted the same valuation as a result. The intuition here is that the two agents aim
to make the minimal changes to their beliefs in order to reach consensus on the sentences that
are important to them.
However, there is an alternative approach which, while also adopting the paradigm of minimal
belief change, applies the consensus operator directly to valuations on propositional variables.
More specifically, this second sentence-level consensus model would work as follows. The two
agents broadcast their respective truth assignments on Θ; ~t1 and ~t2. Agent 1 then considers all
valuations consistent with ~t2, i.e. V~t2 , and similarly agent 2 considers all valuations consistent
with ~t1, i.e. V~t1 . Each agent then identifies the valuation most similar to their current beliefs but
which is consistent with the other’s truth assignment. They then apply the consensus operator
to their current valuation and this ‘most similar’ valuation. More formally, agent 1 identifies
v′1 = arg max {S(v1,v) : v ∈ V~t2}
and then adopts the new valuation v1  v′1. Similarly, agent 2 identifies
v′2 = arg max {S(v2,v) : v ∈ V~t1}
and then adopts the new valuation v2  v′2. Note that there is no reason in general that, when
~t1 6= ~t2, v1v′1 and v2v′2 should correspond to the same valuation and furthermore, that they
should generate the same truth assignment on Θ. In other words, at the agent-level this approach
does not force a consensus. This is in contrast to the approach discussed in Section 5.2. In the
following sections, however, we present a number of simulation experiments suggesting that this
second approach results in the population nonetheless converging to consensus regarding the
truth values of the sentences in Θ.
5.5 Simulation experiments for the consistent sentence-level con-
sensus model
We use the same experimental set-up as in Section 5.3. That is, for a population of 100 agents we
iteratively apply the process described in Section 5.4 for a total of 1 000 iterations, unless stated
otherwise. We continue to adopt the bounded rationality requirement that the chosen pair of
agents are sufficiently consistent according to an inconsistency threshold γ ∈ [0, 1]. Results are
averaged over 100 independent runs.
5.5.1 Simulation results for Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2}
Figures 5.16 and 5.17 show the average number of agents with truth assignments on the sentences
in Θ and the average number of agents with valuations on the propositions p1 and p2, respectively.
Both figures show results at steady state for different inconsistency thresholds γ after 3 000
iterations. We immediately notice that in contrast to the first model there is no longer clear
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Figure 5.16: Number of agents with truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2}.



















































































Figure 5.17: Number of agents with valuations on L for sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2}.
convergence to a single truth assignment, as seen in Figure 5.16. We do, however, see over 80%
of the population adopting the same truth assignment at steady state for γ ≥ 0.5. Figure 5.17
also suggests much stronger convergence at the valuation level in comparison to the results of
the first model shown in Section 5.3.1.
To further study the convergence of this new model, we now study trajectory results for
γ = 1.0 in order to gain a complete picture of the convergence properties of the current model,
for the case where all randomly selected pairs of agents combine their beliefs. Figure 5.18 shows
the average number of distinct truth assignments on Θ against iterations. In this new model, we
can see that on average the population converges to 1.35 distinct truth assignments at steady
state. This suggests that, while a majority of the time the population converges to a single
truth assignment on Θ, there are others in which this is not the case. This is also true for
extended tests in which we ran experiments beyond the 3 000 iterations shown here. Similarly,
in Figure 5.19 the population converges to an average of 1.35 distinct valuations at steady state.
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Figure 5.18: Number of distinct truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2} against
iterations for an inconsistency threshold γ = 1.0.

























Figure 5.19: Number of distinct Kleene valuations on L against iterations for an inconsistency threshold
γ = 1.0.
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Figure 5.20: Number of agents with truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2,¬p1 ∧ ¬p2}.















































































, ∅)∈ (1, 0)
Figure 5.21: Number of agents with valuations on L for sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2,¬p1 ∧ ¬p2}.
5.5.2 Simulation results for Θ = {p1 ∧ p2,¬p1 ∧ ¬p2}
For the sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2,¬p1 ∧ ¬p2} in Θ we see that Figures 5.20 and 5.21 differ very
little under the new model, when compared with the results presented in Section 5.3.2. This
is perhaps less surprising than for the previous set of sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2}
for which the majority of the population converged to a completely different truth assignment
when compared with the previous model. Figure 5.20 shows the population converging to the
same truth assignment (0, 0) as seen in Figure 5.5. Indeed even for γ < 0.5 the system exhibits
almost identical convergence behaviour, favouring (0, 0) with small minorities adopting either
of the truth assignments (0, 1) or (1, 0). When we look specifically at Figure 5.21 showing
the average number of agents with valuations on p1 and p2, we see that for this set Θ, the
population continues to converge on the truth assignment with the largest set of corresponding
valuations i.e. that
∣∣V(0,0)∣∣ is maximal amongst the precise truth assignments and, therefore,
contains precise valuations for v ∈ V(0,0).
To identify whether the population does in fact reach a consensus on a single underlying val-
uation, and is simply ambivalent about either of the valuations v ∈ V(0,0), or whether the system
remains split between both valuations, we examine the system’s convergence more deeply in Fig-
ures 5.22 and 5.23. Specifically, in Figure 5.22 we see the number of distinct truth assignments
on the sentences, on average, as a trajectory against iterations and for γ = 1.0. The system
converges fully after just under 700 iterations, reaching a consensus about the truth assignment
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Figure 5.22: Number of distinct truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2,¬p1 ∧ ¬p2} against
iterations for an inconsistency threshold γ = 1.0.

























Figure 5.23: Number of distinct Kleene valuations on L against iterations for an inconsistency threshold
γ = 1.0.
(0, 0). In Figure 5.23, however, we can see that the system fails to form consensus at the valua-
tion level, instead forming a split convergence on ({p1}, {p2}) and ({p2}, {p2}) with near-equal
likelihood. This confirms that, under the new model, convergence for this set of sentences Θ is
unchanged. Moreover it appears that convergence occurs in roughly the same amount of time
for both models. This was certainly not the case for the previous set of sentences Θ. As such,
we now turn our attention to a new set of sentences and assess whether convergence under this
new model exhibits similar convergence properties as observed under the previous model.
5.5.3 Simulation results for Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2}
In Figures 5.24 and 5.25 we see the average number of agents with associated truth assignments
and valuations, respectively, at steady state. As for the previous set of sentences, with Θ =
{p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2} we see that the new model does perform almost identically under this new
model as it did using the initial model introduced. Despite a change in application of the
consensus operator, combining valuations rather than truth assignments, it would appear that
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Figure 5.24: Number of agents with truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2}.















































































, ∅)∈ (1, 1)
Figure 5.25: Number of agents with valuations on L for sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2}.
certain sets of sentences Θ behave very similarly under both models, while other sentences in Θ
behave quite differently. In Figure 5.24 we see complete convergence to a single truth assignment
(0, 1) for γ ≥ 0.5 just as was shown in Figure 5.9 from Section 5.3.3. For Figure 5.25 showing the
number of agents with associated valuations as their beliefs, we again see that there is an equal
split in the population at steady state between the two precise valuations associated with the
truth assignment (0, 1), those being ({p1}, {p2}) and ({p2}, {p2}). So it would seem that there is
still an inherent bias in the population to gravitate towards the more precise truth assignment
corresponding to the maximal set, where
∣∣V(0,1)∣∣ = 2 is maximal set, while |V0,0| = |V1,1| = 1
and |V1,0| = 0.
The trajectories of these experiments for γ = 1.0 are presented in Figures 5.26 and 5.27,
showing the number of distinct truth assignments on Θ and distinct valuations on p1 and p2,
respectively. When looking at these results, it is again clear that convergence to steady state
occurs in under 700 iterations, slightly faster than under the initial model shown in figure 5.11.
The population is quick to converge on the truth assignment (0, 1) and both valuations with
equal likelihood. Consensus at the sentence level is therefore achieved, but not at the underlying
propositional level.
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Figure 5.26: Number of distinct truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∨ p2} against
iterations for an inconsistency threshold γ = 1.0.

























Figure 5.27: Number of distinct Kleene valuations on L against iterations for an inconsistency threshold
γ = 1.0.
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)∈ (1, 1, 1, 0)
Figure 5.28: Number of agents with valuations on L for sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2,¬p1 →
p2,¬p1 → ¬p2}.




























Figure 5.29: Number of distinct truth assignments on the sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2,¬p1 →
p2,¬p1 → ¬p2} against iterations for an inconsistency threshold γ = 1.0.
5.5.4 Simulation results for Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2,¬p1 → p2,¬p1 → ¬p2}
Under the previous two sets of sentences Θ, both the first model and the new model behaved
almost identically. However, for the initial set of sentences Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2} this was
not the case. Therefore, as in Section 5.3, we now consider Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2, ¬p1 → p2,
¬p1 → ¬p2}. As with the initial model’s results, we consider only the valuation results at steady
state given that the number of truth assignment combinations far exceeds our ability to present
useful results in a similar format. For the purpose of highlighting the model’s convergence under
this set of sentences Θ, however, Figure 5.28 is more than sufficient. These experiments are
extended to run for 2 000 iterations.
We see that the new model exhibits much stronger convergence than previously seen under
the initial model. There were 4 valuations remaining at steady state across all values of γ under
the initial model in Figure 5.13, and furthermore the population always converged to a single
valuation with equal likelihood across all 4 precise valuations. While under this new model,
however, we see that as γ increases, the population increasingly favours just two valuations
above the other remaining valuations in the population. These are ({p1}, {p2}) and ({p2}, {p2}),
the same valuations converged to for the previous two sets of sentences. This was perhaps not
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Figure 5.30: Number of distinct Kleene valuations on L against iterations for an inconsistency threshold
γ = 1.0.
too surprising for the two previous sets as Θ, because these two valuations also reflected the
maximal sets of truth assignments for which both the truth assignments and their corresponding
valuations were precise (i.e. non-vague). The more surprising aspect of this model’s convergence,
then, is that these valuations are the most dissimilar from one another if one applies the similarity
measure of Definition 5.1 to them. The precise valuations corresponding to equally precise
truth assignments, that are no longer present in the final consensus of the population, include
({p1, p2}, ∅) and (∅, {p1, p2}) corresponding to the truth assignments (1, 0, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 0, 1),
respectively. Both are equally as precise at both the sentence and valuation levels, yet under
this new model of belief updating, are rarely present at steady state.
In Figures 5.29 and 5.30 we can see this more clearly, where it is observed that, for an incon-
sistency threshold γ = 1.0, the number of distinct Kleene valuations present in the population
decreases to just above 1 after approximately 1600 iterations. This suggests that for a large
majority of runs the population does converge to a single valuation, achieving consensus, and
that for these runs the resulting valuation is in the set {({p1}, {p2}), ({p2}, {p2})} with a slight
preference for ({p2}, {p2}). In a small number of runs, the model fails to fully converge to a
single valuation and therefore a single truth assignment. This is true for experiments running
for 4 000 iterations, where no further convergence to a single truth assignment nor valuation
occurs.
5.6 Conclusions
Through simulation studies, we have highlighted several important properties of the proposed
model of multi-agent consensus for compound sentences and how it differs from previous models
of consensus restricted to propositional variables i.e. that convergence is not guaranteed for
all sets of sentences Θ. In particular, we see that convergence at the sentence level does not
guarantee convergence at the propositional level. We also note that convergence appears to
favour the maximal set of valuations corresponding to a truth assignment that is precise at
the sentence level, and that when no majority exists amongst precise truth assignments the
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population converges seemingly at random. We have also highlighted potential inconsistencies
that can occur as a result of forming consensus as the sentence level, directly on the truth
assignments on a set of sentences Θ, and have therefore proposed an alternative model that
seeks to address this, while behaving in a similar manner as before, under the assumption that
underlying valuations are not publicly shared amongst agents
Our initial model in Section 5.2 proved to be initially promising by showing strong conver-
gence at the sentence level, achieving consensus on a single truth assignment in three of the four
experiments studied. We also felt that this would be the most intuitive, broadly speaking, for
a system in which agents are concerned with forming consensus at the sentence level and not
necessarily concerned with forming consensus on the propositions. However, due to the issues
highlighted for more complex sets of compound sentences, where truth assignment combinations
can lead to inconsistencies, it is clear that this form of consensus will not scale well with the
number of sentences, nor with the increase in complexity of sentences.
In Section 5.4 we introduced a more familiar model of consensus where the consensus operator
is applied to the underlying valuations. Inconsistencies arising in the initial model provided
sufficient justification to approach consensus in a similar manner as in Section 4. We referred to
this model as belief updating, distinguishing this asymmetric process of updating agents’ beliefs
from that of symmetric consensus formation between pairs of agents, where both agents adopt
the same consensus valuation. Under this new model, some experiments performed similarly
in terms of convergence; both at the sentence level and at the propositional level. For other
experiments, convergence was much improved over the initial model. In particular, for sentences
Θ = {p1 → p2, p1 → ¬p2, ¬p1 → p2, ¬p1 → ¬p2} we saw convergence to a smaller subset of truth
assignments, with the population forming consensus on a single truth assignment and valuation
for the majority of the runs, while sometimes remaining split between two truth assignments in
others.
Further analysis of the belief updating model is required, including studying the model with
increased numbers of propositional variables and sentences to determine what kind of consensus,
if any, is achieved. However, we believe that this model presents a promising basis for consensus
of compound sentences and, given previous extensions of the consensus operator, we believe that
it may be possible to combine it with a probabilistic model of uncertainty to allow agents to
express both vagueness and uncertainty in their beliefs. In comparison to the related work of
Cholvy [7, 8], we believe that by allowing agents to combine at random and limiting interactions
only by their relative inconsistency, we avoid a seemingly arbitrary preference ordering being
assigned to the population for each agent. We also favour pairwise interactions in allowing beliefs
to change more naturally over time, as we feel this is more intuitive as opposed to attempting





Reaching a consensus is often a precursor to distributed decision-making and is therefore an
important aspect of multi-agent systems. In this thesis, we have argued that a natural route to
consensus is to exploit vagueness in propositions by adopting a more vague interpretation of the
underlying concepts about which two (or more) agents disagree. To this end, we have introduced
a third (intermediate) truth state to enable an agreement between agents with opposing or
conflicting opinions which, for Boolean propositions, would be inconsistent. We have then
studied this model in both a multi-agent and a swarm robotics setting, and we have tried to
highlight both the strengths and the limitations of this approach in the context of distributed
decision-making.
In Chapter 2 we developed a three-valued model of consensus in a multi-agent setting, where
a large population of agents sought to reach an agreement about a shared set of relevant propo-
sitions. By iteratively applying a pairwise consensus operator, we showed that the population of
agents reached consensus on a single, shared opinion which was completely precise (i.e. admit-
ting no borderline cases). We also introduced the notion of payoff in which during the consensus
process, agent selection would be biased in favour of those agents whose opinions more accu-
rately reflected the ‘true’ state of the world. In this case, the population converged to a more
accurate opinion when compared with a Boolean version of our consensus model. An emer-
gent property resulting from adopting a third truth value was that robustness to the presence
of malfunctioning agents was improved when compared with a Boolean model, as detailed in
Chapter 4.
As well as agents holding vague opinions, we have argued that agents also need to be able to
express uncertainty about the underlying state of the world. In Chapter 3 we have extended the
model from Chapter 2 so as to take account of epistemic uncertainty. In simulation experiments
we showed that the population converged to a belief that was completely certain, as well as
precise. Using this model, we explored how the process of consensus formation improved evidence
dissemination in a multi-agent setting. We compared a model in which agents randomly received
direct evidence at a given rate, and contrasted this evidence-only approach with a combination
of the same evidence rate with random pairwise consensus. The results confirmed that the
combination of consensus formation and evidential updating outperformed the evidence-only
129
model.
In Chapter 4 we applied the three-valued approach to consensus of Chapter 2 to distributed
decision-making in swarm robotics, specifically for a swarm of 400 Kilobot robots. We adapted
our three-valued model and applied it to the ‘best-of-n’ problem; a decision problem in which
agents must reach an agreement about which is the best of n possible choices. Here, rather than
pairwise consensus, agents were split between signalling and updating states, which allowed for
multiple agents to update their beliefs per iteration. In this context, we compared our approach
to the weighted voter model [73], a Boolean model of asymmetric belief-updating also studied
for Kilobot swarms [74], and conducted both simulation and physical experiments for both.
We demonstrated that the three-valued model converged with similarly high accuracy as the
weighted voter model and, although it was slower to reach a consensus, it proved to be more
robust to the presence of malfunctioning agents.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we argued that consensus is not always required at the level of the
propositional variables in the language. Instead, agents may need to reach an agreement about
a set of compound sentences e.g. the antecedents of a set of decision-rules, which are central to
decision-making. We show that it is possible to extend the three-valued approach to compound
sentences and to reach a consensus at the level of the sentences while not necessarily forcing
agents to reach an agreement at the level of the underlying propositional variables.
The research in this thesis has suggested a number of avenues of future research. We now
summarise several of these in no particular order.
We proposed a three-valued model for group consensus in Chapter 2 in an attempt to speed
up consensus formation in large agent populations. From these results, it is clear that the
iterative pairwise combinations of the group’s opinions, while natural, is a relatively ad hoc
extension of a model ideally suited to pairwise combinations. The resulting model led to greatly
improved convergence speeds, but the accuracy of the model suffered as a consequence. The
pairwise model, while accurate, is much slower to converge. It would therefore be interesting to
try to identify a group-wide consensus operator which leads to increased speeds of convergence
without affecting the overall accuracy of the model. In Chapter 4 we considered an asymmetric
model of belief-updating in which, for a pair of interacting agents, only one agent adopts a new
opinion. While this model also led to faster convergence for large agent populations, and showed
great accuracy in the context of the ‘best-of-n’ problem, the agents cannot be said to be forming
‘consensus’, as only one of the agents alters their opinion. Nevertheless, the work of this chapter
may inspire alternative models for increasing the speed of consensus while maintaining a high
level of accuracy.
In this thesis, consensus has been defined as convergence to a single, shared belief state.
However, there are scenarios in which total unanimity may not be desirable. For example,
in an environmental disaster it may be necessary for a swarm of robots to make a collective
decision about which source of pollution they should prioritise for treatment. Alternatively, the
swarm may need to identify multiple sources and divide themselves into smaller groups so that
each group can be allocated to a source of pollution. These two scenarios were categorised by
Brambilla et al. [3] as consensus achievement and task allocation, respectively. However, we
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would argue that both scenarios require the robots to reach a consensus regarding the state of
the world they inhabit, and then involve making collective decisions based upon this consensus.
Therefore, it would be interesting to see the development of an alternative consensus operator,
which would enable the swarm to form a proportional consensus where the sizes of the minority
groups are proportional to the desirability of each outcome or choice.
While consensus is important when making distributed decisions, the resulting consensus is
often unalterable once achieved. For example, the introduction of a minority group of agents
would be unsuccessful in disseminating potentially relevant, more up-to-date information to the
swarm as the majority group would simply overwhelm the minority group. Furthermore, the
environment is often changing as a consequence of the agents’ actions and also due to external
factors. Consequently, it would be interesting to develop models that either reach only partial
consensus, allowing agents to adapt to an influx of new opinions, or models of consensus which
allow agents to ‘forget’ or to revert back to a more uncertain or unbiased state in which they
are able to incorporate new information, received either from other agents or directly from their
environment. Indeed, it may be necessary to separate different levels of evidence, such that
direct evidence, perhaps received via sensory modalities from the environment, has a higher
weighting than indirect evidence received from other agents.
From the work described in Chapter 4, it is clear that much of the literature concerning the
best-of-n problem is concerned primarily with the n = 2 case. From our preliminary work on
extending both the weighted voter model and the three-valued model, it became apparent that
scaling the models to larger values of n is potentially problematic. We have highlighted how
increasing the size of n seems to require a similar increase in the variation of quality values, to
enable the population to continue to select the best choice. Clearly, then, as n increases, so too
must the time agents spend in the signalling state. This will lead to much slower convergence
times which, depending on the intended applications of the swarm, may be detrimental to their
performance. We would therefore like to suggest further work which considers scaling these
consensus algorithms to larger values of n, and perhaps proposals for alternative methods for
consensus. A potential solution is to adopt beliefs in the form of preferences, in place of single-
choice beliefs. Agents would then be able to communicate more information in the form of
an incomplete (total/partial) ordering on the n choices, or possibly a subset of the n choices.
Rather than requiring discrete quality values for each choice, agents would be able to infer choice
qualities relative to their position in the orderings, and this could therefore avoid the need for
varying signalling durations entirely. Of course, the new consensus operator would need to be
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